Wife Living in Adultery Can Be Denied Interim Maintenance Under Section 125(4) CrPC Supreme Court Clarifies Law in Himanshu Chordia v. State of Rajasthan (2026)

EduLaw EditorialLandmark Judgements2026-08-02

Can a husband be forced to pay interim maintenance while his statutory defence of adultery sits unheard in the trial court's pending tray? The Supreme Court, in a landmark ruling delivered on July 31, 2026, answered with a firm "no" — holding that courts cannot postpone a husband's defence under Section 125(4) CrPC until final adjudication when clear evidence of adultery exists on the face of the record. Title: Wife Living in Adultery Can Be Denied Interim Maintenance — Supreme Court Clarifies Scope of Section 125(4) CrPC Case Name: Himanshu Chordia v. State of Rajasthan & Another Case Number: Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Criminal) No. 3171 of 2025 Court: Supreme Court of India Judges: Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Vipul M. Pancholi Judgment Date: July 31, 2026 Citation: 2026 INSC 778 / 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 748 ABSTRACT The Supreme Court of India, in Himanshu Chordia v. State of Rajasthan & Anr. (2026 INSC 778), has settled a significant procedural and substantive question concerning interim maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 . The Court ruled that interim maintenance is a discretionary relief and cannot be granted mechanically when the statutory bar under Section 125(4) CrPC — which disentitles a wife living in adultery from receiving maintenance — is attracted on the basis of credible material placed before the court. The Bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Vipul M. Pancholi set aside concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Rajasthan High Court, which had erroneously held that a husband's application under Section 125(4) could only be decided at the final adjudication stage. The judgment delineates the stages of maintenance proceedings, identifies the threshold of evidence required to deny interim maintenance, and provides important observations concerning the admissibility and verification of electronic evidence under Sections 65A and 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 , while also flagging the unregulated nature of private detective agencies in India. TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction and Significance of the Judgment Factual Background and Procedural History Issues Before the Supreme Court Statutory Framework — Section 125 CrPC and Its Sub-Sections The Court's Reasoning and Ratio Decidendi Precedents Relied Upon by the Court Observations on Electronic Evidence and Private Investigators Conclusion, Relief Granted, and Key Takeaways 1. INTRODUCTION AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE JUDGMENT The right to maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has long been recognised as a social justice measure aimed at preventing destitution. Courts have consistently interpreted this provision liberally to protect wives, children, and parents who are unable to maintain themselves. However, the legislature also carved out specific statutory disqualifications in Section 125(4) — one of which relates to a wife who is "living in adultery." The critical question that remained unsettled was whether such a disqualification could be adjudicated and enforced at the interim stage, or whether the husband would be compelled to continue paying interim maintenance until the final disposal of the case, regardless of how strong his evidence might be. The Supreme Court's decision in Himanshu Chordia v. State of Rajasthan fills this procedural vacuum with clarity. The Court has established that where the husband places clear, cogent, and ex facie convincing material before the court demonstrating the wife's adulterous relationship, interim maintenance may be denied at the threshold itself. This is not a blanket rule that allows every unsubstantiated allegation to succeed — the Court carefully distinguished between cases where evidence speaks for itself and cases where it requires detailed verification before a finding can be returned. 2. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The appellant-husband married the respondent-wife on July 7, 2014. Disputes arose in the marriage over the following years, culminating in the wife leaving the matrimonial home on May 13, 2020, taking their child and valuables with her. On November 5, 2020, the wife filed a petition under Section 125 CrPC before the Special Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate at Udaipur, seeking maintenance for herself and the child, along with an application for interim maintenance. The husband responded by filing an application under Section 125(4) CrPC , asserting that the wife was living in an adulterous relationship and was therefore disentitled to maintenance under the express statutory bar. To substantiate his claim, the husband placed approximately 92 videos and 237 photographs before the trial court, along with other electronic material. He also filed an application under Section 91 CrPC seeking the production of bank records, call detail records, location data, social media information, and property records from various institutions. The Trial Court dismissed both the Section 125(4) application and the Section 91 application on June 27, 2024, holding that the authenticity and originality of the photographs and electronic material could only be determined after evidence was formally exhibited during the main maintenance proceedings. Thereafter, on July 30, 2024, the Trial Court granted interim maintenance of Rs. 25,000 each to the wife and the child. The husband challenged the dismissal of his Section 125(4) application before the Rajasthan High Court . By its order dated February 4, 2025, the High Court dismissed the challenge, holding that while adultery could be considered as a factor in maintenance proceedings, the question was disputed and could only be properly adjudicated at the final stage after evidence had been recorded. The husband then approached the Supreme Court by way of special leave. 3. ISSUES BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT The central issue before the Supreme Court was straightforward but consequential: whether a court is bound to postpone the adjudication of a husband's application under Section 125(4) CrPC — alleging that the wife is living in adultery — until the final disposal of the maintenance petition, or whether such an application can be decided at the interim stage so as to affect the grant of interim maintenance under the second proviso to Section 125(1). In simpler terms, the Court had to decide whether a husband could be forced to keep paying interim maintenance indefinitely while the statutory ground that disentitles his wife from receiving it remains unexamined in the trial court's pending list. 4. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK — SECTION 125 CrPC AND ITS SUB-SECTIONS The Court undertook a careful structural analysis of Section 125 CrPC in its entirety. Section 125(1) empowers a Magistrate of the first class to direct a person having sufficient means to pay a monthly maintenance allowance to his wife, legitimate or illegitimate minor child, or parent, where such person neglects or refuses to maintain them. The second proviso to Section 125(1) allows the Magistrate to order interim maintenance and expenses of the proceeding during the pendency of the case. The third proviso provides that such interim maintenance applications shall, as far as possible, be disposed of within sixty days from the date of service of notice on the respondent. Section 125(4) contains the statutory disqualifications. It provides that no wife shall be entitled to receive an allowance for the maintenance or the interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding if she is living in adultery, or if without sufficient reason she refuses to live with her husband, or if the parties are living separately by mutual consent. Section 125(5) deals with the cancellation or alteration of a maintenance order already passed if any of the Section 125(4) disqualifications are subsequently proved. The Court emphasised that Section 125(4) and Section 125(5) operate at different stages — the former can prevent the initial grant of maintenance, while the latter deals with undoing an order already in existence. 5. THE COURT'S REASONING AND RATIO DECIDENDI The judgment authored by Justice Sanjay Karol proceeds systematically through the legislative purpose, the structure of proceedings, and the standard of proof required at the interim stage. The Court began by affirming the beneficent nature of Section 125, observing that maintenance law is intended to ensure that individuals unable to provide for themselves have means of securing the essential aspects of a dignified life. The Court drew upon a long line of precedent to emphasise that maintenance proceedings under Section 125 are summary and civil in nature, secular in application, and oriented towards social justice. However, the Court was equally emphatic that the statutory disqualifications in Section 125(4) cannot be rendered meaningless by a procedural approach that postpones their consideration indefinitely. The Bench held: "The courts below clearly fell into error to hold that it was only at the stage of final adjudication that such a question could be decided. This view would render otiose what has been provided in the statute." The logic is simple — Section 125(4) explicitly uses the phrase "interim maintenance" in addition to final maintenance. If the legislature intended the disqualification to operate only at the final stage, it would not have included a reference to interim maintenance within Section 125(4). The Court then articulated the precise threshold at which interim maintenance may be denied. It held: "if a husband files an application under Section 125(4) and is, at the first instance, able to establish the charge through evidence ex facie, then only, there can be said to be a bar to interim maintenance." This formulation establishes that the bar is not automatic upon the mere filing of an application. The husband must produce material that, on its face, establishes the allegation of adultery without requiring detailed examination or cross-verification at that stage. Where the evidence is documentary, electronic, or circumstantial and requires verification, the court must still examine the Section 125(4) application — but interim maintenance may continue in the interregnum until the application is decided on merits. The Court further clarified that the pendency of a Section 125(4) application does not per se bar interim maintenance. It observed: "If such a view is accepted, the payment of maintenance would be perpetually contingent on the decision in 125(4), which may, given the nature of the allegation, take considerable time in reaching its final conclusion." The correct procedural flow, as the Court described it, involves three stages: first, the filing of the maintenance application and the potential grant of interim maintenance; second, the filing and adjudication of the Section 125(4) application, whose outcome determines whether the matter proceeds further; and third, the final order of maintenance under Section 125(1) or its denial. The scheme ensures that neither party is unfairly prejudiced — the wife receives sustenance during the pendency if no disqualification is apparent, and the husband receives an expeditious hearing of his statutory defence. 6. PRECEDENTS RELIED UPON BY THE COURT The judgment draws extensively from prior Supreme Court decisions to build its reasoning. In Dukhtar Jahan v. Mohd. Farooq (1987) 1 SCC 624 , the Court had affirmed that Section 125 CrPC proceedings are summary and are not affected by personal law. In Vimala (K.) v. Veeraswamy (K.) (1991) 2 SCC 375 , the Court had emphasised the secular character of Section 125 and its applicability irrespective of religion. Danial Latifi v. Union of India (2001) 7 SCC 740 reinforced that the right to maintenance is a constitutional imperative linked to Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution. The Court also relied on Rajnesh v. Neha (2021) 2 SCC 324 , which laid down comprehensive guidelines for maintenance proceedings including the disclosure of financial information and the expeditious disposal of interim applications. Dwarika Prasad Satpathy v. Bidyut Prava Dixit (1999) 7 SCC 675 was cited for the principle that maintenance under Section 125 is meant to achieve a social purpose and ought to be construed beneficially. On the question of electronic evidence, the Court referred to Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer (2014) 10 SCC 473 , which established that electronic records are admissible only in compliance with the conditions prescribed under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act . The judgment also cited Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal (2020) 7 SCC 1 , which clarified that the certificate under Section 65B(4) is a condition precedent for admissibility of electronic evidence and is not merely a procedural formality. More recent precedents including Rina Kumari v. Dinesh Kumar Mahto (2025) and Mohd. Abdul Samad v. State of Telangana (2025) were referred to for the evolving standards of proof in maintenance cases and the approach courts should adopt when confronted with prima facie evidence of statutory disqualifications. 7. OBSERVATIONS ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE AND PRIVATE INVESTIGATORS A noteworthy and forward-looking aspect of this judgment is the Supreme Court's detailed observations concerning the use of electronic material and private detective agencies in matrimonial disputes. The record revealed that the husband had placed approximately 92 videos and 237 photographs before the trial court to establish his wife's alleged adultery. The Court questioned several aspects of this evidence: who captured the photographs, whether the person had lawful authority to do so, whether the material was genuine or digitally altered, and whether its collection violated the wife's privacy and data protection rights. The Bench noted that the legal framework governing private detective agencies in India is virtually non-existent. It referred to the Private Detective Agencies (Regulation) Bill, 2007, which was never enacted into law. In the absence of any regulatory mechanism, the Court observed that private investigators operate without oversight, raising concerns about the methods employed to gather evidence and whether such methods might themselves constitute criminal offences under provisions like Section 354C of the Indian Penal Code (voyeurism). This is a significant observation because it signals that future courts adjudicating Section 125(4) applications will need to scrutinise not just the content of electronic evidence but also the legality of its collection. The Court directed that a copy of the judgment be forwarded to the Secretary of the Ministry of Law and Justice and the Chairman of the Law Commission of India for appropriate consideration regarding the regulation of private detective agencies. 8. CONCLUSION, RELIEF GRANTED, AND KEY TAKEAWAYS The Supreme Court allowed the husband's appeal, set aside the Rajasthan High Court's order dated February 4, 2025, and remanded the matter to the Trial Court with a direction to decide the husband's application under Section 125(4) CrPC on its merits. The Court did not itself record any finding on whether the wife had committed adultery — that determination was left to the trial court upon proper consideration of the evidence. The Court clarified that upon remand, the wife would be entitled to dispute the correctness, authenticity, legality, and admissibility of the electronic material placed by the husband. The key principles emerging from this judgment are as follows. First, interim maintenance under Section 125 CrPC is discretionary and not automatic — it can be denied where a statutory disqualification under Section 125(4) is established on the face of the record. Second, a husband's application under Section 125(4) cannot be dismissed at the threshold on the ground that it can only be decided at the final stage — such an approach renders the statutory provision meaningless. Third, the mere filing of a Section 125(4) application does not automatically suspend interim maintenance — the husband must place clear and cogent evidence that establishes adultery ex facie. Fourth, where the evidence is circumstantial or electronic and requires detailed verification, interim maintenance may continue until the Section 125(4) application is decided on merits, but the court must proceed to decide it expeditiously rather than deferring it indefinitely. Fifth, courts must also examine the legality of the means by which evidence has been collected, particularly when it involves electronic surveillance by private agencies operating without any regulatory framework. This judgment strikes a careful balance between the beneficent purpose of maintenance law and the legislative intent behind the statutory disqualifications, ensuring that neither party is unfairly prejudiced by procedural inaction. Frequently Asked Questions (for SEO enrichment) Can a wife be denied interim maintenance under Section 125 CrPC? Yes. The Supreme Court in Himanshu Chordia v. State of Rajasthan (2026 INSC 778) has held that a wife can be denied interim maintenance if the husband places clear and cogent evidence before the court establishing that she is living in adultery, which attracts the statutory bar under Section 125(4) CrPC. What evidence is required to deny interim maintenance on grounds of adultery? The husband must present material that ex facie establishes adultery — meaning evidence that, on its face, without requiring detailed cross-examination or verification, demonstrates the wife's adulterous relationship. Mere allegations without supporting material will not suffice. Does filing a Section 125(4) application automatically stop interim maintenance? No. The Supreme Court has clarified that the mere pendency of a Section 125(4) application does not per se bar the grant of interim maintenance. The court must examine the evidence and decide the application on merits before interim maintenance can be stopped or denied.