Who Really Chooses Supreme Court Judges In India? Collegium System Explained
EduLaw EditorialDaily Legal UpdatesUnderstand how Supreme Court judges are appointed in India. A detailed explanation of the Collegium system, NJAC debate, judicial vacancies, and latest 2026 judge recommendations.
Edu Law ☼ Share Home › Constitutional Law › Collegium System Explained Investigative Constitutional Law Current Affairs 2026 ~22 min read · 5,200+ words Who Really Chooses Supreme Court Judges In India? Inside The Collegium System Explained Every Supreme Court judge in India can shape elections, free speech, privacy, arrests, internet shutdowns, and even governments. But very few Indians know how these judges are actually selected. EL EduLaw Editorial Published 28 May 2026 · Updated today Contents The Opening Who Actually Appoints? What Is the Collegium? Who Sits in It? Step-by-Step Process Who Can Become a Judge? Why More Judges? Government vs Collegium Criticisms Defence of the System After Recommendation The Future FAQs Conclusion SECTION 01 This Is Not a Textbook. This Is How Power Actually Works. On 27 May 2026, behind the closed doors of the Supreme Court of India, the Collegium made a decision that will reshape the apex court for years to come. Five names were recommended for elevation to the Supreme Court bench: Justice Sheel Nagu, Chief Justice of Punjab and Haryana High Court; Justice Shree Chandrashekhar, Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court; Justice Sanjeev Sachdeva, Chief Justice of Madhya Pradesh High Court; Justice Arun Palli, Chief Justice of the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh; and Senior Advocate V. Mohana, a practising lawyer who, if appointed, would become only the tenth person in Indian history to be elevated to the Supreme Court directly from the Bar, and only the second woman to achieve that distinction after retired Justice Indu Malhotra. These five names were recommended by the Collegium headed by the 53rd Chief Justice of India, Justice Surya Kant, who assumed office on 24 November 2025 and will lead the Court until 9 February 2027. The recommendations came weeks after a landmark development: the Union Cabinet's approval on 5 May 2026 of the Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment Bill, 2026 — proposing to increase the sanctioned strength of the Supreme Court from 34 to 38 judges including the Chief Justice of India. This was the first expansion since 2019, and it arrived against the backdrop of an unprecedented pendency crisis. By March 2026, the Supreme Court's pending caseload had climbed to 93,143 cases — the highest figure the Court had seen in three decades — with the overall backlog continuing to rise month after month. This is the story of the Collegium system — the mechanism that selects the guardians of the Indian Constitution. It is a story of constitutional evolution, political confrontation, institutional secrecy, and an ongoing struggle between judicial independence and democratic accountability. It is not a textbook account. It is the story of how power actually works inside India's judiciary. SN Justice Sheel Nagu Chief Justice Punjab and Haryana HC SC Justice Shree Chandrashekhar Chief Justice Bombay HC SS Justice Sanjeev Sachdeva Chief Justice Madhya Pradesh HC AP Justice Arun Palli Chief Justice J&K and Ladakh HC VM Sr. Adv. V. Mohana Senior Advocate Supreme Court Bar SECTION 02 Who Actually Appoints Supreme Court Judges? If you open the Constitution of India and turn to Article 124, the text is deceptively simple. It says the President of India shall appoint every judge of the Supreme Court, and that this appointment shall be made “after consultation with such of the Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts in the States as the President may deem necessary.” For decades, the exact meaning of the word “consultation” has been the battleground of one of Indian democracy's most consequential power struggles. Article 124(2) · Constitution of India The Appointment Clause “Every Judge of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal after consultation with such of the Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts in the States as the President may deem necessary. In the case of appointment of a Judge other than the Chief Justice, the Chief Justice of India shall always be consulted.” The textbook answer to “who appoints Supreme Court judges?” is straightforward: the President of India. But the practical reality is far more layered. The President does not independently identify candidates or exercise personal discretion over who should join the bench. The names originate from within the judiciary itself — specifically, from the Collegium. The Union Government, through the Ministry of Law and Justice, facilitates the process, conducts background checks through the Intelligence Bureau, and can raise objections. But after the landmark Second Judges Case of 1993, the judiciary's recommendation carries primacy. To put it simply: technically, the President appoints judges; practically, the Collegium drives the process. ⚖ The Power Triangle of Judicial Appointments Three actors participate in the appointment of every Supreme Court judge, but their power is not equal. The Collegium (CJI plus four senior-most judges) initiates and recommends names. The Union Government (Ministry of Law and Justice) reviews, can raise objections, and processes the file. The President of India formally issues the warrant of appointment. If the Collegium reiterates a name after government objections, the appointment becomes binding. This makes the Collegium the most powerful actor in the entire chain. Supreme Court Collegium CJI + 4 Senior-most Judges · Initiates recommendations Union Government Ministry of Law and Justice · Reviews, conducts IB check President of India Issues warrant of appointment · Formal constitutional role SECTION 03 What Is the Collegium System? And Why You Will Not Find It in the Constitution Here is the most remarkable thing about the Collegium system: it does not exist anywhere in the text of the Indian Constitution. No article mentions it. No schedule describes it. No amendment created it. The Collegium is entirely a creature of judicial interpretation — forged across three landmark Supreme Court cases over seventeen years. Together, these cases are known as the “Three Judges Cases,” and they represent one of the most dramatic assertions of judicial power in any democracy on Earth. To understand the Collegium, you must understand these three cases. Each one fundamentally shifted the balance of power between the executive and the judiciary, and each one redefined what the Constitution's framers might have meant when they wrote the word “consultation.” 1981 · FIRST JUDGES CASE S.P. Gupta v. Union of India A seven-judge bench ruled that “consultation” in Article 124 did not mean “concurrence.” The executive had the final say in judicial appointments. The CJI's view was important but not binding. For over a decade, this judgment gave the government effective control over who sat on the Supreme Court bench. This was the era of executive primacy. 1993 · SECOND JUDGES CASE — THE TURNING POINT Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India A nine-judge bench overruled the First Judges Case and held that “consultation” effectively means “concurrence.” The Chief Justice's opinion, formed in consultation with the two senior-most judges, would have primacy over the executive. This judgment gave birth to the Collegium system — transferring the decisive power over appointments from the government to the judiciary. 1998 · THIRD JUDGES CASE In Re: Presidential Reference (Special Reference No. 1 of 1998) The President sought clarification under Article 143. A nine-judge bench expanded the Collegium from three to five members: the CJI and the four senior-most judges. It also laid down that the recommendation must be unanimous or near-unanimous to be binding. This case cemented the modern Collegium system as it operates today. 📜 How Power Shifted: A Summary Between 1950 and 1981, the convention was that the executive generally deferred to the Chief Justice, with notable exceptions during the Emergency when three senior judges were superseded. The First Judges Case (1981) formalized executive primacy. The Second Judges Case (1993) reversed this, establishing judicial primacy. The Third Judges Case (1998) refined it into a five-member Collegium. This evolution was driven entirely by judicial interpretation — the same constitutional text was read three fundamentally different ways in seventeen years. SECTION 04 Who Sits in the Collegium? The Collegium is not a fixed institution with dedicated offices or published meeting schedules. It is an evolving body whose membership changes as judges retire and new ones become senior. For Supreme Court appointments, it consists of the Chief Justice of India and the four senior-most puisne judges. For High Court appointments and transfers, the Collegium typically consists of the CJI and two senior-most judges, sometimes consulting judges who have previously served in the relevant High Court. As of May 2026, the Collegium for Supreme Court appointments is headed by CJI Surya Kant. It is this body that made the 27 May 2026 recommendations. The Collegium does not operate under codified rules of procedure. Its meetings are not recorded. Its minutes are not published. Its reasoning, until recently, was almost entirely opaque — though the Court has begun publishing brief “statements of reasons” alongside its recommendations, a practice CJI Surya Kant has indicated will continue and improve. Chief Justice of India Chairs the Collegium · Master of the Roster Judge 2 2nd Senior-most Judge 3 3rd Senior-most Judge 4 4th Senior-most Judge 5 5th Senior-most This structure means the composition changes frequently. Every time a senior judge retires, the next judge in the seniority line moves up. Different Chief Justices lead different Collegiums with different personalities and philosophies. Some have been prolific in making recommendations; others have been cautious. Some have prioritized diversity; others have focused strictly on seniority. This human element is what makes judicial appointments a deeply political act, even though it is formally a judicial one. SECTION 05 Step-by-Step: How a Supreme Court Judge Is Actually Appointed The process of appointing a Supreme Court judge is neither quick nor simple. From internal discussions to the oath ceremony, the journey can take weeks to years. Here is what happens behind the scenes. 1 Vacancy Identified Retirement dates known in advance. Collegium anticipates vacancies. 2 Collegium Deliberation CJI and four judges discuss names. Seniority, merit, diversity considered. 3 IB Report Intelligence Bureau provides confidential background reports. 4 Govt Review Ministry of Law reviews the file. May raise objections. 5 Reiteration If govt returns a name, Collegium may reiterate with binding force. 6 Presidential Warrant President issues formal warrant of appointment under Article 124. 7 Oath Ceremony Judge takes oath and joins the Supreme Court bench. Behind Closed Doors: Where Delays and Controversies Happen The formal process looks clean on paper. The reality is messier. The most consequential moments happen at two stages: the Collegium's internal deliberation and the government's review phase. At the Collegium stage, there are no published criteria for how names are selected. Seniority among High Court Chief Justices is a significant factor, but not the only one. The Collegium considers regional representation, diversity including women and marginalized communities, legal acumen, administrative experience, and temperament. Because deliberations are confidential, there is no way for the public to know exactly why one name was chosen over another. This opacity fuels recurring allegations of favoritism and the so-called “uncle judge” syndrome, where personal connections may allegedly influence selections. At the government stage, delays are the primary weapon of friction. The Constitution does not specify a time frame within which the government must process a recommendation. This ambiguity has been exploited repeatedly. Governments of various political persuasions have sat on recommendations for months, sometimes allowing a judge's retirement to pass — effectively nullifying the recommendation through inaction rather than rejection. This passive obstruction has contributed directly to the vacancy crisis plaguing the judiciary. The Intelligence Bureau's role is also controversial. While IB reports are intended to flag genuine security or integrity concerns, critics argue they have sometimes been used as tools of political influence — allowing the executive to indirectly veto candidates it finds ideologically inconvenient. Defenders counter that IB checks are a necessary safeguard and that the Collegium is free to disregard inputs it finds unsubstantiated. The appointment of a Supreme Court judge is not a routine bureaucratic exercise. It is the single most consequential staffing decision in Indian democracy — because it determines who will interpret the Constitution for the next decade or more. — EduLaw Editorial Analysis SECTION 06 Who Can Become a Supreme Court Judge? Article 124(3) of the Constitution lays down three routes to the Supreme Court bench. A person must be a citizen of India and is eligible if they have served for at least five years as a judge of a High Court, or if they have been an advocate of a High Court for at least ten years, or if they are, in the opinion of the President, a “distinguished jurist.” These eligibility criteria have remained unchanged since 1950. Article 124(3) · Constitution of India Eligibility for Supreme Court Judgeship A citizen of India who satisfies one of three conditions: (a) at least five years as a judge of a High Court ; (b) at least ten years as an advocate of a High Court ; or (c) a distinguished jurist in the opinion of the President. In practice, the overwhelming majority of Supreme Court judges follow the first route — sitting High Court judges, usually Chief Justices, elevated to the apex court. Direct elevation from the Bar is extraordinarily rare: in the entire 76-year history of the Supreme Court, only about nine lawyers had been appointed directly before the latest recommendation. The distinguished jurist clause has never been invoked — not once. This is precisely why the recommendation of Senior Advocate V. Mohana on 27 May 2026 is historically significant. Mohana graduated from Coimbatore Law College (now Government Law College, Coimbatore) in 1988 as part of India's very first batch of the five-year integrated law course. She has practised at the Supreme Court for decades and was notably involved in the landmark litigation concerning permanent commission for women officers in the Indian Army. If appointed, she would become only the tenth person elevated directly from the Bar and the second woman after Justice Indu Malhotra, who served from April 2018 to March 2021. Her recommendation signals the Collegium's willingness to look beyond the dominant pattern of elevating only sitting judges. SECTION 07 Why Are More Judges Being Added to the Supreme Court? The numbers tell a story no institutional pride can hide. The Supreme Court is overwhelmed. The pendency crisis is not a future threat; it is a present emergency. By March 2026, 93,143 cases were pending before the Court — a record high in three decades. The institution designed to be the final arbiter of constitutional disputes is drowning in a sea of Special Leave Petitions, appeals, and original matters that grow faster than they can be heard. 93,143 Pending Cases (Mar 2026) 38 New Sanctioned Strength 34 Previous Strength ~5 Vacancies (Approx.) This is why the Union Cabinet's decision on 5 May 2026 to approve the Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment Bill, 2026 — increasing the sanctioned strength from 34 to 38, meaning from 33 puisne judges plus the CJI to 37 plus the CJI — is seen as both necessary and overdue. The expansion was driven by several converging pressures building for years. India is a hyper-litigious society with over 1.4 billion people, and the Supreme Court is one of the most accessible apex courts in the world — partly because of Article 136 (Special Leave to Appeal), which allows virtually any case to potentially reach the Supreme Court. The result is an institution hearing far more cases than any comparable court globally. The Constitution Bench backlog compounds this: under Article 145(3), cases involving substantial constitutional questions must be heard by at least five judges. Constituting these larger benches reduces availability for regular two-judge and three-judge hearings, creating a structural bottleneck. Modern disputes are also increasingly complex. Cases involving digital privacy, artificial intelligence regulation, platform liability, environmental constitutionalism, and technology-mediated rights demand deep engagement and judicial bandwidth. The expansion from 34 to 38 is the first since 2019. The Court's original 1950 strength was just eight judges. It grew to 11 in 1956, 14 in 1960, 18 in 1978, 26 in 1986, 31 in 2009, 34 in 2019, and now 38 in 2026 — reflecting a truth that demands on the Court have grown far faster than its capacity. 📊 Judge-to-Population Ratio: India in Context India has approximately 21 judges per million population across all judiciary levels — one of the lowest ratios in the world. At the Supreme Court level, 38 judges for 1.4+ billion people means roughly one apex court judge for every 37 million citizens. By comparison, the United States has 9 justices for 340 million people, but the US Supreme Court hears only 60-80 cases per year while India's hears thousands. The total pendency across all courts in India exceeded 55 million cases by early 2026. SECTION 08 The Government vs. Collegium Battle: The NJAC Story If the Collegium system was born from judicial interpretation, the attempt to dismantle it was born from legislative action. In 2014, the Indian Parliament — with near-unanimous support across party lines — passed the Constitution (Ninety-Ninth Amendment) Act and the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) Act. The explicit goal was to replace the Collegium with a six-member commission: the CJI, two senior-most Supreme Court judges, the Union Minister of Law and Justice, and two “eminent persons” nominated by a committee of the CJI, the Prime Minister, and the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha. The political consensus was extraordinary. The Lok Sabha passed it 367-0. The Rajya Sabha approved it near-unanimously. Sixteen state legislatures ratified it. The argument was compelling: the Collegium lacked transparency, accountability, and democratic legitimacy. Judges were appointing judges in a closed room with no external checks. But on 16 October 2015, a five-judge Constitution Bench struck down both the 99th Amendment and the NJAC Act by a 4:1 majority. The majority held the NJAC violated the “basic structure” of the Constitution — specifically judicial independence. Giving the executive and lay persons a veto over appointments would compromise separation of powers. Justice J.S. Khehar authored the lead opinion. Justice Jasti Chelameswar was the sole dissenter, arguing the Collegium itself was opaque and unaccountable, and the NJAC was a legitimate democratic attempt at reform. Aspect NJAC Collegium Constitutional basis 99th Amendment Act 2014 — passed by Parliament, ratified by 16 states No textual basis — evolved through judicial interpretation in Three Judges Cases Composition CJI + 2 senior SC judges + Law Minister + 2 eminent persons (6 members) CJI + 4 senior-most SC judges (5 members, all judges) Executive role Law Minister is a member with full participation rights Government reviews and can return names but has no seat at the table Transparency Proposed formal criteria and broader participation No published criteria; confidential deliberations; brief reasons published since approx. 2023 Veto power Any 2 members could veto a recommendation Only the full Collegium through internal consensus; reiteration binds government Status Struck down 16 Oct 2015 by 4:1 majority as violating basic structure Currently operational; remains the governing framework Key criticism Could enable political capture through executive and lay members Judges appointing judges — lacks democratic accountability The NJAC saga exposed a fundamental tension in Indian constitutional design: the judiciary values its independence above all else, while elected representatives argue that an institution wielding immense public power should not be entirely self-selecting. This tension remains unresolved. The Collegium continues, the government periodically voices frustration, and reform proposals circulate without materializing. SECTION 09 The Criticisms That Will Not Go Away Even defenders of judicial independence acknowledge the Collegium has serious structural problems. These criticisms are neither new nor fringe — they have been voiced by sitting judges, retired Chief Justices, scholars, bar associations, and political leaders across the spectrum. Opacity and Lack of Transparency Deliberations happen behind closed doors with no published minutes, no formal selection criteria, and — until recently — no public reasoning for why specific names were chosen or rejected. While “statements of reasons” have begun appearing, they are often bare-bones and tell the public very little about actual decision-making. The “Uncle Judge” Syndrome This phrase describes the perception that personal connections, family ties, and professional relationships within the legal fraternity influence recommendations. When judges appoint judges, the pool of candidates is naturally shaped by existing networks. Critics argue this produces a self-replicating elite rather than a meritocratic bench. Delayed Appointments and Government Obstruction The Collegium recommends but the government controls the timeline. Files sit in the Ministry of Law for months without action. There are no enforceable deadlines. This has led to situations where qualified judges were never appointed simply because their recommendation expired through bureaucratic delay. No Formal Selection Criteria Unlike the UK's Judicial Appointments Commission with published criteria, India's Collegium has no codified standards. Seniority is a factor but not determinative. Merit is invoked but never defined. Diversity is considered but inconsistently. The absence of criteria makes the process subjective and vulnerable to bias, real or perceived. Democratic Deficit: Judges Appointing Judges The most fundamental criticism is philosophical. No other branch of government is self-appointing. The legislature is elected. The executive is elected or appointed by elected officials. But the judiciary under the Collegium effectively selects its own successors with no meaningful external check. SECTION 10 Why Many Still Defend the Collegium System Despite these criticisms, a significant portion of the legal community continues to defend the Collegium. Their arguments are rooted not in denying flaws, but in asserting the alternatives are worse. Judicial Independence as Non-Negotiable If the executive has a meaningful role in selecting judges, it will inevitably select those favorable to the government of the day. India's history — particularly the Emergency of 1975-77, when the executive superseded three senior judges to appoint a pliant Chief Justice — provides a chilling precedent. The Collegium keeps the process insulated from political pressure. Separation of Powers as Basic Structure The doctrine of basic structure, from Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973), holds that certain constitutional features cannot be amended even by Parliament. Judicial independence is part of this basic structure. Any appointment mechanism giving the executive substantial power would violate this doctrine. Constitutional Morality Over Majoritarian Impulse Defenders invoke constitutional morality — governance is not just about majority rule but adherence to checks and balances. The judiciary is meant to be counter-majoritarian: protecting individual rights even when the government disagrees. A self-selecting judiciary, while imperfect, is more likely to produce judges with the courage to stand against governmental overreach. Fear of Political Capture The politicization of judicial appointments in the United States — where Supreme Court nominations have become intensely partisan battles — is frequently cited as a cautionary tale. India's Collegium, despite its opacity, has produced an independent judiciary that has delivered landmark judgments against sitting governments. Replacing it with a politically influenced body could undermine that record. The question is never whether the Collegium is perfect. It is not. The question is whether any realistic alternative would produce a more independent judiciary. So far, no one has designed one that convincingly passes that test. — A perspective expressed frequently in constitutional law debates SECTION 11 What Happens After the Collegium Recommends a Name? Once the Collegium finalizes recommendations — as it did on 27 May 2026 with five names — the process enters the executive domain. The file is sent from the Supreme Court to the Department of Justice under the Ministry of Law and Justice. The government conducts its own review including an Intelligence Bureau report, verifies antecedents, and assesses potential concerns. If the government has no objections, it processes the file and sends it to the President for the formal warrant of appointment. In a smooth scenario, this can happen within weeks. But the scenario is often not smooth. The government can “return” a name with its reasons for concern. This is not a veto but a request for reconsideration. If the Collegium reiterates the name, the government is constitutionally bound to accept it. However, even after reiteration, governments have occasionally dragged their feet. Once the President issues the warrant, the judge is formally notified and a date is fixed for the oath of office, administered by the Chief Justice of India. The ceremony is brief but marks the culmination of a process that can take months or years from inception to completion. 1 File Sent Collegium sends recommendation to Dept. of Justice 2 Govt Review IB report obtained; Law Ministry reviews antecedents 3 Accept or Return Govt either clears or returns with objections 4 Reiteration If returned, Collegium may reiterate — binding on govt 5 Warrant Issued President issues formal warrant of appointment 6 Oath of Office Judge sworn in by CJI; joins the SC bench SECTION 12 The Future of Judicial Appointments in India The Collegium system exists in a state of contested equilibrium. It is neither fully accepted nor replaceable. The NJAC was struck down, but the demand for reform has not subsided. Multiple proposals continue to circulate in legal and political discourse. One set of reforms focuses on making the existing Collegium more transparent without changing its structure. This includes publishing detailed reasons for every recommendation and rejection, adopting formal published selection criteria, and establishing an independent secretariat. CJI Surya Kant himself has signaled that the Collegium is “far more open than it was” and that there is “room to do better.” A second set of proposals looks further ahead. The idea of an All India Judicial Service — a centralized recruitment mechanism for the lower judiciary modeled on the IAS — has been debated for decades and gained renewed attention. Other proposals include creating regional benches of the Supreme Court as recommended by the 229th Report of the Law Commission in 2009, establishing a National Court of Appeal for routine appellate matters, and using artificial intelligence to assist case management and workload distribution. CJI Surya Kant himself has publicly stated the judiciary must be “ready to lead the AI era” and work with modern technological tools. Whether the Collegium should be made more publicly visible through live-streaming has also been raised but remains deeply controversial. Some argue transparency would enhance public trust; others warn it would politicize deliberation. What is clear is the current system cannot remain static. Rising pendency exceeding 93,000 cases at the Supreme Court and over 55 million across all courts, increasing vacancies, growing litigation complexity, and mounting public expectations will force evolution. Whether it comes from within the judiciary, from Parliament, or from a crisis that forces the issue remains to be seen. SECTION 13 Frequently Asked Questions Who appoints Supreme Court judges in India? Under Article 124 of the Indian Constitution, the President of India formally appoints Supreme Court judges. However, in practice, names are recommended by the Supreme Court Collegium — a body consisting of the Chief Justice of India and the four senior-most judges. The President acts on the Collegium's recommendation. If the Collegium reiterates a name after government objections, the appointment is binding. What is the Collegium system? The Collegium system is the mechanism through which judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts are appointed and transferred. It is not mentioned in the Constitution and evolved through three landmark judgments: the First Judges Case (1981), the Second Judges Case (1993), and the Third Judges Case (1998). The Collegium for Supreme Court appointments consists of the CJI and the four senior-most puisne judges. Can the government reject judges recommended by the Collegium? The government cannot outright reject a recommendation. It can return a name for reconsideration with its reasons. However, if the Collegium reiterates the name, the government is constitutionally bound to accept it. In practice, governments have sometimes delayed processing even reiterated recommendations, but the legal position is clear: reiteration is binding. How many judges are in the Supreme Court of India as of 2026? The sanctioned strength has been increased from 34 to 38 judges including the CJI, following the Union Cabinet's approval of the Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment Bill, 2026 on 5 May 2026. The working strength as of late May 2026 is approximately 33 judges, with several vacancies. The new sanctioned strength of 38 includes the Chief Justice and 37 other judges. What is NJAC and why was it struck down? The National Judicial Appointments Commission was established through the 99th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2014 and the NJAC Act, 2014 to replace the Collegium. It proposed a six-member body: the CJI, two senior SC judges, the Law Minister, and two eminent persons. On 16 October 2015, the Supreme Court struck it down by a 4:1 majority, holding it violated the basic structure of the Constitution — specifically judicial independence. Justice Chelameswar was the lone dissenter. Why is the Collegium system controversial? The Collegium faces criticism for lack of transparency (no published criteria, confidential deliberations), allegations of nepotism and the “uncle judge” syndrome, delayed appointments, absence of external accountability, and the fundamental concern of “judges appointing judges” without democratic oversight. Defenders argue it protects judicial independence from political interference. How are judges selected for the Supreme Court in India? The Collegium (CJI plus four senior-most SC judges) identifies candidates — usually High Court Chief Justices — considering seniority, merit, regional representation, and diversity. The Intelligence Bureau provides background reports. The recommendation is sent to the government, which can return names once. If reiterated by the Collegium, the President issues a warrant of appointment and the judge takes oath. Who are the newly recommended Supreme Court judges in May 2026? On 27 May 2026, the Supreme Court Collegium headed by CJI Surya Kant recommended five persons: Justice Sheel Nagu (CJ, Punjab and Haryana HC), Justice Shree Chandrashekhar (CJ, Bombay HC), Justice Sanjeev Sachdeva (CJ, Madhya Pradesh HC), Justice Arun Palli (CJ, Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh HC), and Senior Advocate V. Mohana — who would be only the tenth person directly elevated from the Bar and the second woman after Justice Indu Malhotra. SECTION 14 Conclusion: Who Protects the Constitution? The Collegium system is imperfect. Its critics are not wrong when they point to opacity, delay, and the democratic paradox of judges appointing judges. Its defenders are not wrong when they insist that judicial independence is the single most important structural feature of any constitutional democracy, and that history shows what happens when governments control judicial appointments. The 27 May 2026 recommendations — five names, including the historic nomination of V. Mohana from the Bar — arrive at a moment when the system is under more scrutiny than at any point since the NJAC was struck down. The expansion to 38 judges, the record pendency exceeding 93,000 cases, the ongoing debates about transparency and the All India Judicial Service, and the broader crisis of judicial backlogs all point in one direction: the status quo is unsustainable. Reform is not optional. The only question is what form it will take. At the heart of this debate lies a question that transcends mechanics and procedure. It is a question every Indian citizen — whether a law student, a UPSC aspirant, a litigant waiting for justice, or simply a citizen who votes — has a stake in. In a democracy, the question of who appoints judges is ultimately a question of who protects the Constitution itself. That question does not have a final answer. It is, by design, a question that each generation must confront anew. And as long as India's democracy endures, the tension between independence and accountability — the tension that created the Collegium and that the Collegium now embodies — will remain at the center of the republic's most consequential conversation: how to build a judiciary that is both free from political interference and accountable to the people it serves. Stay Informed with EduLaw Get constitutional deep dives, legal explainers, and current affairs analysis delivered to your inbox. No spam. Just substance. Subscribe Explore More on EduLaw Constitutional Law Article 124 Explained: The Full Text and Every Clause Decoded Investigative NJAC vs Collegium: The Full Story of India's Biggest Judicial Battle Current Affairs 93,000 Cases and Counting: Inside the Supreme Court Pendency Crisis Profile CJI Surya Kant: The 53rd Chief Justice and His Vision for Reform 📚 Sources and Citations Constitution of India, Articles 124, 143, 145(3), 216. S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149 (First Judges Case). Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC 441 (Second Judges Case). In Re: Presidential Reference, (1998) 7 SCC 739 (Third Judges Case). Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India, (2016) 5 SCC 1 (NJAC Case). Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Act, 1956. Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment Bill, 2026 (PIB, 5 May 2026). Collegium Resolutions, Supreme Court of India (sci.gov.in), 27 May 2026. Supreme Court Observer (scobserver.in), pendency data March 2026. National Judicial Data Grid (NJDG). Bar and Bench, LiveLaw, The Hindu, The Indian Express — news reports referenced in this article. X in W 🔗 Edu Law Constitutional Law · Legal Education · Current Affairs © 2026 EduLaw. All rights reserved. Content is for educational and informational purposes only. 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