Supreme Court Rules Extension of Chargesheet Time Without Hearing Accused is Illegal — Grants Default Bail Under UAPA 2026 INSC 456
EduLaw EditorialLandmark JudgementsTitle: Default Bail Under UAPA Cannot Be Defeated by Mechanical, Ex Parte Extension of Investigation Time — Supreme Court Reaffirms Constitutional Safeguards for Personal Liberty Case Name: Md. Ariz Hasnain @ Ariz Hasnain v. State of Jharkhand Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. ___ of 2026 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 11860 of 2025) Court: Supreme Court of India Judges: Hon'ble Justice Vikram Nath and Hon'ble Justice Sandeep Mehta Judgment Date: 30 April 2026 Citation: 2026 INSC 456 ABSTRACT The Supreme Court of India, in Md. Ariz Hasnain v. State of Jharkhand (2026 INSC 456), delivered a significant judgment on the interplay between statutory investigation timelines under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) and the indefeasible right of the accused to default bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 . The Bench of Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta set aside orders passed by the Special Judge and the Jharkhand High Court, holding that extending the period for filing of chargesheet without producing the accused before the Court, without affording an opportunity of hearing, and without recording justifiable reasons constitutes a "gross illegality" violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India . The Court granted default bail to the appellant who had been booked under Sections 18, 20, 38, and 39 of the UAPA along with Sections 124A, 153A, and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. This judgment reinforces the constitutional mandate that personal liberty cannot be taken away through procedural shortcuts and that the right to default bail, once crystallized, remains indefeasible and cannot be defeated by a subsequently filed chargesheet. TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction and Factual Background Procedural History and Chronology of Events Issues Raised Before the Supreme Court Submissions on Behalf of the Appellant Submissions on Behalf of the State Supreme Court's Analysis: The Mandate of Hearing the Accused Absence of Judicial Application of Mind in Extension Orders The Indefeasible Right to Default Bail — Constitutional Foundation and Conclusion 1. INTRODUCTION AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND The intersection of national security legislation and fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution has always been a contested terrain in Indian criminal jurisprudence. The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 authorizes extended periods of investigation — up to 180 days — compared to the standard 60 or 90 days under Section 167(2) of the CrPC . However, such extension is not automatic. It requires a report from the Public Prosecutor indicating progress of investigation and specific reasons justifying continued detention, followed by a judicial order granting extension. The present case squarely raised the question of what happens when these procedural safeguards are flouted — when extension orders are passed behind the back of the accused, without judicial scrutiny, and without any semblance of reasoned decision-making. The appellant, Md. Ariz Hasnain, was arraigned as an accused in FIR No. 13 of 2023 dated 7 November 2023, registered at Police Station ATS, Ranchi. The charges levelled against him included offences punishable under Sections 124A, 153A, and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 18, 20, 38, and 39 of the UAPA . According to the appellant, he was illegally detained on 4 November 2023, three days before the FIR was even registered. He was formally shown as arrested on 7 November 2023, the same day the FIR was lodged, and was remanded to judicial custody on 8 November 2023. The period of 90 days prescribed under Section 167(2) CrPC read with the proviso inserted by Section 43D(2) of the UAPA was set to expire on 5 February 2024. 2. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS The procedural chronology of this case reveals a disturbing pattern of executive overreach facilitated by judicial abdication. On 2 February 2024, merely three days before the 90-day statutory period was to expire, the Investigating Officer moved an application before the Special Judge (AJC XVIII cum Special Judge, ATS, Ranchi) seeking an extension of 30 days to complete the investigation. The application was forwarded by the Additional Public Prosecutor. On the very same day, the Special Judge granted the extension for 25 days beyond the 90-day period. This order was passed without producing the appellant before the Court, without informing him that such proceedings were underway, and without affording him any opportunity to contest the prayer for extension. The appellant, languishing in judicial custody, remained entirely unaware that his right to default bail was being extinguished behind his back. On 5 February 2024, when the 90-day period expired without a chargesheet being filed, the appellant was produced before the Special Judge via video conferencing, and his judicial custody was routinely extended for 14 days. Still unaware of the extension order dated 2 February 2024, the appellant moved an application on 8 February 2024 seeking default bail under Section 167(2) CrPC . It was only on 20 February 2024 that the Special Judge informed the appellant about the earlier extension order and rejected his default bail application on that very basis. Thereafter, the Special Judge granted further extensions on 28 February 2024, 28 March 2024, and 19 April 2024 — each time using virtually identical, verbatim language without any independent reasoning. The chargesheet was eventually filed on 2 May 2024. The appellant challenged the extension order before the Jharkhand High Court through Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 742 of 2024. However, the High Court dismissed the petition vide order dated 21 February 2025, holding that since the chargesheet had been filed within the extended period, the question of default bail no longer survived for consideration. It was against this order that the appellant approached the Supreme Court by way of Special Leave Petition. 3. ISSUES RAISED BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT The appeal raised several interconnected questions of law that go to the heart of the relationship between statutory investigation timelines and constitutional protections for personal liberty. First, whether an order extending investigation time under Section 43D(2) of the UAPA read with Section 167(2) CrPC can be validly passed without producing the accused and without granting an opportunity of hearing. Second, whether a mechanical extension order that fails to record justifiable reasons and reflects no application of judicial mind satisfies constitutional standards under Article 21 . Third, whether, once the initial extension order is found to be illegal, the subsequent filing of a chargesheet within the extended period can defeat the indefeasible right to default bail that had already crystallized in favour of the accused. Fourth, whether the High Court was correct in holding that the filing of the chargesheet rendered the challenge to the extension order infructuous. 4. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT Senior Advocate Abhinav Sekhri, appearing for the appellant, advanced a multi-layered challenge to the extension orders. The primary submission was that the first extension order dated 2 February 2024 was passed entirely behind the appellant's back. The appellant was neither produced before the Court — physically or through video conferencing — nor served with or otherwise notified of the application seeking extension. This violated the mandatory procedural requirement established by the Constitution Bench in Sanjay Dutt v. State (1994) 5 SCC 410 and authoritatively reiterated by the three-judge Bench in Jigar v. State of Gujarat (2023) 6 SCC 484 , which holds that production of the accused and communication of the extension proceedings is a constitutional sine qua non and not a mere procedural formality. The second limb of the argument attacked the quality of judicial reasoning in the extension orders. Learned counsel pointed out that the order dated 2 February 2024 merely recorded the bald submission of the Additional Public Prosecutor that "investigation is still pending" without reflecting any application of mind to the progress of investigation or to the necessity for continued detention. Critically, the subsequent extension orders dated 28 February, 28 March, and 19 April 2024 reproduced virtually the same words in a verbatim manner, demonstrating that the Special Judge had treated the extension as an empty formality rather than a decision impacting fundamental rights. It was contended that the appellant acquired an indefeasible right to default bail upon expiry of the 90-day period and that this right crystallized when he filed the bail application on 8 February 2024, well before the chargesheet was filed on 2 May 2024. 5. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE Standing Counsel Rajiv Shankar Dwivedi for the State of Jharkhand opposed the appeal and supported the impugned orders. His central contention was that the extension of time for completion of investigation had been validly granted in accordance with law under the provisions of Section 43D(2) of the UAPA . He further argued that since the chargesheet had been filed within the extended period, the right to default bail under Section 167(2) CrPC did not survive. However, when the Supreme Court, by order dated 9 March 2026, specifically directed the State to clarify whether the appellant was produced before the Special Judge at the time of granting extension, Shri Dwivedi — after obtaining instructions — was unable to dispute that the proceedings did not reflect any intimation to the appellant or opportunity of hearing. 6. SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS: THE MANDATE OF HEARING THE ACCUSED The Supreme Court's analysis began with a meticulous examination of the trial court's order sheet dated 2 February 2024. Upon perusal, the Bench confirmed that the proceedings did not reflect any indication that the appellant had been intimated of the extension application or afforded an opportunity to oppose it. The Court then turned to the authoritative pronouncement in Jigar v. State of Gujarat (2023) 6 SCC 484 , wherein the Supreme Court had comprehensively laid down the legal framework governing extension of investigation time under special statutes. The Bench quoted extensively from paragraphs 41, 42, 44, and 45 of the Jigar judgment. In paragraph 41, the Court in Jigar had held that clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 167 CrPC mandates that no Magistrate shall authorize continued detention unless the accused is produced in person, and that this requirement is "sine qua non" for exercising the power to extend judicial custody. In paragraph 42, the Court reasoned that since extension of investigation time under special statutes necessarily leads to extension of judicial custody beyond 90 days, the same mandatory requirement of production applies. Most significantly, the Bench relied on paragraph 45 of Jigar , which declared: "The logical and legal consequence of the grant of extension of time is the deprivation of the indefeasible right available to the accused to claim a default bail. If we accept the argument that the failure of the prosecution to produce the accused before the Court and to inform him that the application of extension is being considered by the Court is a mere procedural irregularity, it will negate the proviso... and that may amount to violation of rights conferred by Article 21 of the Constitution." The Court in Jigar had concluded — and this Bench reiterated — that "the failure to procure the presence of the accused either physically or virtually before the Court and the failure to inform him that the application made by the Public Prosecutor for the extension of time is being considered, is not a mere procedural irregularity. It is gross illegality that violates the rights of the accused under Article 21." Applying this ratio to the facts at hand, the Bench in the present case held that the order dated 2 February 2024 was passed in flagrant violation of the accused's right to be heard. The right to be heard at the stage of extension is not an empty formality — it enables the accused to raise specific objections, including pointing out that the prayer has been made by the Investigating Officer rather than the Public Prosecutor, or that the twin requirements of the report under Section 43D(2) have not been satisfied. Denying this opportunity effectively reduces the accused to a mute spectator in proceedings that directly curtail his fundamental right to liberty. 7. ABSENCE OF JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF MIND IN EXTENSION ORDERS The Court's analysis did not stop at the absence of hearing. The Bench proceeded to examine the substance of the extension orders themselves and found them wholly deficient in reasoned decision-making. The order dated 2 February 2024 contained only a bald observation that "investigation is still pending" — which, the Court observed, could be said in virtually every case and does not constitute a valid reason for extending custody beyond the statutory period. There was no reference to the progress of investigation, no identification of specific steps remaining to be completed, and no assessment of whether continued detention was necessary or whether the investigation could proceed with the accused on bail. The Court drew particular attention to the requirement laid down in paragraph 43 of Jigar v. State of Gujarat (2023) 6 SCC 484 : "The requirement of the report under the proviso added by sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the 2015 Act to clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 167 CrPC is twofold. Firstly, in the report of the Public Prosecutor, the progress of the investigation should be set out and secondly, the report must disclose specific reasons for continuing the detention of the accused beyond the said period of 90 days. Therefore, the extension of time is not an empty formality. The Public Prosecutor has to apply his mind before he submits a report/an application for extension." The Bench found that the Additional Public Prosecutor in the present case had merely "forwarded" the Investigating Officer's application without any independent application of mind. The Special Judge, in turn, accepted the prayer without any scrutiny. What was more damning, the Court noted, was that the second, third, and fourth extension orders reproduced verbatim the same reasons as the first — confirming that the process had been reduced to a rubber-stamp exercise. The Bench categorically held: "The order extending time to conclude investigation is grossly illegal, arbitrary and violative of the fundamental right of liberty of the appellant as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India." 8. THE INDEFEASIBLE RIGHT TO DEFAULT BAIL — CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION AND CONCLUSION Having found the first extension order to be illegal on dual grounds — absence of hearing and absence of judicial reasoning — the Court addressed the critical legal consequence. Under Section 167(2) CrPC , when the investigation is not completed and the chargesheet is not filed within the prescribed statutory period (60 or 90 days as applicable, or as extended under special statutes), the accused acquires an "indefeasible right" to be released on default bail. This right, as the Constitution Bench held in Sanjay Dutt v. State (1994) 5 SCC 410 , crystallizes the moment the accused files an application for default bail after expiry of the statutory period, provided the chargesheet has not been filed by that date. In the present case, the 90-day period expired on 5 February 2024 without a valid extension being in place (since the extension order dated 2 February 2024 itself was illegal). The appellant filed his application for default bail on 8 February 2024 — before the chargesheet was eventually filed on 2 May 2024. Therefore, the Court held, the appellant's right to default bail stood crystallized on the date of his application. The subsequent filing of the chargesheet, even if within the purportedly extended period, could not defeat this already-accrued indefeasible right. The Court rejected the High Court's reasoning that the filing of the chargesheet rendered the entire challenge academic. The Bench emphasized that where the very foundation — the extension order — is illegal, everything built upon it collapses. Personal liberty under Article 21 is too precious to be curtailed on the basis of an order that was passed without notice, without hearing, and without any judicial application of mind. As a consequence, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned orders of both the Special Judge and the High Court and directed that the appellant be released on default bail upon furnishing bail bonds and sureties to the satisfaction of the trial Court, with liberty to the trial Court to impose suitable conditions for securing the appellant's presence during trial. This judgment stands as a powerful reaffirmation that the procedural safeguards attending the deprivation of liberty are not bureaucratic inconveniences but constitutional imperatives. Even where the offences alleged are serious — as they are under the UAPA — the State cannot circumvent statutory timelines through mechanical, ex parte, and unreasoned extension orders. The right to default bail serves as a critical check on prosecutorial inefficiency and judicial complacency. As the Court in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra (1994) 4 SCC 602 and later in Jigar v. State of Gujarat (2023) 6 SCC 484 have repeatedly affirmed, this right is indefeasible — once it crystallizes, it cannot be taken away. KEY CASE LAWS CITED Jigar v. State of Gujarat , (2023) 6 SCC 484 — On mandatory production of accused, opportunity of hearing, and application of mind before granting extension of investigation time under special statutes. Sanjay Dutt v. State through CBI , (1994) 5 SCC 410 — Constitution Bench decision on the indefeasible right to default bail under Section 167(2) CrPC and when such right crystallizes. Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra , (1994) 4 SCC 602 — On the procedural requirements for extension of time under special legislation and the mode of service of notice. KEY STATUTORY PROVISIONS Section 167(2), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Statutory limit on remand and right to default bail. Section 43D(2), Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 — Proviso enabling extension of investigation time up to 180 days upon report of Public Prosecutor. Article 21, Constitution of India — Right to life and personal liberty; no deprivation except by procedure established by law (which must be fair and reasonable). Sections 124A, 153A, 120B, Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Sedition, promoting enmity, and criminal conspiracy. Sections 18, 20, 38, 39, UAPA, 1967 — Punishment for terrorist act, membership of terrorist organization, offence relating to membership, and offence relating to support. FINAL TAKEAWAY The decision in Md. Ariz Hasnain v. State of Jharkhand (2026 INSC 456) sends an unambiguous message to trial courts across India: the extension of investigation time under the UAPA or any other special statute is not a ministerial act. It demands the physical or virtual presence of the accused, meaningful opportunity to contest, and a reasoned order reflecting genuine judicial application of mind. Anything less is a "gross illegality" that violates Article 21 and triggers the indefeasible right to default bail. This ruling will serve as a bulwark against indefinite pre-trial detention in cases involving national security legislation and will compel investigating agencies to complete their work within statutory timelines or face the consequence of the accused walking free on default bail.