Supreme Court Declines Interim Relief Against CEC Gyanesh Kumar — Cannot Pass Orders on News Reports Alone

The Supreme Court declined to grant interim relief against Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar, holding that newspaper reports cannot form the sole basis for ex parte orders. The Bench issued notice to the ECI, directing transparent disclosure of decision-making records under Section 18 of the CEC Act, 2023. Title: Supreme Court Declines Interim Relief Against Chief Election Commissioner — Orders Cannot Rest on News Reports Alone Case Name: Rakesh Kumar Singh v. Union of India & Shailendra Mani Tripathi v. Union of India Case Number: W.P.(C) No. 1246/2026 & W.P.(Crl.) No. 401/2026 Court: Supreme Court of India Judges: Chief Justice of India Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi, and Justice V. Mohana Hearing Date: October 5, 2026 Citation: 2026 SCC OnLine SC __ (Awaited) Abstract The Supreme Court of India, in the case of Rakesh Kumar Singh v. Union of India, W.P.(C) No. 1246/2026, dealt with urgent petitions seeking the suspension of Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar on allegations that he had been taking unilateral decisions in the name of the Election Commission of India without securing the concurrence or majority support of the two other Election Commissioners — Dr. Sukhbir Singh Sandhu and Dr. Vivek Joshi. The petitioners relied substantially on investigative media reports to argue that the CEC had violated Section 18 of the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023 , which mandates that Commission decisions be taken unanimously as far as possible, or by majority in case of disagreement. A Bench comprising CJI Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi, and Justice V. Mohana declined to grant any ex parte interim relief, categorically observing that orders cannot be passed on the basis of newspaper reports alone. The Court issued notice to the Union of India, the Election Commission of India, and other respondents, emphasising the need for factual verification before any judicial intervention. Table of Contents Background and Factual Matrix Petitioners' Prayers and Legal Grounds Arguments Advanced by the Petitioners Observations of the Supreme Court Bench The Court's Refusal to Grant Ex Parte Interim Relief The Form 6 Controversy and the Connected Petition Relevant Statutory Provisions and Case Law Significance and Implications of the Decision 1. Background and Factual Matrix The petitions before the Supreme Court arose from a detailed investigative report published by The Indian Express on September 25, 2026, which disclosed that Election Commissioners Dr. Sukhbir Singh Sandhu and Dr. Vivek Joshi had registered written dissents and formal objections on at least fourteen separate occasions over a ten-month period — from October 2025 to August 2026 — concerning decisions and orders issued in the name of the Election Commission of India. According to the report, these actions were undertaken without the knowledge, consent, or participation of the full three-member Commission, and were attributed solely to Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar and certain senior bureaucrats within the Commission's secretariat. The objections raised by the two Election Commissioners pertained to a range of critical matters connected with the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls. These included communications and orders issued without the Commission's collective approval, the alleged absence of circulated agendas before meetings and minutes after meetings for over a year, unauthorized foreign travel by the CEC, substantive modifications to statutory Form 6 used for voter registration, the progressive centralization of control over the ERONet and ECINet electoral roll databases within the Commission's IT establishment bypassing statutory Electoral Registration Officers, and the filing of appeals before appellate tribunals in West Bengal without the other two Commissioners being informed of who had authorized those appeals. Of particular concern was the allegation that on July 29, 2026, Election Commissioners Sandhu and Joshi took the extraordinary step of formally petitioning Cabinet Secretary T.V. Somanathan, terming the actions of Senior Deputy Election Commissioner Maneesh Garg a "clear violation of Section 18 of the 2023 Act" and demanding strict disciplinary action. On July 30, 2026, the two Commissioners jointly nullified and quashed Garg's order. The Election Commission subsequently issued a press release disputing the allegations, maintaining that all decisions carried full legal sanction and followed established statutory procedures, and that the communications from the two Commissioners concerned administrative issues relating to a deputed officer rather than substantive policy decisions. 2. Petitioners' Prayers and Legal Grounds Two separate petitions were heard by the Bench on October 5, 2026. The first, filed by Patna resident Rakesh Kumar Singh through Advocate Sudeep Gupta (with AOR Mudit Gupta), was framed as a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India seeking several forms of relief. The petitioner sought a declaration that decisions of the Election Commission of India, being a multi-member constitutional body, cannot be taken unilaterally by the Chief Election Commissioner alone. The petition also sought a writ in the nature of quo warranto against CEC Gyanesh Kumar, challenging his exercise of powers that are constitutionally vested in the Election Commission as a collective body under Article 324 of the Constitution , rather than in any individual member. As interim relief, the petitioner prayed for the immediate suspension of Gyanesh Kumar as CEC, with the two remaining Election Commissioners jointly overseeing the Commission's functioning during such suspension, and that any vacancy arising therefrom be filled on the recommendation of a committee including the Chief Justice of India. The second petition, filed by Advocate Shailendra Mani Tripathi (W.P.(Crl.) No. 401/2026), sought the quashing of fourteen decisions allegedly taken unilaterally, the constitution of an independent Judicial Inquiry Commission or Special Investigation Team headed by a retired Supreme Court judge to conduct a forensic audit of the ECINet and ERONet databases, and an investigation into the circumstances in which approximately 13 crore names were allegedly deleted from electoral rolls across 30 States and Union Territories during the SIR exercise. The petition further sought directions to initiate prosecution under Section 32 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 , which prescribes punishment for specified breaches of official duty in connection with the preparation, revision, or correction of electoral rolls. Specifically, the petition named CEC Gyanesh Kumar, Senior Deputy Election Commissioner Maneesh Garg, and Director General (IT) Seema Khanna as officials against whom prosecution was sought. 3. Arguments Advanced by the Petitioners Senior Advocate Vikas Singh, appearing for petitioner Rakesh Kumar Singh, anchored his submissions on the statutory framework governing the Election Commission's decision-making process. He drew the Court's attention to Section 18 of the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023 , which provides that the Election Commission may, by unanimous decision, regulate the procedure for transaction of its business and allocation of work. Under Section 18(2) , the discharge of functions is to be done unanimously as far as possible, failing which decisions are to be taken by majority. Singh argued that the CEC had acted in direct contravention of this statutory mandate by taking unilateral decisions without securing either unanimity or majority support. Singh drew an important distinction between two aspects of Section 18 — submitting that the procedure for transaction of business and allocation of work (under sub-section 1) requires unanimous decision, while the discharge of functions (under sub-section 2) permits majority decision-making in the absence of unanimity. He contrasted this with the earlier regime under the 1991 Act (as amended in 1993), arguing that the statutory evolution reflected the legislature's intent to maintain a collegiate functioning of the Commission. He further referred to Section 16 of the 2023 Act , which grants legal immunity to the CEC and Election Commissioners for acts taken in discharge of official duties — a protection that extends even beyond their tenure. Singh submitted that this level of statutory immunity was unprecedented and was not available even to Supreme Court judges or other constitutional functionaries, making judicial oversight of the CEC's conduct all the more necessary. Pressing for immediate interim relief, Singh made impassioned submissions. He told the Court: "We are dealing with a grave situation which can undermine the very basis of our democracy. The elections were conducted with the ECI having some respect. But today we are having a situation where the CEC is acting in a manner which is completely contrary to the statutory framework." When the Bench observed that it must first determine whether any violation had occurred, Singh warned: "The Court has to pass some interim orders, otherwise the country will burn." He proposed that if the CEC were suspended, the two remaining Election Commissioners could discharge the functions of the Commission. Alternatively, he urged the Court to direct that all decisions be taken only unanimously or by majority until the matter was heard next. In the connected matter, Senior Advocate Menaka Guruswamy, appearing for Advocate Shailendra Mani Tripathi, submitted that the actions of the CEC should at minimum be characterized as biased. She referred to the alleged unauthorized modification of Form 6, specifically highlighting that in Delhi, two new conditions had been added to the voter registration process despite Form 6 being prescribed under the Schedule to the Representation of the People Act and thus requiring a formal amendment to the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960, by the Central Government. Guruswamy told the Court: "Deletions of voters have been made in the largest democracy. We have grown up with free and fair elections; that is not the case now." 4. Observations of the Supreme Court Bench The three-judge Bench made several significant observations during the hearing that illuminate the Court's approach to petitions involving constitutional bodies and the standard it applies before granting extraordinary interim relief. The Bench's observations can be understood across four key themes. On the evidentiary threshold for ex parte relief, Chief Justice Surya Kant was forthright in his assessment that the Court could not proceed on the basis of media reports alone. He told Senior Advocate Vikas Singh: "You have come here on the basis of a news report, which can be 100% correct, partially correct or partially incorrect. We cannot pass any order on the basis of a newspaper report." This observation is consistent with a long line of Supreme Court jurisprudence, including the principle articulated in Laxmi Raj Shetty v. State of Tamil Nadu (1988) 3 SCC 319 , where the Court held that newspaper reports by themselves are not evidence of the facts stated therein. The Bench made clear that the factual position had to be verified through proper response from the respondents before any form of relief could be considered. On the necessity of hearing the other side, Justice Joymalya Bagchi posed a pointed question that went to the heart of the principles of natural justice: "Can we ex parte come to a decision that all decisions were unilateral? If records show some decision was not unanimous, we will injunct those decisions and say they are ultra vires. We expect them to respond in a clear, transparent manner." This observation reflects the doctrine established in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248 , which requires that no person be condemned unheard, and that the principles of audi alteram partem apply with full force even in public law proceedings. On the functional consequence of granting relief, the Bench raised a practical concern that revealed its institutional awareness. When the petitioner sought the CEC's immediate suspension, the Bench asked: "Who will conduct the elections?" This question acknowledged that the Election Commission is a continuously functioning constitutional body with ongoing responsibilities, and that any order disrupting its functioning must reckon with the practical consequences for democratic governance. Justice Bagchi also cautioned that "petitions have to be filed with an eye on the working of the Constitution." On the statutory framework, the Bench acknowledged that Section 18 of the 2023 Act established a mandatory framework for decision-making within the Commission. Chief Justice Kant stated: "There is a mandatory law, and we expect them to follow it. If there is any violation, we will undo." The Bench further observed that even the immunity granted under Section 16 of the 2023 Act to the CEC was something "which even judges don't have," signalling that the Court was alive to the concerns about the breadth of statutory protection afforded to the office. 5. The Court's Refusal to Grant Ex Parte Interim Relief The Bench's decision to decline interim relief, while issuing notice, represents a principled application of the law governing ex parte injunctions. The Supreme Court has consistently held that ex parte interim orders are exceptional remedies to be granted only in cases of extreme urgency and only when the balance of convenience clearly favors the applicant and irreparable injury would otherwise result. In Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v. Kartick Das (1994) 4 SCC 225 , the Supreme Court laid down that an ex parte injunction should be granted only where the applicant satisfies the Court that irreparable loss would ensue and that the balance of convenience is overwhelmingly in favor of the applicant. Similarly, in Shiv Kumar Chadha v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (1993) 3 SCC 161 , the Court held that caution must be exercised in passing ex parte orders, especially when they operate against public authorities and constitutional bodies. The Bench in the present case applied this standard rigorously. Rather than suspending a constitutional functionary on the basis of unverified allegations — however serious — the Court chose to issue notice and await responses. This approach preserves judicial propriety while keeping open the possibility of future intervention. The CJI made this clear by stating: "If correctional requirements are there, we can issue those orders in future." Justice Bagchi added that the Court's position was not one of inaction but of sequenced intervention: "If we find out that some decisions were taken either unanimously or without majority, as provided under Section 18, we will injunct those decisions and say these decisions cannot be implemented." It is significant that the Bench did not dismiss the petitioners' concerns or foreclose future relief. The issuance of notice to the Union of India, the Election Commission of India, CEC Gyanesh Kumar, Election Commissioners Dr. Sukhbir Singh Sandhu and Dr. Vivek Joshi, Deputy Election Commissioner Maneesh Garg, and DG(IT) Seema Khanna indicates that the Court treats the allegations with sufficient seriousness to warrant a full hearing. The Bench's direction that the respondents "respond in a clear, transparent manner" is itself a form of judicial signaling — it communicates the expectation of candor and completeness from the Election Commission. 6. The Form 6 Controversy and the Connected Petition One of the most legally consequential aspects of the hearing concerned the alleged modification of Form 6, which is the statutory application form for inclusion in electoral rolls. Form 6 is prescribed under the Schedule to the Representation of the People Act, 1950 , and any substantive change to it ordinarily requires an amendment to the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960 , by the Central Government. The petitioners alleged that new conditions had been added to the Form 6 declaration on the ECINet and ERONet portals, including a requirement that applicants disclose whether they or their parents had been mapped during an earlier SIR exercise — a condition that did not exist in the previous version of the form. This allegation gained added significance because of the Election Commission's own press statement of September 26, 2026, in which it asserted that the revised declaration had been upheld by the Supreme Court in its May 2026 judgment concerning the Bihar SIR exercise. However, Chief Justice Surya Kant directly addressed this claim during the hearing and made a categorical clarification: "Any modified Form 6 has not been approved by us. Let's be clear. When the record is produced, we would like to see who has modified it." This observation is legally significant because it refutes the Commission's assertion of judicial approval and preserves the Court's authority to examine the legality of any modification to a statutory form. The principle that statutory forms prescribed under delegated legislation cannot be altered without following the prescribed rule-making process is well established in Indian administrative law, as recognized in State of Tamil Nadu v. P. Krishnamurthy (2006) 4 SCC 517 . Senior Advocate Menaka Guruswamy submitted that the modifications had far-reaching implications, pointing to the number of voters affected during the SIR exercises in Delhi and West Bengal, and asserting that approximately 16 lakh appeals were pending before appellate tribunals. She highlighted that when retired High Court judges presiding over appellate tribunals in West Bengal heard appeals against wrongful voter exclusions, between 90% and 93% of deleted voters were restored — a statistic that, if accurate, would suggest deeply problematic functioning in the Commission's initial voter purge exercise. 7. Relevant Statutory Provisions and Case Law The legal framework engaged by this case spans constitutional provisions, recent legislation, and established judicial precedent. Article 324 of the Constitution of India vests the superintendence, direction, and control of elections in the Election Commission, which functions as a multi-member collegiate body. The Supreme Court in T.N. Seshan v. Union of India (1995) 4 SCC 611 held that the Election Commission, when it is a multi-member body, must function collegially and that no single member — including the CEC — can claim exclusive authority over the Commission's powers. The Court observed that leaving the exclusive and uncontrolled powers of the Commission in the hands of one person would violate the principles of democratic governance. This precedent is directly relevant to the present controversy. Section 18 of the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023 establishes the decision-making framework: sub-section (1) requires unanimity for regulating the procedure of transaction of business and allocation of work; sub-section (2) mandates that the Commission's functions be discharged unanimously as far as possible, and by majority where unanimity cannot be achieved. Section 16 of the 2023 Act provides statutory immunity to the CEC and Election Commissioners for acts done in the discharge of official duties, extending even beyond their tenure in office. The constitutional validity of this provision is separately under challenge before a larger Bench of the Supreme Court. Section 32 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 prescribes punishment for specified breaches of official duty in connection with the preparation, revision, or correction of electoral rolls — a provision invoked by the second petitioner to seek prosecution of the CEC and other officials. The landmark decision in Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (2023) 6 SCC 161 is the immediate constitutional backdrop to this litigation. In that case, the Supreme Court directed the formation of a committee comprising the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition, and the Chief Justice of India for recommending appointments to the Election Commission, emphasizing the need for the Commission's independence from executive influence. The CEC Act, 2023 was subsequently enacted by Parliament, replacing the CJI with a Union Cabinet Minister on the selection committee — a change that is itself under constitutional challenge. Senior Advocate Vikas Singh specifically referred to the Anoop Baranwal framework during his submissions, urging the Court to "restore the Anoop Baranwal position." The principle that newspaper reports cannot constitute evidence was affirmed in Laxmi Raj Shetty v. State of Tamil Nadu (1988) 3 SCC 319 and reiterated in Quamarul Islam v. S.K. Kanta (1994) SCC (Cri) 830 , where the Court held that newspaper reports are hearsay evidence and cannot be relied upon unless proved by the maker of the report. 8. Significance and Implications of the Decision The Supreme Court's handling of this matter carries significance on multiple levels — procedural, institutional, and constitutional. At the procedural level, the Bench reaffirmed that the bar against passing ex parte orders on the basis of newspaper reports applies even to matters of extraordinary public importance. The Court's insistence on receiving the respondents' version before making any determination is a salutary reminder that procedural safeguards exist to protect the integrity of judicial outcomes, not to frustrate the pursuit of justice. By issuing notice and demanding "clear, transparent" responses, the Bench created a structured mechanism for the factual record to be established before the Court through authenticated documents — file notings, meeting minutes, and internal communications — rather than through media narratives, however credible those narratives may appear. At the institutional level, the case raises fundamental questions about the functioning of the Election Commission as a collegiate constitutional body. The allegation that fourteen decisions were taken unilaterally by the CEC despite written dissent from both other Election Commissioners, if established, would represent a serious departure from the statutory mandate under Section 18 of the 2023 Act and from the constitutional design articulated in T.N. Seshan (1995). The fact that two sitting Election Commissioners allegedly petitioned the Cabinet Secretary — an extraordinary and unprecedented step — suggests a breakdown in the Commission's internal governance mechanisms. The Court's observation that the statutory immunity under Section 16 exceeds even the protection available to judges signals its awareness of the potential for misuse of such immunity. The case also has immediate electoral consequences. With the SIR exercise ongoing across multiple States and allegations of mass voter deletions — reportedly affecting 13 crore voters — the stakes extend beyond abstract constitutional questions to the foundational democratic right of every citizen under Article 326 of the Constitution , which guarantees adult suffrage. Senior Advocate Singh's argument that the Court "cannot undo an election or undo an elected government" highlights the irreversible nature of electoral harm, distinguishing it from the kind of injury that can be remedied through subsequent judicial intervention. Looking ahead, the next date of hearing will be critical. The Court has directed all respondents to file their responses, and the production of internal records — meeting minutes, file notings, and the authorization chain for the Form 6 modifications — will likely determine whether the Court proceeds to grant the substantive relief sought. The Bench's repeated assurance that "our powers are known to everyone" and that it will "injunct" any decision found to be ultra vires signals that the Court is prepared to act decisively once the factual record is established. For now, the refusal of interim relief is not a vindication of the Election Commission's conduct, but a disciplined application of judicial process in a case where the final outcome may reshape the institutional architecture of India's electoral machinery. Keywords: Supreme Court CEC Gyanesh Kumar, interim relief news reports, Section 18 CEC Act 2023, Rakesh Kumar Singh v Union of India, Election Commission unilateral decisions, quo warranto CEC, Form 6 modification SIR, Article 324 Constitution, Anoop Baranwal, T.N. Seshan, Election Commission collegiate body