Section 498A Now Covers Live-In Relationships: Supreme Court Landmark Ruling on Cruelty in Nature of Marriage

EduLaw EditorialLandmark Judgements2026-08-04

The Supreme Court has expanded the scope of Section 498A IPC beyond formal marriages, ruling that men in live-in relationships resembling marriage can be prosecuted for cruelty provided the relationship carries an "intent to marry." This landmark judgment redefines domestic cruelty protections for Indian women. Title: Section 498A IPC Applicability to Live-In Relationships in the Nature of Marriage Case Name: Dr. Lokesh B.H. & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr. Case Number: Special Leave Petition (Criminal) — Appeals Against Quashing Orders Court: Supreme Court of India Judges: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sanjay Karol and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh Judgment Date: August 3, 2026 Citation: 2026 INSC 784 | 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 753 ABSTRACT The Supreme Court of India, in Dr. Lokesh B.H. & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr. (2026 INSC 784), has delivered a landmark pronouncement extending the protection of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 to women in live-in relationships that qualify as "relationships in the nature of marriage." The Court held that the word "husband" appearing in Section 498A must be given a purposive interpretation, encompassing a male partner in a relationship that bears the essential characteristics of marriage and where the "intent to marry" is established as an intrinsic component. The Bench comprising Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice N. Kotiswar Singh reasoned that denying criminal protection to a woman solely because her domestic relationship lacks formal solemnization offends Article 14 of the Constitution of India and defeats the reformative objective of the anti-cruelty provision. However, the Court carefully narrowed the scope by mandating that only those live-in relationships where both partners share a demonstrable intent to marry shall attract penal consequences under Section 498A, thereby distinguishing this criminal remedy from the broader civil protections available under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 . The judgment also reiterated strict compliance with the safeguards against arrest laid down in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar (2014) 8 SCC 273 . TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction and Contextual Background Factual Matrix and Procedural History Key Legal Issues Before the Court Submissions and Arguments of the Parties Supreme Court's Reasoning and Analysis The Constitutional Dimension — Article 14 and Rational Nexus Key Legal Principles, Holdings, and Safeguards Relevant Case Laws and Statutory Provisions Discussed Implications for Indian Criminal and Family Law Conclusion 1. INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND The institution of marriage in India has traditionally served as the gateway through which women access legal protections against domestic abuse and cruelty. Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code — introduced in 1983 as a specific legislative response to rampant dowry harassment and domestic violence — was framed with the explicit use of the word "husband," thereby anchoring its protective ambit to the formal institution of matrimony. For decades, this textual constraint left women in cohabitative relationships without recourse to criminal remedies for cruelty inflicted by their male partners or the partner's relatives. The social reality of modern India, however, has evolved considerably. Live-in relationships are no longer uncommon, and the Supreme Court itself has, over the years, acknowledged their legitimacy and the rights flowing therefrom. Yet until this judgment, the criminal law's response to cruelty remained tethered to the formality of a marriage certificate. The judgment in Dr. Lokesh B.H. & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr. (2026 INSC 784) represents a watershed moment in Indian domestic violence jurisprudence — it declares, in unequivocal terms, that cruelty does not check at the door based on whether the house it enters belongs to a married woman or not. The ruling arrives at a time when the Indian Penal Code has already been replaced by the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) , meaning the judgment will likely extend its interpretive force to Section 85 of the BNS , which corresponds to the erstwhile Section 498A. The Court's reasoning, rooted in constitutional principles of equality and personal dignity, ensures that the protection against domestic cruelty travels with the vulnerability of the woman, rather than halting at the technicality of formal nuptials. 2. FACTUAL MATRIX AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The case originated from a criminal complaint filed in Karnataka, where the complainant-woman alleged that the accused (the appellant before the Supreme Court) had married her in accordance with Hindu customs and that thereafter, she was subjected to cruelty by the accused and his family members, including demands for dowry and physical violence resulting in burn injuries on her leg. The accused, however, denied the existence of any valid marriage, contending that since he was already married to another woman, the relationship with the complainant could never constitute a valid matrimonial union. On the basis of this argument, the accused sought quashing of the criminal proceedings initiated under Section 498A IPC and other related provisions, asserting that the penal provision applied exclusively to a "husband" in the context of a legally subsisting marriage. The Karnataka High Court rejected this plea, holding that the term "husband" in Section 498A cannot be construed in an unduly technical manner. The High Court reasoned that when a man induces a woman to believe she is lawfully married and thereafter subjects her to cruelty, he cannot invoke the absence of a valid marriage as a shield against prosecution. Aggrieved by the High Court's refusal to quash the proceedings, the accused preferred a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court. The Apex Court, rather than confining itself to the narrower question of void or voidable marriages, expanded the scope of its inquiry to address the broader and more significant question: whether Section 498A IPC can apply to live-in relationships that bear the characteristics of marriage. 3. KEY LEGAL ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT The Supreme Court framed several interconnected legal questions for determination. The primary issue was whether Section 498A IPC, being a penal provision employing the specific term "husband," must be restricted in its application to only those relationships that constitute legally valid marriages, or whether the provision is capable of a wider interpretation encompassing relationships that are "in the nature of marriage." A related question was whether denying the protection of Section 498A to women in marriage-like live-in relationships violates the equality guarantee under Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court also examined whether the civil remedies available under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act) constitute an adequate substitute for the criminal deterrence provided by Section 498A, and if not, what additional safeguards must be imposed when the penal provision is extended to non-marital relationships. 4. SUBMISSIONS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES Senior Advocate Anand Sanjay M. Nuli , appearing for the appellants, advanced the argument that Section 498A is a penal provision that must be interpreted strictly in accordance with well-settled canons of criminal law. Since the provision expressly uses the word "husband," it could not be stretched to cover a male partner in a live-in relationship. Any such extension, it was argued, would amount to judicial legislation and would open the floodgates of false complaints in informal relationships. Additional Solicitor General Brijender Chahar , representing the State of Karnataka and the Union of India, took the somewhat surprising position that the existing framework under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 already covers women in live-in relationships by providing civil remedies including protection orders, maintenance, and compensation. This, the Union submitted, rendered any expansion of the criminal provision unnecessary and potentially disruptive. Advocate Hetu Arora Sethi , representing the complainant-respondent, contended that the purposive interpretation of Section 498A demanded its extension to marriage-like relationships. The Court also had the benefit of submissions from Additional Solicitor General Aishwarya Bhati and Advocate Nina R. Nariman , who assisted as Amici Curiae, providing perspectives on constitutional principles, comparative jurisprudence, and the protection of women's rights. 5. SUPREME COURT'S REASONING AND ANALYSIS Justice Sanjay Karol, writing the judgment for the Bench, adopted a methodical and purposive approach to statutory interpretation. The Court began by firmly rejecting the contention that Section 498A, merely because it is penal in character, must be confined to a husband within a legally recognized marriage. The Court observed that the purpose of penalizing cruelty by a husband and his relatives was to introduce a factor of deterrence against reprehensible behaviour directed at women in domestic settings — behaviour that was not adequately addressed by existing laws at the time of the provision's enactment in 1983. The objective, the Court noted, was "reformative, cloaked with punishment," and any interpretation that frustrates this reformative purpose would defeat the legislative mandate. The Court then drew a critical distinction between the broad concept of a "live-in relationship" and the narrower legal category of a "relationship in the nature of marriage." Relying on the principles articulated in Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma (2013) 15 SCC 755 , the Court reiterated that a relationship in the nature of marriage is a subset of the broader category of live-in relationships. Such a relationship is characterized by several illustrative (though not exhaustive) indicators, including the couple holding themselves out to society as being akin to spouses, pooling financial resources, sharing a household, existing in a sexual relationship of some permanence, having children together, and presenting themselves socially as a domestic unit. However, the Court introduced a crucial additional requirement for the application of Section 498A: the existence of an "intent to marry." The Court reasoned that many couples may satisfy the criteria for a relationship in the nature of marriage yet consciously choose never to formalize their union through matrimony. In such cases, the relationship, while deserving of civil protection under the DV Act, should not attract the severe penal consequences of Section 498A. Only those relationships that are in the nature of marriage and also carry a demonstrable intent to marry are, in the Court's view, "the closest to marriage itself," and it is those relationships that shall be entitled to the protection of the anti-cruelty provision. The initial burden of establishing this intent was placed on the woman invoking the provision. 6. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION — ARTICLE 14 AND RATIONAL NEXUS A significant portion of the judgment addressed the constitutional dimension of the question. The Court examined the issue through the lens of Article 14 of the Constitution and the fundamental rights of dignity and personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 . Referring to the landmark privacy judgment in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1 and the decision in Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M. (2018) 16 SCC 368 , the Bench observed that the law fairly well recognizes the right and freedom of an individual to choose the person they want to be with as an inextricable part of dignity and personal liberty. The Court posed a penetrating question: if persons A and B choose each other and decide to live life together, why should there be any difference in the protection given to the woman merely because the couple is not formally married? The distinction between "married" and "live-in relationship in the nature of marriage," insofar as it relates to the protection envisaged by Section 498A, the Court declared, "has no rational nexus with the object of preventing domestic violence and is as such offensive to Article 14 of the Constitution of India." This constitutional reasoning elevated the judgment from a mere exercise in statutory interpretation to a pronouncement on fundamental rights, ensuring that the ruling rests on a foundation that future legislative changes cannot easily disturb. The Court also addressed the Union's argument that the DV Act provided adequate protection. Rejecting this submission, the Bench held that the DV Act is primarily a piece of civil legislation — save for Section 31 which provides for penalty only upon violation of a protection order — and cannot substitute for the deterrent effect of criminal law. To equate the civil remedies of the DV Act with the penal protection of Section 498A, the Court stated, "would be a misstatement of law," because the import of civil and criminal law is fundamentally different: one carries monetary consequences, while the other is backed by the force of criminal deterrence. 7. KEY LEGAL PRINCIPLES, HOLDINGS, AND SAFEGUARDS The Court crystallized its holdings into four clear propositions. First, Section 498A is held to be applicable to live-in relationships that qualify as "relationships in the nature of marriage" with the intent to marry being established as an intrinsic part thereof. Second, the live-in relationships protected by Section 498A are those between two consenting adult individuals. Third, the proposition of law as laid down is limited to Section 498A IPC only, and this extended interpretation shall not affect any other provision of the Penal Code. Fourth, the safeguards against arrest and other factors as laid down in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar (2014) 8 SCC 273 shall be strictly applied, and no person in a relationship in the nature of marriage who has been accused of committing cruelty shall be arrested without preliminary enquiries. The emphasis on the Arnesh Kumar safeguards is particularly significant. The Court was clearly conscious of longstanding concerns regarding the misuse of Section 498A, which has been described in earlier judicial pronouncements as a provision sometimes used as a weapon rather than a shield. By mandating strict compliance with the requirement of preliminary enquiry before arrest — especially in the context of live-in relationships where the existence of the relationship itself may be disputed — the Court sought to balance the extension of protection with the prevention of potential abuse. On the facts of the specific case before it, the Court refused to quash the criminal proceedings. It held that the allegations in the FIR — including suppression of a prior marriage, harassment for dowry, and physical injury causing burns — disclosed a prima facie case that required adjudication at trial. Whether the allegations were true remained a matter for the trial court to determine upon appreciation of evidence. 8. RELEVANT CASE LAWS AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS DISCUSSED The judgment engages extensively with prior judicial pronouncements. The Court relied upon Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma (2013) 15 SCC 755 , which laid down the indicators of a "relationship in the nature of marriage" for the purposes of the Domestic Violence Act. The constitutional framework was drawn from K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1 (the right to privacy as a fundamental right encompassing personal autonomy and dignity) and Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M. (2018) 16 SCC 368 (the right to choose one's life partner as part of personal liberty). The safeguards mandated in the dispositional portion draw directly from Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar (2014) 8 SCC 273 , which established procedural protections against automatic arrest in Section 498A cases. The key statutory provisions discussed include Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (cruelty by husband or relatives of husband), Section 85 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (the corresponding provision in the new criminal code), Sections 2(f) and 2(q) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (definitions of "domestic relationship" and "relationship in the nature of marriage"), Section 31 of the DV Act (penalty for breach of protection order), and Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India (right to equality and right to life and personal liberty respectively). 9. IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIAN CRIMINAL AND FAMILY LAW This judgment carries transformative implications for the landscape of Indian domestic violence law. For women in long-term cohabitative relationships who face cruelty from their partners or the partner's family, the ruling opens a door to criminal remedies that was previously shut. The practical effect is that a woman who has been living with her male partner in a relationship bearing the characteristics of marriage — and where both shared an intent to eventually solemnize the union — can now file a complaint under Section 498A (or its BNS equivalent, Section 85) if she is subjected to cruelty. For legal practitioners, the judgment introduces a new preliminary factual inquiry in Section 498A cases involving unmarried complainants: the court must first be satisfied that the relationship qualifies as one "in the nature of marriage" and that the intent to marry existed. This adds a layer of factual adjudication at the threshold stage itself, which may become a contested battleground in such cases. The burden on the complainant to establish the intent to marry — an inherently subjective mental state — may prove challenging to discharge in practice, particularly where the relationship has deteriorated and contemporaneous evidence of such intent is sparse. The judgment also signals the Court's readiness to interpret penal provisions in light of evolving social norms and constitutional values, rather than confining itself to literalist textualism. This interpretive philosophy may have implications beyond Section 498A, potentially influencing how courts approach other gender-sensitive criminal provisions in the context of non-traditional domestic arrangements. 10. CONCLUSION The Supreme Court's decision in Dr. Lokesh B.H. & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr. (2026 INSC 784) represents a carefully calibrated expansion of criminal law's protective umbrella over women in domestic relationships. By holding that Section 498A IPC extends to live-in relationships in the nature of marriage where the intent to marry is established, the Court has bridged a significant gap between social reality and legal protection. The judgment neither opens the provision to all live-in relationships indiscriminately nor keeps it confined within the rigid walls of formal matrimony. Instead, it carves out a principled middle path — one that recognizes the constitutional imperative of equal protection while maintaining the safeguards necessary to prevent misuse of a potent penal provision. The requirement of "intent to marry" as a threshold condition, the limitation of the ruling to Section 498A alone, and the mandatory application of Arnesh Kumar safeguards collectively demonstrate the Court's awareness of the need for balance. This judgment will undoubtedly shape the contours of domestic cruelty litigation in India for years to come, and legal practitioners, trial courts, and investigating agencies must familiarize themselves with both its expansive principles and its carefully drawn limitations. Disclaimer: This case analysis is published for educational and informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers are encouraged to consult qualified legal professionals for case-specific guidance. Tags: Section 498A IPC, Live-In Relationship, Supreme Court India 2026, Cruelty Against Women, Domestic Violence, Relationship in Nature of Marriage, Intent to Marry, Article 14, Arnesh Kumar Safeguards, Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita Section 85, Dr Lokesh BH v State of Karnataka