PM's Degree Is Personal Information Under RTI Act: Gujarat HC Dismisses Kejriwal's Appeal Full Case Analysis

EduLaw EditorialLandmark Judgements2026-10-01

The Gujarat High Court, in a landmark ruling on the intersection of the Right to Information and the Right to Privacy, held that a Prime Minister's educational degree constitutes personal information exempt from disclosure under the RTI Act. The Division Bench dismissed Arvind Kejriwal's appeal and upheld Rs 25,000 costs, ruling that the CIC exceeded its jurisdiction. Read the full case analysis. Title: PM's Degree Is Protected Personal Information Under RTI — Gujarat High Court Draws the Line Between Transparency and Privacy Case Name: Arvind Kejriwal v. Gujarat University & Ors. Case Number: R/Letters Patent Appeal No. 796 of 2026 Court: Gujarat High Court (Division Bench) Judges: Chief Justice Sunita Agarwal and Justice D.N. Ray Judgment Date: September 29, 2026 Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Guj) 263 ABSTRACT This case analysis examines the Division Bench judgment of the Gujarat High Court in Arvind Kejriwal v. Gujarat University & Ors., wherein the court comprehensively addressed the tension between the citizen's right to information under the Right to Information Act, 2005 (hereinafter "RTI Act") and an individual's constitutionally protected right to privacy under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The central question was whether the educational degree of the Prime Minister of India could be compelled to be disclosed through the machinery of the RTI Act. The court answered in the negative, holding that educational records constitute "personal information" protected under Section 8(1)(j) and information held in a "fiduciary capacity" under Section 8(1)(e) of the RTI Act. The judgment further found that the Central Information Commission (CIC) had acted beyond its statutory jurisdiction by taking suo motu cognizance of a letter written by Kejriwal during unrelated proceedings and treating it as a formal RTI application. The court dismissed the appeal and upheld the Rs 25,000 costs imposed on the appellant, observing that the RTI Act cannot be weaponised for political vendetta. TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction and Background of the Dispute Factual Matrix and Procedural History Key Legal Issues Before the Court The Court's Analysis on CIC's Jurisdiction Under the RTI Act Personal Information, Fiduciary Duty, and the Privacy Shield Under Section 8 The Public Interest Test — Balancing Transparency and Privacy RTI as a Political Tool — The Court's Strong Observations Conclusion, Implications, and Key Takeaways INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF THE DISPUTE The Right to Information Act, 2005 was enacted as a powerful instrument of democratic accountability, giving every citizen the right to access information held by or under the control of public authorities. However, the Act was never intended to be an unbounded sword. It carefully carved out exemptions under Section 8 to protect national security, sovereignty, commercial confidence, fiduciary relationships, and crucially, personal privacy. The case of Arvind Kejriwal v. Gujarat University & Ors. brings into sharp focus the collision between two fundamental constitutional values — the right of citizens to demand transparency from those who govern them, and the right of every individual, including a public servant, to the sanctity of personal information that has no bearing on the discharge of public functions. The dispute originated in 2016 when Arvind Kejriwal, then Chief Minister of Delhi and convenor of the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP), wrote a letter to the Central Information Commission during the pendency of separate proceedings concerning his own electoral photo identity card. In that letter, he demanded that Prime Minister Narendra Modi's educational degree be made public. The then Central Information Commissioner, M. Sridhar Acharyulu, treated the letter as an RTI application and suo motu directed Gujarat University and Delhi University to provide information regarding the degrees of the Prime Minister to Kejriwal. This extraordinary step by the CIC — converting a letter written during unrelated proceedings into a formal RTI application and issuing disclosure directions — became the nucleus of a legal battle that wound its way through a single-judge bench, a division bench, and spanned nearly a decade. The Gujarat High Court's September 2026 judgment represents the definitive judicial pronouncement on the scope of RTI exemptions concerning personal educational records and the jurisdictional limits of the CIC. FACTUAL MATRIX AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY In April 2016, while the Central Information Commission was adjudicating a complaint filed by an RTI applicant concerning Arvind Kejriwal's electoral photo identity card, Kejriwal submitted a written response dated April 28, 2016. In this response, he stated that he had no objection to government records about him being made public and questioned why the CIC wished to "hide" information concerning the Prime Minister's educational qualifications. On the very next day, the then Information Commissioner M. Sridhar Acharyulu passed what the court later termed an "Adjunct Order," treating Kejriwal as an applicant based on this letter and directing the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) to provide the specific number and year of the Prime Minister's degree and post-graduate degree to Delhi University and Gujarat University. The universities were further directed to search their records and furnish the information to Kejriwal. Gujarat University challenged this CIC order before the Gujarat High Court. In May 2016, the then Vice-Chancellor of Gujarat University, M.N. Patel, publicly announced that Narendra Modi had completed his MA in Political Science in 1983 with 62.3 per cent marks as an external student, and the university posted the degree on its website. Despite this, the legal challenge continued. In March 2023, a single-judge bench of the Gujarat High Court quashed the CIC's 2016 order, holding that the CIC had committed a "clear transgression of jurisdiction." The single judge further imposed costs of Rs 25,000 on Kejriwal, observing that his conduct amounted to a misuse of the RTI machinery for political gain. Kejriwal did not challenge the quashing of the CIC order on its merits. His Letters Patent Appeal No. 796 of 2026 was confined to challenging the adverse observations against his conduct and the imposition of costs. Despite this limited challenge, the Division Bench undertook an extensive and comprehensive examination of every legal dimension of the dispute, including the CIC's jurisdiction, the scope of RTI exemptions, the fiduciary relationship between universities and students, the right to privacy, and the public interest doctrine. KEY LEGAL ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT The Division Bench framed and addressed several interrelated legal questions that together constitute a comprehensive framework for understanding the limits of the RTI Act when personal information is at stake. The first and most fundamental issue was whether the Central Information Commission possessed the jurisdictional authority under the RTI Act to take suo motu cognizance of a letter written by Kejriwal in unrelated proceedings and convert it into a fresh RTI application at the second appellate stage. The second issue was whether educational qualification documents, specifically degree certificates and marksheets, constitute "personal information" within the meaning of Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act and whether universities hold such records in a "fiduciary capacity" attracting the exemption under Section 8(1)(e) . The third issue concerned the application of the "public interest" and "larger public interest" test — whether the mere fact that the information pertained to the Prime Minister of India, a constitutional functionary, automatically elevated it from the domain of private information to public interest. The fourth issue was whether the RTI Act could be used as a mechanism to pursue personal grudges or political vendetta against an individual holding public office, and whether the single judge's imposition of costs on Kejriwal was justified. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS ON CIC'S JURISDICTION UNDER THE RTI ACT The Division Bench opened its analysis with a meticulous examination of the statutory scheme of the RTI Act concerning the procedure for seeking information. The court referred to Section 6(1) of the RTI Act, 2005 , which prescribes that any person desiring information must make a request in writing or through electronic means in the form of an application, accompanied by the prescribed fee, to the Public Information Officer (PIO) of the concerned public authority. The application must specify the particulars of the information sought. This procedure, the court emphasised, is the foundational gateway through which the entire machinery of the RTI Act is set in motion. The court observed that the CIC, established as a second appellate authority under the RTI Act, has powers under Section 18 to receive and inquire into complaints from persons who have been refused access to information or have been provided incomplete, misleading, or false information. However, these powers presuppose the existence of a validly filed RTI application at the first stage. In the present case, no independent RTI application had ever been submitted by Kejriwal to the Public Information Officer of Gujarat University seeking the Prime Minister's educational records. What the CIC acted upon was merely a letter written by Kejriwal during proceedings concerning an entirely different matter — his own electoral photo identity card. The court held unequivocally that the act of the CIC in taking suo motu cognizance and treating Kejriwal as an applicant based on this letter was "completely outside the scope of the RTI Act, 2005." The court agreed with the single judge's characterisation of this conduct as a "clear transgression of jurisdiction" by a statutory authority exercising quasi-judicial powers. This finding carries significant implications for the institutional discipline expected of information commissions across the country. It establishes that the CIC cannot function as a self-activating body that manufactures RTI applications out of stray communications and then proceeds to adjudicate upon them. The procedural safeguards of the RTI Act exist not merely as formalities but as jurisdictional prerequisites that protect the rights of third parties whose information may be sought. PERSONAL INFORMATION, FIDUCIARY DUTY, AND THE PRIVACY SHIELD UNDER SECTION 8 The most doctrinally significant portion of the judgment is the court's analysis of the twin exemptions under Section 8(1)(e) and Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act. Section 8(1)(e) exempts from disclosure information available to a person in his fiduciary relationship, unless the competent authority is satisfied that the larger public interest warrants disclosure. Section 8(1)(j) , as it stood before amendment, exempted information which relates to personal information, the disclosure of which has no relationship to any public activity or interest, or which would cause unwarranted invasion of privacy, unless the larger public interest justifies disclosure. The court noted a critical legislative development: Section 8(1)(j) has been amended and substituted by Section 44(3) of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (DPDPA) . Under the amended provision, there is an "absolute exemption" to any information that relates to personal information. This amendment, the court observed, is fully aligned with the constitutional protection of the right to privacy as recognised by the Nine-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1 . The court further relied extensively on the Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal (2020) 5 SCC 481 , which had authoritatively held that professional and educational records fall within the category of personal information entitled to protection from unwarranted invasion of privacy. Applying these principles, the Division Bench held that educational qualification documents — including marksheets and degree certificates — fall squarely within the ambit of "personal information" of the individual concerned. The court further held that universities, boards, and examining bodies hold such records in a fiduciary capacity on behalf of their students and ex-students. This fiduciary relationship triggers the exemption under Section 8(1)(e) , in addition to the personal information exemption under Section 8(1)(j) . The court observed that the CIC's original order had contained only a "cryptic reasoning" and a "casual remark" that educational qualifications of a political leader occupying a constitutional position were not hit by Section 8, without providing any supporting reasons — an approach that was directly contrary to the Supreme Court's holdings in Subhash Chandra Agarwal and Puttaswamy. THE PUBLIC INTEREST TEST — BALANCING TRANSPARENCY AND PRIVACY Having established that the Prime Minister's educational records fell within the scope of the twin exemptions, the court turned to the critical question of whether the "larger public interest" exception could override these exemptions and compel disclosure. Both Section 8(1)(e) and Section 8(1)(j) permit disclosure of otherwise exempt information if the larger public interest justifies it. The court held that this determination requires a careful balancing exercise. Authorities must weigh the public interest in disclosure against the potential harm, the invasion of privacy, and the breach of confidentiality that disclosure may cause to the individual concerned. The court articulated the public interest test in the context of the RTI Act as requiring reflection upon three elements: the object and purpose behind the right to information; the right to privacy and the consequences of its invasion; and the possible harm, injury, and breach of confidentiality that would be caused to the third party with reference to a particular piece of information and the person concerned. Applying this test, the Division Bench arrived at the emphatic conclusion that "no public interest much less larger public interest would require seeking of information of the educational qualification of the Prime Minister of India, who is an elected representative of the people and when his educational qualification has no bearing on his election to the Constitutional post." The court addressed and rejected the argument that the mere fact that the information concerned the Prime Minister automatically elevated it to a matter of public interest. In the court's view, information does not lose its private character solely because the individual concerned occupies a constitutional office. The court further noted that the CIC's own original order had itself recorded that the information sought was neither for any public interest nor relatable to accountability or transparency in the discharge of public functions performed by the Prime Minister — a self-defeating acknowledgment that the Commission nevertheless chose to disregard while directing disclosure. The court also distinguished between the election law requirement for candidates to disclose educational qualifications in their nomination papers and a separate demand for university records through the RTI Act. While acknowledging that voters have a right to know the qualifications of candidates at the time of elections, the court held that this right operates within the framework of electoral laws and does not automatically extend to compelled disclosure of university records under the RTI Act, which is "a code in itself" with its own exemptions and procedural safeguards. RTI AS A POLITICAL TOOL — THE COURT'S STRONG OBSERVATIONS The Division Bench devoted pointed observations to the conduct of Kejriwal and the broader principle that statutory proceedings should not be converted into platforms for political warfare. Endorsing the single judge's findings, the court held that "statutory authorities and the Courts should not be treated as a public platform to ventilate the political vengeance." The court further observed that "a political leader holding the public office cannot use the statutory proceedings for their political motives." Addressing Kejriwal's specific conduct, the court noted that the manner in which Kejriwal "responded to the CIC in the proceedings against him and further pursued the matter by filling the written submissions speaks of itself and need no further comments or observations from us." It was noted that Solicitor General Tushar Mehta, appearing for Gujarat University, submitted that Kejriwal had fought the case "relentlessly" and had even held press conferences to defame the institution, seeking costs to discourage future misuse of the RTI machinery. Senior Advocate Abhishek Manu Singhvi, appearing for Kejriwal, argued that his client had not "persisted" in seeking the Prime Minister's degree and that the CIC had initiated proceedings suo motu, naming Kejriwal as a respondent based on a letter rather than a formal application. The Division Bench, however, found these arguments unpersuasive and upheld the Rs 25,000 costs imposed by the single judge, observing that the RTI Act "cannot be used as a tool to ventilate personal grudges or political vendetta against an individual even if he or she is holding a public office." This observation, while made in the specific context of this case, carries broader significance as a judicial warning against the instrumentalisation of transparency legislation for partisan purposes, a concern that had been flagged by courts in earlier cases as well. CONCLUSION, IMPLICATIONS, AND KEY TAKEAWAYS The Gujarat High Court's judgment in Arvind Kejriwal v. Gujarat University & Ors. is a consequential ruling that clarifies several important aspects of RTI jurisprudence, privacy law, and institutional jurisdiction. On the jurisdictional front, the court has drawn a firm boundary around the powers of the Central Information Commission, holding that the CIC cannot manufacture RTI applications from letters received in unrelated proceedings and then issue disclosure directions. The CIC must function strictly within the procedural framework of Section 6(1) of the RTI Act, and any departure from this framework constitutes a jurisdictional nullity. On the substantive question of privacy, the court has reaffirmed and strengthened the doctrinal foundations laid by the Supreme Court in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) and CPIO, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal (2020) , holding that educational records are personal information held by universities in a fiduciary capacity, attracting dual protection under Section 8(1)(e) and Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act. The court's reference to the amendment of Section 8(1)(j) by Section 44(3) of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 is particularly noteworthy, as it signals the evolving legislative landscape toward even stronger privacy protections and the courts' willingness to interpret these protections robustly. Perhaps the most far-reaching implication of this judgment lies in its articulation of the public interest test. The court has made clear that holding a constitutional office does not strip an individual of the right to privacy over personal information that has no bearing on the discharge of public duties. The mere eminence of the office-holder does not automatically convert private information into public interest information. This principle protects not only the Prime Minister but every public servant, elected representative, and constitutional functionary from fishing expeditions disguised as RTI applications. At the same time, the court has left the door open for genuine cases where a larger public interest can be demonstrated — the exemptions are not absolute (except under the amended Section 8(1)(j) post-DPDPA), and the balancing test remains available. The imposition and affirmation of Rs 25,000 costs on the appellant serves as a practical deterrent against the misuse of RTI proceedings for collateral purposes. This judgment will serve as an important precedent in future cases where the boundaries between legitimate transparency demands and privacy-invasive political manoeuvring need to be adjudicated. KEY CASE LAWS CITED Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal (2020) 5 SCC 481 — Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court holding that personal and professional records are entitled to privacy protection under Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act. K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1 — Nine-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court recognising the right to privacy as a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. KEY STATUTORY PROVISIONS Section 6(1), RTI Act, 2005 — Procedure for making an RTI application to the Public Information Officer. Section 8(1)(e), RTI Act, 2005 — Exemption from disclosure of information available in a fiduciary relationship. Section 8(1)(j), RTI Act, 2005 — Exemption from disclosure of personal information (as amended by Section 44(3) of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023). Section 18, RTI Act, 2005 — Powers of the Central Information Commission. Section 3, RTI Act, 2005 — Right to information vested in citizens. Section 4(1)(b) and (c), RTI Act, 2005 — Obligations of public authorities to publish certain information. Article 21, Constitution of India — Right to life and personal liberty, encompassing the right to privacy. Section 44(3), Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 — Amendment substituting Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act with absolute exemption for personal information.