Owning a ₹1.70 Crore Flat and Luxury Cars Does Not Deny Maintenance Madras High Court Upholds ₹2.5 Lakh Monthly Order

Justice Sunder Mohan of the Madras High Court dismissed a film producer's revision petition and confirmed ₹1 lakh maintenance for his estranged partner and ₹1.5 lakh for their minor son, holding that property ownership alone does not prove regular income. The Court reaffirmed that strict proof of marriage is not essential under Section 144 of BNSS (formerly Section 125 CrPC) and that long cohabitation raises a presumption of marriage. Title: Owning a ₹1.70 Crore Flat and Luxury Cars Does Not Deny Maintenance — Madras High Court Upholds ₹2.5 Lakh Monthly Order Case Name: X v. Y (Names Masked by the Court) Case Number: CRL RC No. 1116 of 2026 Court: Madras High Court (High Court of Judicature at Madras) Judge: The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sunder Mohan Judgment Date: 21 September 2026 (Reserved on 15 September 2026) Citation: CRL RC No. 1116 of 2026, CNR: HCMA011151842026 Relevant Statutes: Section 144 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) [formerly Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) ]; Section 438 read with Section 442 of BNSS ; Section 7(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 ; Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 ABSTRACT This case analysis examines the order of the Madras High Court in CRL RC No. 1116 of 2026, wherein Justice Sunder Mohan dismissed a criminal revision filed by a film producer challenging a Family Court order that awarded ₹1 lakh per month as maintenance to his estranged partner and ₹1.5 lakh per month to their minor son. The petitioner contended that the woman was not entitled to maintenance because no valid marriage existed, she was aware of his prior marriage, and she possessed significant assets including a flat purchased for ₹1.70 crore and two luxury cars. The High Court rejected all three contentions, holding that the petitioner had failed to discharge the burden of proving a subsisting earlier marriage, that strict proof of marriage is not required in proceedings under Section 144 of BNSS (formerly Section 125 CrPC ), and that ownership of immovable property and luxury vehicles does not by itself establish regular income sufficient to deny maintenance. The judgment extensively relies on the Supreme Court rulings in Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse (2014) 1 SCC 188 , Chanmuniya v. Virendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha (2011) 1 SCC 141 , and Vimala v. K. Veerasamy (1991) 2 SCC 375 to articulate a purposive and welfare-oriented interpretation of maintenance provisions. TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction and Factual Background Proceedings Before the Family Court Arguments Advanced by the Petitioner (Husband) Before the High Court Arguments Advanced by the Respondent (Wife) Before the High Court Analysis of the Court on the Question of Marriage and Entitlement to Maintenance Analysis of the Court on Property Ownership, Luxury Assets, and the Quantum of Maintenance Key Case Laws Relied Upon and Their Application Significance, Takeaways, and Concluding Observations 1. Introduction and Factual Background The origins of this dispute trace back to 2014, when the first respondent — a woman working as a professional model — became acquainted with the petitioner through a mutual friend. The petitioner introduced himself as a film producer and subsequently disclosed that he also ran an educational institution. On 14 February 2016, the petitioner proposed marriage to the first respondent, who initially refused on the ground that she was aware he was already married. However, according to the woman's testimony — which remained unchallenged in cross-examination — the petitioner approached her again in August 2016 and persuaded her by claiming that his first marriage was a failure and that he had already obtained a divorce. He allegedly produced a copy of a divorce order to support this representation. By November 2019, the petitioner had convinced the woman's mother to consent to their union, and a marriage ceremony was performed at a temple in Uthiramerur on 20 January 2020. The couple subsequently cohabited at the woman's residence, and a son was born on 15 March 2021. Photographs and Aadhaar cards produced before the Family Court showed the petitioner as the husband and father respectively. However, from June 2022, the petitioner stopped visiting the woman and the child, though his parents continued to visit them. It was in this context that the woman filed Maintenance Case No. 415 of 2023 before the Family Court, Chennai, seeking ₹6 lakh per month for herself and ₹4 lakh per month for the child, alleging that the petitioner earned approximately ₹30 lakh per month and that she had been forced to abandon her modelling career after childbirth. 2. Proceedings Before the Family Court Before the VI Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Chennai, the woman examined herself as PW1 and produced several documents including the child's birth certificate (Ex.P3) recording the petitioner as the father, the woman's Aadhaar card (Ex.P4) listing the petitioner as her husband, the child's Aadhaar card (Ex.P5) listing the petitioner as the father, and a series of photographs (Ex.P6 series) depicting the couple living together over an extended period. The petitioner, on the other hand, chose not to examine himself as a witness. He filed a counter denying the marriage and the relationship, characterising the woman's pregnancy as an act of entrapment during "a weak moment." He offered to undergo a paternity test but simultaneously expressed willingness to pay ₹25,000 as maintenance solely for the child. Critically, the petitioner's only documentary evidence was Ex.R1, a certified copy of a sale deed establishing that the woman had purchased a flat for ₹1.70 crore in 2020. The Family Court held that since the petitioner had not examined himself as a witness and had failed to discredit the woman's testimony in any manner, the fact that the petitioner misled her into believing he was a divorcee stood established. The Family Court further found that the relationship amounted to long cohabitation sufficient to raise a presumption of marriage, and that the woman had no regular means of income after the child's birth. Accordingly, by its order dated 13 March 2026, the Family Court awarded ₹1,00,000 per month to the woman and ₹1,50,000 per month to the minor child. 3. Arguments Advanced by the Petitioner (Husband) Before the High Court The petitioner filed CRL RC No. 1116 of 2026 under Section 438 read with Section 442 of BNSS seeking to set aside the Family Court order, though notably he did not seriously challenge the maintenance awarded to the child. Mr. B. Kumar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, raised several interconnected arguments. First, he submitted that the woman's own pleadings revealed that she knew the petitioner was already married, and therefore any subsequent ceremony was void under Hindu law, rendering her ineligible for maintenance as a "second wife." In support, he relied upon Vimala v. K. Veerasamy (1991) 2 SCC 375 and Rajkumari v. Krishna (2015) 14 SCC 511 for the proposition that unless a valid marriage is established, a woman cannot claim maintenance under Section 125 CrPC (now Section 144 BNSS ). He further relied upon Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya v. State of Gujarat (2005) 3 SCC 636 to argue that there can be no estoppel against statute, and that the petitioner's alleged suppression of his subsisting marriage could not create a legal right to maintenance where none existed. He additionally cited K. Rajendran v. Dhanabakkiam, 2026 (5) CTC 209 , a decision of the Madras High Court itself, for the principle that admissions made in pleadings constitute the best proof of facts admitted, arguing that the woman's acknowledgment of the petitioner's prior marriage should be treated as conclusive. Second, he contended that no temple certificate, no independent witnesses, and no photographs of a marriage ceremony were produced, and that there was no evidence of "thaali" being tied. Third, he argued that the woman was financially self-sufficient because she owned a ₹1.70 crore flat (established through Ex.R1) and two luxury cars, and therefore did not meet the threshold of being "unable to maintain herself" as required under Section 144 BNSS . Finally, he pointed out that paragraphs 37 and 38 of the Family Court order appeared to have been mechanically "cut and pasted" from an earlier interlocutory order in the same proceedings, raising questions about judicial application of mind. 4. Arguments Advanced by the Respondent (Wife) Before the High Court Ms. B. Poongkhulali, learned counsel for the respondents, countered each submission. She emphasized that the petitioner had deliberately chosen not to testify or lead any evidence to counter the woman's version that she had been deceived into believing he was divorced. She submitted that the judgment in Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse (2014) 1 SCC 188 directly governed the present facts, as the Supreme Court had categorically held that a man who dupes a woman into a second marriage by suppressing his prior marriage cannot take advantage of his own wrong and deny her maintenance. On the question of the validity of the marriage, she argued that Section 125 CrPC (now Section 144 BNSS ) is a beneficial social welfare legislation requiring a purposive interpretation, and that the standard of proof required is not the same as that required to prove bigamy. She further submitted that the petitioner admittedly earned over ₹10 lakh per month and that the quantum of maintenance awarded was commensurate with the status of the parties, relying on observations in Vimala's case itself regarding proportionality. 5. Analysis of the Court on the Question of Marriage and Entitlement to Maintenance Justice Sunder Mohan's reasoning on the question of the woman's entitlement to maintenance constitutes the jurisprudential core of this judgment. The Court systematically addressed each of the petitioner's contentions, beginning with the argument that the woman was a "second wife" who knew about the earlier marriage. The Court noted that while the woman's pleading did state that she initially knew about the petitioner's marriage, her testimony — both in examination-in-chief and in cross-examination — consistently maintained that the petitioner subsequently convinced her that he had obtained a divorce. Since the petitioner chose not to enter the witness box, there was no evidence to contradict this version. The Court then turned to the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse (2014) 1 SCC 188 , where the Supreme Court held: "We are dealing with a situation where the marriage between the parties has been proved. However, the petitioner was already married. But he duped the respondent by suppressing the factum of alleged first marriage. On these facts, in our opinion, he cannot be permitted to deny the benefit of maintenance to the respondent, taking advantage of his own wrong." The Court observed that the ratio of Badshah applied with even greater force in the present case, since the petitioner had not merely suppressed his earlier marriage but had actively represented that it had been dissolved by divorce. The Court also distinguished Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya v. State of Gujarat (2005) 3 SCC 636 , noting that the Supreme Court in Badshah had itself clarified that Savitaben applies "only in those cases where a woman married a man with full knowledge of the facts of subsisting marriage." Since the woman in the present case was deceived about the subsistence of the earlier marriage, Savitaben had no application. Similarly, the Court distinguished the Karnataka High Court decision in Annapurna S. Hippargi v. Siddaram @ Siddaramappa Hippargi (Revision Petition Family Court No. 100123 of 2025, decided on 01.09.2026) , where the second wife had not accused her husband of any suppression and had failed to verify the status of a pending appeal against a divorce decree. On the broader question of whether strict proof of marriage is essential for a claim under Section 144 BNSS (formerly Section 125 CrPC ), the Court drew heavily upon Chanmuniya v. Virendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha (2011) 1 SCC 141 , where the Supreme Court held: "A broad and expansive interpretation should be given to the term 'wife' to include even those cases where a man and woman have been living together as husband and wife for reasonably long period of time, and strict proof of marriage should not be a pre-condition for maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. so as to fulfill the true spirit and essence of the beneficial provision of maintenance under Section 125." While the Court noted that the larger bench questions framed in Chanmuniya remain pending, it held that the subsequent decision in Badshah , which endorsed and applied the principles of Chanmuniya , is binding. The Court conclusively held: "The standard of proof to establish the marriage in a claim under Section 125 Cr.P.C. cannot be the same as that is required to prove the offence of bigamy. Therefore, in a claim under Section 125 Cr.P.C. strict proof of marriage is not essential and if it is shown that the relationship was continuous and for a sufficiently long time, the marriage can be presumed." On the evidentiary record — including the birth certificate, Aadhaar cards, and photographs — the Court found that "there is no doubt whatsoever that the relationship was continuous and the petitioner treated the first respondent as his wife." 6. Analysis of the Court on Property Ownership, Luxury Assets, and the Quantum of Maintenance The second major strand of the judgment deals with the petitioner's contention that the woman's ownership of a ₹1.70 crore flat and two luxury cars demonstrated that she had independent means and could not claim the statutory benefit of maintenance. This argument is particularly noteworthy because it reflects a common litigation strategy in high-net-worth maintenance disputes — using the existence of capital assets to argue that the claimant is not "unable to maintain herself" within the meaning of the statute. Justice Sunder Mohan addressed this argument with notable clarity. The Court acknowledged that the flat purchase for ₹1.70 crore (evidenced through Ex.R1) and the ownership of two luxury cars were undisputed facts. However, the Court drew a critical distinction between ownership of capital assets and the existence of a regular source of income. The Court observed: "But the evidence reveals that after the child's birth, the 1st respondent did not have a regular source of income. No evidence to the contrary has been let in by the petitioner. The finding of the learned Judge in this regard, which is based on the evidence, cannot be faulted." This observation is doctrinally significant. It establishes that the test under Section 144 of BNSS is not whether the claimant possesses assets in the abstract, but whether she has a regular, recurring income sufficient to maintain herself and the child at a standard commensurate with the status of the parties. A woman who owns immovable property but earns no regular income after sacrificing her career to raise a child born out of the relationship remains entitled to maintenance. The Court further noted that the petitioner's monthly income of ₹10 lakh — as found by the Family Court and not disputed before the High Court — made the combined maintenance of ₹2.5 lakh per month (representing 25% of his admitted income) reasonable and proportionate. 7. Key Case Laws Relied Upon and Their Application The judgment is anchored in a chain of Supreme Court and High Court authorities that collectively establish the modern law on maintenance for women in relationships that fall outside the strict framework of a valid marriage under personal law. Vimala v. K. Veerasamy (1991) 2 SCC 375 laid the foundational principle that Section 125 CrPC is a measure of social justice intended to prevent vagrancy and destitution, and that when a husband seeks to disentitle a wife by claiming the existence of an earlier marriage, the burden of strict proof falls upon him. The petitioner in the present case relied on Vimala to argue that a second wife is not entitled to maintenance, but the Court correctly noted that the same judgment places a "heavy burden" on the husband to prove the subsistence of the first marriage — a burden the petitioner failed to discharge. Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya v. State of Gujarat (2005) 3 SCC 636 was distinguished on the ground that it applies only to cases where the woman enters the marriage with full knowledge and not where she has been deceived. Chanmuniya v. Virendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha (2011) 1 SCC 141 expanded the interpretive horizon by holding that strict proof of marriage is not a precondition for maintenance, and that long cohabitation raises a presumption of marriage — a view that was subsequently endorsed and applied in Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse (2014) 1 SCC 188 . The Badshah decision is the doctrinal centrepiece of the present judgment, providing the proposition that a man who deceives a woman about his marital status cannot take advantage of his own wrong to deny her maintenance. Together, these authorities establish that the maintenance jurisdiction under Section 144 BNSS is remedial and welfare-oriented, and courts must adopt a purposive construction that protects women and children rather than rewarding men who manipulate legal technicalities after exploiting relationships. 8. Significance, Takeaways, and Concluding Observations This judgment makes several contributions to the evolving jurisprudence on maintenance in India. At the level of doctrine, it reinforces the principle that the distinction between "asset ownership" and "income" is legally relevant in determining entitlement to maintenance. A woman who owns property purchased during better times but has no current earning capacity — particularly where she gave up her career to raise a child born from the relationship — is not disqualified from receiving maintenance. This is an important clarification in an era where respondents in maintenance proceedings routinely produce land records, vehicle registrations, and bank statements to suggest that the claimant is financially independent. The Court's approach makes clear that such evidence must be weighed against the reality of whether the claimant has regular, sustainable income and not merely static assets. At the level of evidence, the judgment underscores the consequence of a party's failure to testify. The petitioner's decision not to enter the witness box proved decisive. His counter-affidavit allegations — that the woman had blackmailed him, that she had taken advantage of "a weak moment," and that the marriage never took place — remained unproven assertions in the absence of testimony subject to cross-examination. The Court's consistent refrain that "the petitioner had not let in evidence" highlights a practical litigation lesson: in maintenance proceedings where credibility is in issue, declining to testify is a strategic risk that frequently proves fatal. At the level of social justice, the judgment exemplifies the modern Indian judiciary's commitment to interpreting maintenance provisions in a manner that reflects their protective purpose. By applying the Badshah and Chanmuniya frameworks, the Court ensured that a man who deliberately deceived a woman about his marital status, fathered a child with her, and then abandoned both mother and child could not escape financial responsibility by exploiting the very fraud he had committed. The Court also made a pointed observation about the Family Court's practice of mechanically copying paragraphs from interlocutory orders into final orders, cautioning the trial judge to avoid such errors in the future — a reminder that procedural rigour and judicial discipline remain essential even in summary proceedings. For practitioners, the judgment serves as a comprehensive reference point on the interplay between Section 144 of BNSS , the evidentiary burden in maintenance claims involving alleged second marriages, and the correct approach to assessing financial capacity where the respondent owns high-value assets but lacks regular income. It also illustrates that the transition from CrPC to BNSS has not altered the substantive principles governing maintenance — the benevolent and protective interpretation mandated by the Supreme Court in Vimala , Chanmuniya , and Badshah continues to apply with full force under the new procedural code. Disclaimer: This case analysis is prepared for educational and informational purposes. The names of the parties have been masked by the Court, and this article respects that anonymity. Readers are advised to refer to the original judgment available on the Madras High Court's official repository for the authoritative text. Tags / Keywords for SEO: Madras High Court maintenance order, Section 144 BNSS maintenance, Section 125 CrPC wife maintenance, luxury assets maintenance claim, Badshah v Urmila Badshah Godse, Chanmuniya v Virendra Kumar Singh, presumption of marriage maintenance, second wife maintenance rights India, CRL RC 1116 of 2026, Justice Sunder Mohan maintenance judgment, property ownership no income maintenance, Family Court Chennai maintenance, ₹2.5 lakh monthly maintenance order