No Shelter for Pendente Lite Buyers: Supreme Court Reaffirms That Transferees During Pending Litigation Cannot Block Decree Execution

EduLaw EditorialLandmark Judgements2026-06-27

The Supreme Court has decisively settled that purchasers who acquire property during ongoing litigation cannot resist execution of the decree. In a landmark ruling spanning five decades of dispute, the Court held that Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act must yield to Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act once a suit is instituted reaffirming the doctrine of lis pendens as a cornerstone of public policy. Case Name: Alka Shrirang Chavan & Anr. v. Hemchandra Rajaram Bhonsale & Ors. Case Number: Civil Appeal No. ___ of 2026 (arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 27660 of 2025) Court: Supreme Court of India Judges: Hon'ble Justice Manoj Misra and Hon'ble Justice Ujjal Bhuyan Judgment Date: January 12, 2026 Citation: 2026 INSC 52 ABSTRACT The Supreme Court of India, in Alka Shrirang Chavan & Anr. v. Hemchandra Rajaram Bhonsale & Ors. (2026 INSC 52), delivered a definitive pronouncement on the scope and amplitude of the doctrine of lis pendens as codified under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 . The dispute, stretching across five decades, involved a specific performance decree where the judgment debtor transferred suit property to third parties during the pendency of litigation. These subsequent purchasers — the appellants — resisted execution of the decree by claiming independent title. The Supreme Court dismissed both civil appeals and held unequivocally that a transferee pendente lite is bound by the decree as if a party to the original suit, cannot claim independent title, and cannot obstruct execution of the decree. The Court further clarified the interplay between Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act , holding that the former must yield to the latter once a suit is instituted. TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction and Background Facts of the Case Procedural History Issues for Determination Arguments of the Appellants Arguments of the Respondent (Decree Holder) Supreme Court's Analysis, Reasoning, and Ratio Decidendi Conclusion, Directions, and Implications INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND The doctrine of lis pendens — encapsulated in the Latin maxim "pendente lite nihil innovetur" (during the pendency of litigation, nothing new should be introduced) — serves as a foundational safeguard in property law jurisprudence. Codified under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 , this doctrine ensures that transfers made during the pendency of litigation affecting immovable property remain subservient to the final outcome of the suit. The present case, which traversed an extraordinary journey through the Indian judicial system for nearly four decades, presented the Supreme Court with an opportunity to restate, consolidate, and reinforce the legal principles governing pendente lite transfers. The core question was stark: can a person who purchases property after a suit for specific performance has been filed — and after a lis pendens notice has been registered — obstruct the execution of a decree by claiming independent title? The two-Judge Bench of Justice Manoj Misra and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan answered this question with resounding clarity, dismissing the appeals and directing immediate delivery of possession to the decree holder who had waited over three decades for the fruits of his litigation. FACTS OF THE CASE The factual matrix of this case unfolds across several decades and multiple transactions, presenting a complex web of property dealings conducted in the shadow of pending litigation. On 26 April 1973, Respondent No. 1 (the plaintiff and eventual decree holder) entered into an agreement for sale with the defendant Rajaram Bajirao Pokale (Respondent No. 2, the judgment debtor) for agricultural land bearing Survey No. 155, Pot Hissa 3, admeasuring 36 gunthas situated at village Dhayari, Taluka Haveli, District Pune. When the defendant failed to perform his contractual obligations, the plaintiff instituted Regular Civil Suit No. 910 of 1986 on 28 April 1986 before the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Pune, seeking specific performance of the agreement — namely, execution of the sale deed, and in the event of the defendant's failure, execution through the Court Commissioner along with delivery of vacant possession. Critically, on 2 May 1986, the plaintiff registered a notice of lis pendens, thereby placing the entire world on constructive notice that the suit property was subject to pending litigation. Despite the institution of the suit and registration of lis pendens, the judgment debtor (Respondent No. 2), between 7 May 1987 and 31 August 1987, executed eight separate registered sale deeds transferring the right, title, and interest in various parts of the suit property to different persons. In 1989, one of these transferees — Shri Sarangdhar — constructed a bungalow on a portion admeasuring 5R of the suit land. The appellants in the present matter, Alka Shrirang Chavan and Pradip Shrirang Chavan, later acquired 15 gunthas of the suit property through registered sale deeds dated 27 November 1995 and 16 November 1996 from vendors who were themselves purchasers from the judgment debtor during the pendency of the suit. Thus, the appellants were successive transferees whose root of title traced directly back to transactions executed after the suit was filed and lis pendens was registered. On 30 November 1990, the Trial Court decreed the suit ex parte, directing the defendant to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff within two months, failing which the Court Commissioner would execute the same. The decree further directed delivery of vacant possession of the suit land to the plaintiff. PROCEDURAL HISTORY The procedural trajectory of this case is itself a testament to the prolonged obstruction the decree holder was subjected to. The execution petition (Regular Darkhast No. 205 of 1991) was filed on 3 July 1991. On 25 March 1993, when the judgment debtor failed to comply, the Court Commissioner executed the sale deed in favour of the decree holder on orders of the Executing Court. The judgment debtor then filed an application under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 seeking cancellation of this sale deed on the ground that he had already transferred the property. This application was rejected on 18 July 2013. The judgment debtor's Civil Revision Application No. 851 of 2013 before the Bombay High Court was also dismissed on 14 March 2016. In between, the judgment debtor's belated appeal against the original decree was dismissed for non-condonation of delay in 1998; his civil revision application was dismissed for non-prosecution in 1999; and his suit for cancellation of the sale deed (Civil Suit No. 1720 of 1996) was also dismissed for non-prosecution on 3 March 2004. Thus, the original decree and the Court Commissioner's sale deed attained complete finality. In 2018, the decree holder moved the Executing Court for a possession warrant. When the warrant was executed on 18 January 2019, the appellants physically resisted and obstructed possession. The decree holder then filed applications for removal of obstruction under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC . By order dated 29 February 2020, the Executing Court allowed the decree holder's application, rejected the appellants' objections, and directed them to vacate within one month. The appellants' Regular Civil Appeals were dismissed by the District Judge on 12 April 2022. Their Second Appeals before the Bombay High Court were dismissed on 19 December 2024. The appellants then approached the Supreme Court by Special Leave Petition. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION The Supreme Court framed and examined several interconnected legal questions arising from this protracted dispute. The primary question was whether a decree for specific performance is executable when the judgment debtor had already transferred the property during the pendency of the suit, and the subsequent transferees were not joined in the sale deed executed by the Court Commissioner. The second issue concerned whether a transferee pendente lite must necessarily be impleaded in execution proceedings or in the court-executed conveyance for the decree holder to acquire valid title. A third issue related to the rights available to obstructionists under Order XXI Rules 97 to 101 CPC — specifically, whether they could claim an independent right to possession or raise questions about the decree holder's title. Finally, the Court examined the interplay between Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act (doctrine of lis pendens) and Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (which deals with enforcement of a decree against subsequent transferees), and whether the limitation provisions under Articles 129 and 134 of the Limitation Act, 1963 barred the decree holder's application. ARGUMENTS OF THE APPELLANTS Senior Advocate Vinay Navare, representing the appellants, advanced a multi-pronged argument challenging the executability of the decree. His primary contention was that under the settled law as laid down in Lala Durga Prasad v. Lala Deep Chand [(1953) 2 SCC 509] and Thomson Press (India) Ltd. v. Nanak Builders & Investors Pvt. Ltd. [(2013) 5 SCC 397], a transfer made during the pendency of litigation is neither illegal nor void ab initio — it only remains subservient to the rights effectually determined in the pending litigation. He argued that since the transferees pendente lite held valid title (the transfers not being void), they should have been joined in the conveyance executed by the Court Commissioner so as to pass on their title to the decree holder. Without such joinder, he contended, no valid title was transferred to the decree holder, rendering the decree inexecutable for possession. Mr. Navare further argued that a decree for specific performance merely recognizes a contractual claim and does not, by itself, elevate the decree holder to the status of an owner or create any charge over the property. He invoked Order XXI Rule 101 CPC to contend that all questions relating to right, title, and interest — including whether the decree holder possessed valid title — were amenable to adjudication in proceedings under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC . He also raised the point that the decree holder initiated proceedings for delivery of possession only in 2018, i.e., 27 years after filing the execution petition, during which time significant development and change of ownership had occurred. Relying on Anwarbi v. Pramod D.A. Joshi [(2000) 10 SCC 405], he submitted that the belated application for possession was not maintainable. ARGUMENTS OF THE RESPONDENT (DECREE HOLDER) Respondent No. 1, appearing in person along with his son (an advocate), forcefully submitted that no law exists that requires the joining of transferees pendente lite to a sale deed executed by the Court Commissioner after the decree has attained finality. He argued that the appellants, having purchased portions of the suit property after the institution of the suit on 28 April 1986 and after the registration of lis pendens on 2 May 1986, were squarely governed by Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act . Their purchases being pendente lite, the decree of specific performance was binding on them. A transferee pendente lite steps into the shoes of the judgment debtor and can claim no right superior to what the judgment debtor himself held. The decree holder submitted that a combined reading of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act read with Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act and Section 47 CPC along with Order XXI Rules 97, 98, and 101 CPC demonstrates that the title of a transferee pendente lite cannot supersede the decree. Once obstruction is adjudicated and the court is satisfied that it is caused by transferees pendente lite, Order XXI Rule 98 CPC creates a mandatory obligation to remove the obstructionists and deliver possession. He relied heavily on Jayaram Mudaliar v. Ayyaswami [(1972) 2 SCC 200], Celir LLP v. Somati Prasad Bafna [(2024) SCC Online SC 3727], and Sanjay Verma v. Manik Roy [(2006) 13 SCC 608] to establish that the doctrine of lis pendens is a principle of public policy and equity, and no party — not even a bona fide purchaser — can claim exemption from its application. SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS, REASONING, AND RATIO DECIDENDI The Supreme Court, through Justice Ujjal Bhuyan's opinion, undertook a comprehensive analysis of the statutory framework and prior precedents. The Court began by setting out Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act in its entirety, noting that it encapsulates the doctrine of lis pendens and has been the subject of extensive judicial scrutiny. Drawing from its recent landmark ruling in Celir LLP v. Somati Prasad Bafna [(2024) SCC Online SC 3727], the Court reiterated the five conditions that must be fulfilled for the doctrine to apply: (i) there must be a pending suit or proceeding; (ii) the suit must be in a competent court; (iii) it must not be collusive; (iv) the right to immovable property must be directly and specifically in question; (v) the property must be transferred by a party to the litigation in a manner affecting the rights of other parties. The Court emphasized that the doctrine bars transfers of suit property during litigation, with the only exception being transfer under the authority of the court. Where a party transfers suit property to a third party, the latter is bound by the result of proceedings even without notice of the suit. The Court then turned to the critical interplay between Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act and Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act . Observing the arguments of the appellants based on Lala Durga Prasad and Thomson Press , the Court held: "Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act would be available to a party to a contract who suffers a subsequent transfer of property. However, the moment a suit or proceeding is instituted by a party to the contract whereafter there is transfer of the suit property, Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act would have to give way to Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act in which event the doctrine of lis pendens would come into force." This is a significant clarification — Section 19(b), which permits enforcement of a specific performance decree against transferees with notice, operates in the pre-litigation phase. Once a suit is filed, Section 52 takes precedence, and the question of joining subsequent purchasers in the conveyance becomes moot. Addressing the claim that the transfers were valid and title resided with the appellants, the Court acknowledged that Section 52 does not render transfers void. However, it firmly held: "Reliance placed by Mr. Navare on Thomson Press is totally misplaced. There is no dispute to the proposition that transfer pendente lite is neither illegal nor void ab initio. But it remains subservient to the decree that may be passed by the court. Now that the decree and conveyance in favour of respondent No. 1 have attained finality, the transferee pendente lite i.e. the appellants have to give way and hand over actual physical possession of the suit property to respondent No. 1." The Court further relied on M/s. Siddamsetty Infra Projects Pvt. Ltd. v. Katta Sujatha Reddy [(2024) SCC Online SC 3214] and Danesh Singh v. Har Pyari [(2025) SCC Online SC] to reaffirm that the doctrine applies from the moment the proceeding is instituted, irrespective of defects in filing or whether notice has been issued. On the question of limitation, the Court found the argument meritless, holding that Article 129 of the Limitation Act prescribes a 30-day period for filing an application for possession after obstruction, computed from the date of resistance. Since the appellants obstructed on 18 January 2019 and the decree holder's application for removal was filed on 11 February 2019, it was well within time. The Court also emphasized the Bombay amendment to Order XXI Rule 98(2) CPC , which creates a mandatory obligation ("shall") upon the Executing Court to put the decree holder in possession once it is established that obstruction is caused by a transferee pendente lite. CONCLUSION, DIRECTIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS The Supreme Court dismissed both civil appeals and affirmed the concurrent findings of the Executing Court, District Court, and Bombay High Court. The Court found "no error or infirmity in the view taken by the High Court" and held that the appellants' rights as subsequent purchasers were entirely subservient to the rights of the decree holder. After the decree and the execution of the sale deed by the Court Commissioner in 1993, valid title had passed to Respondent No. 1, and the transferees pendente lite had no right to resist execution. Significantly, recognizing that the decree holder had been deprived of the fruits of his litigation for over three decades and had suffered multiple rounds of frivolous challenges, the Supreme Court issued extraordinary directions to prevent any further obstruction. The Court directed the appellants to hand over actual physical possession to the Respondent (decree holder) on or before 15 February 2026. More critically, the Court ordered that no further applications or petitions — either by the appellants, the judgment debtor, or any person claiming through them — shall be entertained by any court with respect to the suit property. This judgment carries profound implications for property law practice in India. It definitively establishes that: (a) a transferee pendente lite cannot claim independent title to obstruct execution of a specific performance decree; (b) there is no obligation upon the decree holder or the court to join transferees pendente lite in the court-executed sale deed; (c) Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act yields to Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act once a suit is instituted; (d) bona fide purchase without notice is irrelevant where Section 52 applies; and (e) courts must ensure that decree holders are not subjected to endless cycles of obstructionist litigation that render judicial decrees illusory. The decision reinforces the sanctity of judicial pronouncements and affirms that the doctrine of lis pendens is not merely a procedural rule but a principle of public policy that protects the integrity of the entire legal system. KEY CASE LAWS CITED Celir LLP v. Somati Prasad Bafna [(2024) SCC Online SC 3727] — Five conditions for applicability of lis pendens; transferees bound regardless of notice. Thomson Press (India) Ltd. v. Nanak Builders & Investors Pvt. Ltd. [(2013) 5 SCC 397] — Transfer pendente lite is not void but subservient to decree. Lala Durga Prasad v. Lala Deep Chand [(1953) 2 SCC 509] — Proper form of decree may require subsequent transferees to join in conveyance (distinguished). Jayaram Mudaliar v. Ayyaswami [(1972) 2 SCC 200] — Approved in Celir LLP; doctrine of lis pendens explained. Sanjay Verma v. Manik Roy [(2006) 13 SCC 608] — Lis pendens is based on equity, good conscience, and public policy; no exemption for bona fide purchasers. Guruswamy Nadar v. P. Lakshmi Ammal [(2008) 5 SCC 796] — Principle applies irrespective of good faith of subsequent purchaser. M/s. Siddamsetty Infra Projects Pvt. Ltd. v. Katta Sujatha Reddy [(2024) SCC Online SC 3214] — Doctrine kicks in the moment a proceeding is instituted. Danesh Singh v. Har Pyari [(2025) SCC Online SC] — Section 52 applies during entire pendency until complete satisfaction of decree. Anwarbi v. Pramod D.A. Joshi [(2000) 10 SCC 405] — Rights of parties must be adjudicated under Order XXI Rule 97 and 101 CPC. KEY STATUTORY PROVISIONS Section 52, Transfer of Property Act, 1882 — Doctrine of lis pendens; bars transfer of suit property during pendency of litigation so as to affect rights of other parties. Section 19(b), Specific Relief Act, 1963 — Specific performance enforceable against transferees with notice of the original contract (yields to Section 52 once suit is filed). Section 47, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Questions to be determined by the court executing the decree. Order XXI Rule 35, CPC — Delivery of possession in execution of decree. Order XXI Rule 97, CPC — Resistance or obstruction to possession by a person bound by the decree. Order XXI Rule 98, CPC — Removal of obstruction and delivery of possession (with Bombay amendment creating mandatory obligation). Order XXI Rule 101, CPC — Questions to be determined by executing court in proceedings under Rules 97–100. Articles 129 and 134, Limitation Act, 1963 — Period of limitation for applications concerning possession and execution of decree.