No Law Prohibits Eating Chicken Over the Ganga: Justice Ujjal Bhuyan Questions Arrest of 14 Youths in Varanasi Boat Iftar Case
EduLaw EditorialLandmark Judgements"Can people be arrested and denied bail for three months for eating chicken biryani?" — Justice Ujjal Bhuyan's powerful remarks at the 4th Justice G.P. Singh Memorial Lecture expose the growing criminalisation of ordinary activities and raise urgent constitutional questions about liberty, bail, and the limits of criminal law. Title: Criminalisation Without Legal Basis — The Varanasi Ganga Boat Iftar Case and the Constitutional Limits of Criminal Law Case Name: Mohd. Azad Ali and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh (Related: Observations by Justice Ujjal Bhuyan at the 4th Justice G.P. Singh Memorial Lecture, NLIU Bhopal) Case Number: FIR No. 0143/2026, P.S. Dashashwamedh, Varanasi (Bail proceedings: Mohd Azad Ali And 2 Others vs. State of U.P. before the Allahabad High Court) Court: Supreme Court of India (Judicial Observations); Allahabad High Court (Bail Orders); Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate Court, Varanasi (Trial Court) Judges: Hon'ble Justice Ujjal Bhuyan (Supreme Court of India — Observations); Hon'ble Justice Rajiv Lochan Shukla & Hon'ble Justice Jitendra Kumar Sinha (Allahabad High Court — Bail Orders) Judgment/Observation Date: July 26, 2026 (Justice Bhuyan's Lecture); May 15 & May 18, 2026 (High Court Bail Orders); March 23, 2026 & April 1, 2026 (Bail Denial by Varanasi Courts) Citation: As reported in LiveLaw, Indian Express, Free Press Journal, and The Hindu (July 26, 2026); Allahabad High Court Order dated May 15, 2026 in Mohd Azad Ali And 2 Others vs. State of U.P. ABSTRACT The Varanasi Ganga Boat Iftar Case became one of the most controversial criminal prosecutions of 2026 when 14 Muslim youths were arrested for consuming chicken biryani during an iftar gathering aboard a boat on the river Ganga. Charged under multiple provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) including Section 299 (outraging religious feelings), Section 298 (defiling a place of worship), Section 196(1)(b) (promoting enmity), Section 270 (public nuisance), Section 279 (fouling water), and Section 24 of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 , the accused spent over two months in judicial custody before the Allahabad High Court intervened to grant bail. The case drew national scrutiny when Supreme Court Justice Ujjal Bhuyan, speaking at the 4th Justice G.P. Singh Memorial Lecture at NLIU Bhopal on July 26, 2026, categorically stated that "there is no law prohibiting consumption of chicken over the Ganga river" and questioned whether citizens can be arrested and denied bail for three months for an activity that does not constitute a criminal offence. This case analysis examines the legal foundations of the prosecution, the constitutional implications of criminalising ordinary conduct, and the broader questions of personal liberty, bail jurisprudence, and the separation of criminal law from public sentiment. TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction and Opening Hook Factual Background of the Varanasi Ganga Boat Iftar Case The Legal Framework — Sections Invoked and Their Applicability Procedural History — From Arrest to High Court Bail Justice Ujjal Bhuyan's Observations — No Crime Without Law Constitutional and Jurisprudential Analysis Comparative Treatment — The June 2026 Incident and Selective Prosecution Relevant Case Laws and Judicial Precedents Implications for Personal Liberty and Bail Jurisprudence Conclusion — Criminal Law Cannot Be Weaponised by Sentiment 1. INTRODUCTION AND OPENING HOOK "I am sure consuming chicken biryani is not an offence. There is no law prohibiting consumption of chicken over the Ganga river… Can people be arrested and denied bail for three months for such an activity? I ask myself! Citizens are watching, people are watching." These words, spoken by Supreme Court Justice Ujjal Bhuyan at one of India's most prestigious legal lectures, cut through the legal fog surrounding one of 2026's most polarising criminal prosecutions. The case of 14 young men arrested in Varanasi for breaking their Ramzan fast on a boat raises fundamental questions that strike at the heart of India's constitutional order: Can the criminal law machinery be deployed against conduct that no statute expressly prohibits? Can the subjective sentiments of a community, however deeply held, substitute for a clear legal prohibition? And can bail — described by the Supreme Court as the rule rather than the exception — be denied for months when the alleged offence itself rests on contested factual and legal grounds? The Varanasi Ganga Boat Iftar Case is not merely about biryani or boats. It is about the boundary between law and morality, the protection of minority rights within a majoritarian framework, and the constitutional obligation of courts to stand as bulwarks of liberty even when popular sentiment demands incarceration. This case analysis dissects the legal, constitutional, and procedural dimensions of the prosecution, situating Justice Bhuyan's observations within the broader framework of Indian criminal jurisprudence. 2. FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE VARANASI GANGA BOAT IFTAR CASE On March 15, 2026, during the month of Ramzan, fourteen young Muslim men organised an iftar gathering — the evening meal that breaks the daily fast — aboard a boat on the river Ganga near Panchganga Ghat in Varanasi, Uttar Pradesh. According to the prosecution's version, the group consumed chicken biryani on the boat and disposed of food waste, including chicken bones, into the river. A video of the gathering was subsequently uploaded to social media, triggering widespread outrage among certain sections of the Hindu community who regard the Ganga as sacred. On March 16, 2026, Rajat Jaiswal, the Varanasi city unit president of the Bharatiya Janata Yuva Morcha (BJYM), the youth wing of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party, filed a written complaint with the Dashashwamedh police station alleging that the act of consuming non-vegetarian food on the Ganga and disposing of remains into the river constituted a deliberate insult to Hindu religious sentiments and a desecration of the holy river. Acting on this complaint, the Varanasi Police arrested all fourteen accused on March 17, 2026. The accused were identified as Azad Ali, Aamir Kaifi, Danish Saifi, Mohd. Ahmed, Nehal Afridi, Mahfooz Alam, Mohd. Anas, Mohd. Awwal, Mohd. Tehseem, Mohd. Ahmed alias Raja, Mohd. Noor Ismail, Mohd. Tauseef Ahmed, Mohd. Faizan, and Mohd. Sameer. They were remanded to judicial custody on March 19, 2026, and remained incarcerated for over two months before obtaining relief from the Allahabad High Court. 3. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK — SECTIONS INVOKED AND THEIR APPLICABILITY The prosecution invoked an extensive array of criminal provisions against the accused, raising serious questions about proportionality and legal basis. The initial charges under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) included: Section 196(1)(b) BNS — Promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, etc., and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony. This provision requires proof that the accused's act was done with the deliberate intention of promoting enmity between identifiable groups. The mere consumption of food on a boat, even if controversial, raises the question of whether eating constitutes an "act prejudicial to maintenance of harmony" or whether the enmity was, in fact, generated by the subsequent social media outrage rather than the act itself. Section 270 BNS — Public nuisance. For this charge to sustain, the prosecution must demonstrate that the act caused common injury, danger, or annoyance to the public or to people in the neighbourhood. Whether eating food on a privately hired boat constitutes a "public nuisance" within the meaning of this provision is legally debatable. Section 279 BNS — Fouling water of a public spring or reservoir. This is perhaps the most legally defensible of the charges, provided there is credible evidence that food waste was actually disposed of into the river. However, as the defence argued during bail proceedings, no mutton or chicken was recovered from the accused, and the viral video itself did not contain photographic evidence conclusively proving meat consumption or disposal. Section 298 BNS — Injuring or defiling a place of worship with intent to insult the religion of any class. The application of this provision hinges on whether the Ganga river, or a boat upon it, legally qualifies as a "place of worship." While the Ganga holds deep religious significance for Hindus, the legal characterisation of an open river as a "place of worship" within the statutory meaning is a novel and contested proposition. Section 299 BNS — Deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings of any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs. This provision requires proof of both "deliberate intent" and "malicious purpose." The central legal question is whether organising an iftar meal — an act of religious observance for Muslims — can simultaneously constitute a "deliberate and malicious" insult to another religion. The constitutional tension between the religious freedom of the accused (Article 25) and the protection of religious sentiments is sharply engaged here. Section 223(b) BNS — Disobedience of an order duly promulgated by a public servant. The basis for this charge was not clearly articulated in public reporting. Section 24 of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 — Prohibition on use of stream or well for disposal of polluting matter. This environmental provision carries its own evidentiary requirements regarding the nature and quantity of polluting matter. Subsequently, on March 19, the police added Section 308(5) BNS (extortion under threat of death or grievous hurt), based on the boat owners' claim that the accused had forcibly taken the boat, and Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (publishing or transmitting obscene material), ostensibly linked to the viral video. The addition of these serious charges dramatically raised the legal stakes, making bail significantly more difficult to obtain. 4. PROCEDURAL HISTORY — FROM ARREST TO HIGH COURT BAIL The procedural trajectory of this case reveals a pattern of escalating charges and repeated denial of bail at lower judicial levels, resulting in prolonged incarceration for what Justice Bhuyan would later characterise as conduct that may not even constitute a criminal offence. On March 20, 2026, the Varanasi court remanded all 14 accused to judicial custody. On March 23, 2026, Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (ACJM) Amit Kumar Yadav-III rejected the first bail application, observing that the "crime is of a serious and non-bailable nature." The court's reasoning drew heavily on the gravity of the charges — particularly the later-added Section 308(5) BNS carrying punishment of up to 10 years — rather than examining whether the factual allegations, even if true, disclosed the commission of the charged offences. On April 1, 2026, the Sessions Court in Varanasi rejected the second bail application, observing that the accused "appear to have intended to disturb social harmony." This finding, made at the bail stage without trial, effectively treated the allegations as established facts and imputed a communal motive to what the accused maintained was a private religious observance. It was only when the matter reached the Allahabad High Court that the accused obtained relief. On May 15, 2026, Justice Rajiv Lochan Shukla granted bail to eight of the fourteen accused, and on May 18, 2026, bail was extended to the remaining six. The High Court, while accepting that the alleged conduct "could hurt religious sentiments of the Hindu community," clarified that the issue before it was limited to whether continued incarceration during investigation and trial was warranted. The court was significantly influenced by the accused's expression of "genuine remorse" and their undertaking not to repeat such conduct — conditions that themselves raise questions about whether expressing regret for an act that may not be criminal should be a prerequisite for liberty. 5. JUSTICE UJJAL BHUYAN'S OBSERVATIONS — NO CRIME WITHOUT LAW Speaking at the 4th Justice G.P. Singh Memorial Lecture at the National Law Institute University (NLIU), Bhopal, on July 26, 2026, Supreme Court Justice Ujjal Bhuyan made pointed observations about the case that struck at the heart of the prosecution's legal basis. While careful to note that he would "not comment on any contemporary happenings" directly, Justice Bhuyan left no ambiguity about the case he was referencing: "I am sure consuming chicken biryani is not an offence. There is no law prohibiting consumption of chicken over the Ganga river; they were arrested for that very reason and they had to remain in jail for three months. Can people be arrested and denied bail for 3 months for such an activity, I ask myself! Citizens are watching, people are watching." These observations, though made in a lecture rather than a judicial order, carry significant jurisprudential weight because they articulate the foundational principle of criminal law: nullum crimen sine lege — there is no crime without law. This principle, embedded in Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India, mandates that no person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act. Justice Bhuyan's remarks directly challenge whether any of the provisions invoked by the prosecution actually criminalise the core conduct alleged — the consumption of chicken biryani on a boat. Justice Bhuyan situated this case within a broader pattern of criminalisation of dissent and ordinary activities, noting that "public space for expressing divergent opinion is shrinking in India" and that "even normal activities are being criminalised." He questioned whether courts, through their bail practices, were themselves contributing to this chilling effect: "By such restrictive orders, are the courts indirectly telling the citizens or discouraging the citizens not to express their dissent?" 6. CONSTITUTIONAL AND JURISPRUDENTIAL ANALYSIS The Varanasi Ganga Boat Iftar Case engages multiple constitutional provisions and raises questions that extend far beyond its immediate facts. Article 21 — Right to Life and Personal Liberty: The Supreme Court has repeatedly held, from Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (AIR 1978 SC 597) onwards, that personal liberty cannot be curtailed except according to procedure established by law, and such procedure must be fair, just, and reasonable. The prolonged detention of the accused — over two months for what Justice Bhuyan characterised as a non-criminal activity — raises serious Article 21 concerns. The Supreme Court's landmark decision in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar (2014) 8 SCC 273 mandates that arrests should not be made routinely and mechanically, particularly in cases punishable with less than seven years' imprisonment. The initial charges in this case (before the addition of Section 308(5)) fell squarely within this category. Article 25 — Freedom of Conscience and Free Profession, Practice, and Propagation of Religion: The accused were observing Ramzan, and the iftar meal is an integral part of Islamic religious practice. Criminalising the manner of breaking one's fast engages the religious freedom guarantee, particularly when the criminality is derived not from any express prohibition but from the religious sensibilities of another community. Article 14 — Right to Equality: The comparative treatment of the June 2026 incident — where five non-Muslim men arrested for cooking chicken and consuming alcohol on a boat in the same river received bail on the same day of arrest — raises stark Article 14 concerns about selective and discriminatory prosecution. The legal concept of "intelligible differentia" requires that any differential treatment must bear a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved. If the object is protection of the Ganga's sanctity, there is no rational basis for treating identical conduct differently based on the religion of the accused. 7. COMPARATIVE TREATMENT — THE JUNE 2026 INCIDENT AND SELECTIVE PROSECUTION The discriminatory application of law became starkly visible when, on June 23, 2026, five men — Deepak Kumar, Arun Kumar Sahni, Rahul Sahni, Ajay Sahni, and Anurag Nishad — were arrested by the same Dashashwamedh police station after a video surfaced showing them cooking chicken and drinking alcohol on a boat on the Ganga. Despite the FIR (No. 0143/2026) invoking Sections 196(2) and 299 BNS — the same provisions used against the iftar group — the five men were released on bail the same day. More tellingly, the challan submitted to the court in the June case did not mention the FIR charges at all. Instead, the arrest was recorded merely as a preventive measure under Section 170 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) to avert a possible breach of peace following an altercation with tourists. This extraordinary discrepancy between the FIR and the challan, combined with same-day bail, contrasts sharply with the seven additional charges, months of incarceration, and repeated bail denials faced by the fourteen Muslim men in the March case. This differential treatment provides a textbook illustration of what the Supreme Court cautioned against in Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh (2014) 2 SCC 1: the police must register FIRs and proceed uniformly upon receiving information of cognisable offences. The selective prosecution and disparate bail outcomes in these two factually analogous cases — differing primarily in the religious identity of the accused — demand scrutiny under Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution. 8. RELEVANT CASE LAWS AND JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS Several landmark decisions of the Supreme Court provide the jurisprudential framework within which the Varanasi case must be analysed: Ramji Lal Modi v. State of U.P. (AIR 1957 SC 620): In this early decision, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of Section 295A IPC (now Section 299 BNS), holding that it constitutes a reasonable restriction on free speech under Article 19(2). However, the Court emphasised that the section requires proof of "deliberate and malicious intention" — mere likelihood of offending religious feelings is insufficient. Applying this standard, the prosecution must demonstrate that the accused organised the iftar with the specific intent to insult Hinduism, a threshold that appears difficult to satisfy when the primary purpose of the gathering was observance of their own religious obligation. Superintendent, Central Prison, Fatehgarh v. Ram Manohar Lohia (AIR 1960 SC 633): The Supreme Court held that "merely because the public mind is agitated over some issue, no restrictions can be placed on the liberty of citizens." This principle directly challenges the lower courts' reasoning that bail should be denied because the incident "disturbed social harmony" — if the disturbance arose from public reaction to lawful conduct rather than from the conduct itself, the criminal law cannot legitimately intervene. Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar (2014) 8 SCC 273: The Supreme Court laid down guidelines to prevent unnecessary arrests, directing that police officers must record reasons for arrest and that magistrates must satisfy themselves about the necessity of detention. The mechanical arrest of all fourteen accused without apparent consideration of individual culpability raises questions about compliance with these mandates. Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI (2022) 10 SCC 51: The Supreme Court reiterated that bail is the rule and jail the exception, particularly in cases involving offences punishable with less than seven years. The initial charges against the accused in the Varanasi case predominantly fell within this category, yet bail was denied at two judicial levels. Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra (2007) 5 SCC 1: The Supreme Court held that for offences under Sections 153A and 295A IPC (now Sections 196 and 299 BNS), the writing or act must be read as a whole and the context must be considered. An act that is primarily a religious observance by one community cannot automatically be characterised as an insult to another community merely because it takes place in a location considered sacred by the latter. Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1997) 7 SCC 431: The Supreme Court emphasised that criminal intent cannot be presumed and must be established through evidence. In bail considerations, courts must examine whether a prima facie case of deliberate malicious intent exists. 9. IMPLICATIONS FOR PERSONAL LIBERTY AND BAIL JURISPRUDENCE The Varanasi Ganga Boat Iftar Case carries profound implications for the future of personal liberty in India. Justice Bhuyan's observations, read alongside the procedural history of the case, illuminate several systemic concerns that extend beyond this specific prosecution. The first concern is the weaponisation of criminal law through the stacking of charges. The initial charges against the accused — relating to public nuisance, water pollution, and hurting religious sentiments — were progressively supplemented with far more serious allegations of extortion (Section 308(5) BNS, carrying up to 10 years' imprisonment) and IT Act violations. The addition of Section 308(5), based on the allegation that the accused "forcibly" took the boat, transformed what was otherwise a bailable or easily bailable set of offences into a case where bail became procedurally difficult. This practice of "charge-stacking" to defeat bail has been criticised by legal scholars and courts alike, yet it continues to be employed as a tool of prosecutorial overreach. The second concern relates to the role of complainants with political affiliations in initiating criminal proceedings. The complaint was filed not by a private citizen claiming personal injury but by the district president of a political party's youth wing. While anyone has the right to approach the police with a complaint, the political identity of the complainant — combined with the selective prosecution demonstrated by the June 2026 case — raises legitimate concerns about whether the criminal law is being instrumentalised for political purposes rather than deployed in genuine pursuit of justice. The third concern, which Justice Bhuyan emphasised most powerfully, is the growing normalisation of prolonged pre-trial detention for offences that may not even be cognisable. When courts deny bail by simply reciting the seriousness of charges without independently examining whether the factual allegations, even if accepted at face value, disclose the commission of those offences, they abdicate their constitutional role as protectors of liberty. The principle established in Sanjay Chandra v. CBI (2012) 1 SCC 40 — that the gravity of the charge alone cannot justify denial of bail — appears to have been overlooked by the Varanasi courts in this case. 10. CONCLUSION — CRIMINAL LAW CANNOT BE WEAPONISED BY SENTIMENT The Varanasi Ganga Boat Iftar Case stands as a cautionary tale about the consequences of allowing criminal law to be driven by popular outrage rather than legal principle. Justice Bhuyan's observation that "there is no law prohibiting consumption of chicken over the Ganga river" is not merely a statement about dietary choices — it is a reaffirmation of the foundational principle that criminal liability must be grounded in a clear statutory prohibition, not in social taboos, religious sentiments, or political calculations. The principle of legality — nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege — demands that the state demonstrate a clear legal basis before depriving any citizen of liberty. When fourteen young men can be incarcerated for over two months for the act of breaking their religious fast in a manner that offends the sensibilities of another community, the boundary between criminal law and majoritarian morality has been dangerously blurred. As Justice Bhuyan reminded his audience, "debate and dissent are the essence of democracy" — and one might add that the freedom to live, eat, pray, and exist in public spaces without fear of arbitrary prosecution is the essence of a constitutional republic. The case also serves as a reminder to the judiciary itself. Courts at the trial and sessions level, by denying bail without rigorously examining the legal sufficiency of the charges, participated in what was effectively punitive detention masquerading as due process. It fell to the High Court, and eventually to a Supreme Court Justice's public observation, to restore the constitutional balance. In a nation governed by the rule of law, this balance should never have been disturbed in the first place. Disclaimer: This case analysis is prepared for educational and informational purposes. It is based on publicly reported facts, judicial observations, and court orders as available in the public domain. Readers are advised to refer to original court orders and judgments for authoritative legal positions. Tags: Supreme Court India, Justice Ujjal Bhuyan, Varanasi Ganga Boat Case, Iftar Party Arrest, Section 299 BNS, Outraging Religious Feelings, Personal Liberty, Bail Jurisprudence, Article 21, Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, Criminal Law, Selective Prosecution, NLIU Bhopal, Constitutional Rights