Live-In Relationship Consent Presumed: Chhattisgarh HC Rules Refusal to Marry Not Rape Full Case Analysis

The Chhattisgarh High Court has settled a critical question in Indian criminal law can a man be convicted of rape merely because he refused to marry his live-in partner? The answer, the Court held, is an unequivocal no. Title: Consent in Live-In Relationships Is Presumed — Mere Refusal to Marry Cannot Be Branded as Rape: Chhattisgarh High Court Upholds Acquittal Case Name: "XYZ" v. Siddharth Sarangi Case Number: ACQA No. 380 of 2025 Court: High Court of Chhattisgarh (Division Bench) Judges: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sanjay S. Agrawal and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas Judgment Date: 29 June 2026 (Reserved on 17 June 2026) Citation: 2026:CGHC:26186-DB ABSTRACT The present case analysis examines the landmark Division Bench judgment of the Chhattisgarh High Court in "XYZ" v. Siddharth Sarangi, wherein the Court dismissed the appellant-victim's appeal against the acquittal of the respondent-accused who had been charged under Section 376(2)(k)(n) and Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 . The Court crystallized an evolving judicial principle: when two consenting adults live together in a long-term live-in relationship, the law raises a presumption that their physical intimacy was voluntary and consensual. The Court emphasized that a subsequent refusal to solemnize the marriage does not, by itself, retroactively vitiate consent so as to convert what was once a consensual relationship into rape. Drawing upon the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Ravish Singh Rana v. State of Uttarakhand (2025 INSC 635) , the Division Bench affirmed that Indian courts must not adopt a pedantic approach and should instead consider the duration of cohabitation, the conduct of both parties, and the financial independence of the woman before branding a failed relationship as a criminal offence. This judgment carries significant implications for the interpretation of consent in an era where live-in relationships are increasingly prevalent across India. TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction and Legal Context Factual Background of the Case Procedural History and Trial Court's Findings Issues Before the High Court The Court's Reasoning and Ratio Decidendi Reliance on Supreme Court Precedent — Ravish Singh Rana (2025) Critical Evaluation and Broader Implications Conclusion 1. INTRODUCTION AND LEGAL CONTEXT The intersection of consent, promise of marriage, and live-in relationships has remained one of the most contested terrains in Indian criminal jurisprudence. Courts across India have grappled with the question of whether a woman's consent to physical intimacy — given during a subsisting romantic relationship — can be deemed vitiated solely because the man later refused to marry her. The charge of rape under Section 376 of the IPC (now Section 63 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 ) requires the prosecution to prove absence of free consent, and the legal distinction between a "false promise to marry" made with no intention of fulfillment from the very beginning, and a mere "breach of promise" where circumstances changed over time, has been elaborated upon in numerous Supreme Court decisions including Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana (2013) 7 SCC 675 , Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra (2019) 9 SCC 608 , and most recently, Ravish Singh Rana v. State of Uttarakhand (2025 INSC 635) . The Chhattisgarh High Court's judgment in XYZ v. Siddharth Sarangi adds a robust layer to this jurisprudence by holding that in a long-term live-in relationship, the very duration and nature of cohabitation creates a legal presumption of consent, thereby shielding the relationship from being criminalized upon its breakdown. 2. FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE CASE The appellant, identified as "XYZ" to protect her identity, was approximately 40 years of age and employed as a Project Manager with the Municipal Corporation, Bhilai. In April 2019, she secured admission to pursue an MBA programme at the Indian Institute of Management (IIM), New Raipur, Chhattisgarh, where she became acquainted with the respondent-accused, Siddharth Sarangi. Their initial interactions revolved around academics, but on 5 July 2019, the accused invited her to his residence ostensibly for group study. Upon her arrival, she found no other students present. According to her complaint, the accused expressed his desire for a physical relationship and, when she objected, assured her of his intention to marry her. Relying on this assurance, she entered into a physical relationship with him. The parties thereafter continued their relationship and, by the appellant's own admission during cross-examination, lived together in a live-in arrangement for approximately two years. After their examinations concluded on 29 August 2021, the accused informed her over telephone that his parents did not consent to the marriage on account of her age, her status as a divorcee, and her Christian faith. Despite continued efforts by the appellant, the accused distanced himself. On 28 November 2021, when the appellant visited his residence to press for marriage, she alleged that the accused subjected her to unnatural sexual intercourse against her wishes. The appellant further stated that the accused visited her residence the next day and reassured her of marriage, but subsequently blocked her contact. The appellant then approached the Women's Commission, where a monetary settlement of Rs. 30 lakhs was proposed. The accused tendered a cheque of Rs. 15 lakhs with an assurance of paying the balance upon execution of an agreement. Since the agreement was not executed, the cheque payment was stopped, and the appellant returned the cheque to the Women's Commission on 7 July 2022. 3. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS On 20 December 2022 — more than three years after the commencement of the relationship and over a year after the accused's refusal to marry — the appellant filed written complaints (Ex. P/1 and Ex. P/2) at Police Outpost Khamhardih, Raipur. An FIR bearing Crime No. 380/2022 was registered under Sections 376, 376(2)(n), and 377 of the IPC . After investigation, a chargesheet was submitted before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Raipur, and the case was committed to the Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Raipur, for trial as Sessions Trial No. 61/2023. Charges were framed under Section 376(2)(k)(n) (rape by a person in a position of control or dominance, committed repeatedly on the same woman) and Section 377 (unnatural offences). Upon appreciation of evidence, the learned Additional Sessions Judge acquitted the accused by judgment dated 24 June 2025, holding that the prosecution had failed to prove the charges through reliable and cogent evidence. The Trial Court specifically found in paragraph 37 of its judgment that the dispute between the parties had assumed the character of a money dispute and that the physical relationship was consensual in nature with no medical evidence to substantiate the allegation of unnatural sexual intercourse. Being aggrieved, the appellant filed the present acquittal appeal (ACQA No. 380 of 2025) before the Chhattisgarh High Court. 4. ISSUES BEFORE THE HIGH COURT The Division Bench was tasked with determining whether the Trial Court committed any infirmity, illegality, perversity, or miscarriage of justice in acquitting the accused. The core question distilled to this: can a long-term live-in relationship, which both parties entered voluntarily as educated, financially independent adults, be retrospectively characterized as rape merely because the man later declined to marry the woman? Secondary issues included whether the allegation of unnatural sex on 28 November 2021 was supported by medical or corroborative evidence, and whether the significant delay of over three years in lodging the FIR affected the prosecution's credibility. 5. THE COURT'S REASONING AND RATIO DECIDENDI Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas, writing for the Division Bench, undertook a comprehensive evaluation of the prosecution evidence. The Court drew attention to several critical evidentiary findings. First, the appellant's own brother, Anand Robert (PW-2), admitted in his testimony that the victim had informed him that the physical relationship developed because of a love affair and that both parties belonged to different castes — a fact that suggested the relationship was rooted in mutual affection rather than deception. Second, the medical evidence of Dr. Vidya Shiv Kumar (PW-4) was devastating to the prosecution's case: the doctor admitted during cross-examination that the appellant neither complained of any forceful physical relationship nor of unnatural sex, and no injuries were found during medical examination that would suggest unnatural intercourse. The Court observed that the appellant, being approximately 40 years of age, educated at a premier management institute, employed in a responsible position, and previously married, was "fully aware of the nature and consequences of entering into a physical relationship with the accused." The evidence unmistakably demonstrated that the physical relationship was consensual. The parties had lived together for nearly two years in what was clearly a long-drawn live-in relationship. The Court held that the learned Trial Court had correctly appreciated the factual matrix and the evidence adduced by both parties, and its finding that the relationship was consensual and that the dispute had subsequently assumed the character of a monetary dispute was unimpeachable. In its most significant pronouncement, the Division Bench stated: "In a long-drawn live-in relationship, a presumption would arise that they voluntarily chose that kind of a relationship fully aware of its consequences." The Court further clarified that while couples in live-in relationships may express a desire to eventually marry, such an expression does not by itself establish that the physical relationship between them existed solely because of a promise of marriage. 6. RELIANCE ON SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT — RAVISH SINGH RANA (2025) The Division Bench placed substantial reliance on the Supreme Court's decision in Ravish Singh Rana v. State of Uttarakhand (2025 INSC 635) , delivered by a Bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Manoj Misra. In that case, the Supreme Court quashed criminal proceedings against a man accused of rape by his live-in partner, holding that "if two able-minded adults reside together as a live-in couple for more than a couple of years and cohabit with each other, a presumption would arise that they voluntarily chose that kind of a relationship fully aware of its consequences." The Supreme Court had further observed that "in a long drawn live-in relationship, occasions may arise where parties in that relationship express their desire or wish to formalize the same by a seal of marriage, but that expression of desire, or wish, by itself would not be indicative of the relationship being a consequence of that expression of desire or wish." The Supreme Court in Ravish Singh Rana also made a sociologically significant observation: "A decade or two earlier, live-in relationships might not have been common. But now more and more women are financially independent and have the capacity to take conscious decisions of charting their life on their own terms. This financial freedom, inter alia, has led to proliferation of such live-in relationships. Therefore, when a matter of this nature comes to a court, it must not adopt a pedantic approach rather the Court may, based on the length of such relationship and conduct of the parties, presume implied consent." The Chhattisgarh High Court found that its own facts fell squarely within the framework articulated by the Supreme Court. The appellant and the accused were both pursuing an MBA at a premier institution, both were adults capable of making informed choices, they cohabited for approximately two years, and the relationship clearly developed out of mutual affection. The Court held that the Trial Court's acquittal was "in conformity with the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Ravish Singh Rana." 7. CRITICAL EVALUATION AND BROADER IMPLICATIONS This judgment must be evaluated against the backdrop of an evolving legal and social landscape. Indian law has consistently distinguished between a "false promise to marry" — where the man never had any intention of marrying the woman and used the promise as a mere tool to obtain her consent — and a "breach of promise" — where the man genuinely intended to marry but later changed his mind due to changed circumstances. The distinction was clearly articulated in Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana (2013) 7 SCC 675 , where the Supreme Court held that the former vitiates consent under Section 90 of the IPC while the latter does not. Similarly, in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra (2019) 9 SCC 608 , the Supreme Court reiterated that there must be "adequate evidence to show that at the inception of the relationship, the accused had no intention of marrying the victim." The Chhattisgarh High Court's judgment extends this line of reasoning by introducing the concept of presumed consent in long-term cohabitation. The implication is significant: where parties have lived together for an extended period, courts will not easily accept the narrative that the physical relationship was solely premised on a promise of marriage. The duration of cohabitation itself becomes evidence of voluntary participation. This approach acknowledges the agency of women as equal participants in relationships rather than treating them as passive victims who surrendered to deception. However, the judgment also implicitly reinforces a protective boundary. It does not hold that consent can never be vitiated in a live-in relationship. If it can be demonstrated that the promise of marriage was made fraudulently from the very inception — with clear evidence that the man never intended to fulfill it — the offence of rape can still be made out even within a live-in arrangement. What the Court rejects is the attempt to criminalize a failed relationship merely because one partner chose not to proceed to marriage. The case also highlights the relevance of delay in filing the FIR. The first physical relationship occurred on 5 July 2019; the refusal to marry was communicated on 31 August 2021; yet the FIR was lodged only on 20 December 2022. While delay in FIR is not by itself fatal, it becomes a relevant consideration when viewed alongside other circumstances, particularly the appellant's willingness to settle the matter monetarily before the Women's Commission — a fact that the Trial Court treated as indicative of the dispute being essentially monetary in nature. 8. CONCLUSION The Chhattisgarh High Court's judgment in XYZ v. Siddharth Sarangi represents a measured and progressive contribution to the jurisprudence on consent, live-in relationships, and the limits of criminal law in regulating intimate relationships between adults. By affirming that the law will presume consent in long-term live-in relationships and that a subsequent refusal to marry does not retroactively criminalize the entire relationship, the Court has provided much-needed clarity to an area of law that has witnessed considerable inconsistency across High Courts. The judgment aligns with the Supreme Court's evolving approach in Ravish Singh Rana (2025 INSC 635) and reflects a judicial recognition that in a society where live-in relationships are a legitimate exercise of personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution , the criminal law must not be weaponized to punish the breakdown of such relationships. The decision ultimately stands for the principle that Indian law respects the autonomy of consenting adults and refuses to treat every failed romance as a crime. Key Sections Discussed: Section 376(2)(k)(n) IPC | Section 377 IPC | Section 90 IPC (Consent obtained by misconception) | Article 21, Constitution of India Key Case Laws Cited/Relied Upon: Ravish Singh Rana v. State of Uttarakhand (2025 INSC 635) — Supreme Court held that in long-term live-in relationships, consent to physical relationship is presumed. Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana (2013) 7 SCC 675 — Supreme Court distinguished between "false promise" and "breach of promise" to marry. Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra (2019) 9 SCC 608 — Supreme Court held that evidence must show absence of intention to marry at inception of relationship.