Instagram Chats Alone Cannot Prove Adultery to Deny Wife Maintenance: Allahabad High Court Landmark Ruling on Electronic Evidence and Section 125 CrPC

EduLaw EditorialLandmark Judgements2026-10-04

Can a husband defeat his wife's maintenance claim by simply producing Instagram chat printouts alleging adultery? The Allahabad High Court, in a judgment delivered on September 29, 2026, answered with a resounding no holding that uncertified social media conversations, without corroborative evidence of physical intimacy or cohabitation, are thoroughly insufficient to establish that a wife is continuously "living in adultery." Title: Instagram Chats Alone Cannot Prove Adultery to Deny Wife Maintenance — Allahabad HC Reaffirms Strict Standard for Electronic Evidence and "Living in Adultery" Under Maintenance Law Case Name: X v. State of U.P. and Another Case Number: Criminal Revision No. 7800 of 2025 Court: High Court of Judicature at Allahabad Judge: Hon'ble Justice Jai Krishna Upadhyay (Court No. 85) Judgment Date: September 29, 2026 Citation: X v. State of U.P. and Another, Criminal Revision No. 7800 of 2025 (Allahabad High Court, decided on 29.09.2026) ABSTRACT The Allahabad High Court, in X v. State of U.P. and Another (Criminal Revision No. 7800 of 2025), addressed a critical intersection of family law, digital evidence law, and maintenance jurisprudence. The revisionist-husband challenged a Family Court order granting maintenance to his estranged wife, contending that she was "living in adultery" with an advocate — a ground that, if established, disentitles a wife from maintenance under Section 125(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now Section 144 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 ). The husband's sole evidence comprised printouts of Instagram conversations between his wife and the said advocate. Justice Jai Krishna Upadhyay dismissed the revision on two independent grounds. First, the Instagram chat printouts were inadmissible because they lacked the mandatory certification under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (corresponding to Section 63 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 ), as mandated by the Supreme Court in Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer (2014) 10 SCC 473 and Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal (2020) 7 SCC 1 . Second, even if the chats were perused on their merits, mere text messages on a social media platform — absent corroborative evidence of physical intimacy or cohabitation — could not establish the continuous, habitual adulterous conduct that the phrase "living in adultery" demands. The Court reaffirmed that maintenance provisions are beneficent social welfare measures designed to prevent vagrancy and destitution, and that the burden of proving a statutory disqualification lies squarely on the party alleging it. TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction and Background Factual Matrix of the Case Issues Before the Court Legal Framework: Maintenance Law and the "Living in Adultery" Exception Admissibility of Electronic Evidence: The Section 65B Mandate Analysis and Reasoning of the Court Case Laws Relied Upon Conclusion and Key Takeaways INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND In an era where social media permeates every aspect of human relationships, courts are increasingly confronted with the question of how much weight digital conversations should carry in serious legal proceedings. The Allahabad High Court's judgment in X v. State of U.P. and Another delivers a resounding answer: unverified Instagram chats, standing alone and unsupported by any corroborative material, cannot be weaponised to strip a wife of her statutory right to maintenance. This ruling arrives at a time when matrimonial disputes are frequently entangled with allegations built on screenshots, chat printouts, and social media activity — raising urgent questions about the evidentiary threshold courts should apply before such material can influence the outcome of proceedings that determine whether a person will have the means to sustain a dignified life. The case is significant not merely for its holding on electronic evidence, but for the meticulous manner in which Justice Jai Krishna Upadhyay interpreted the statutory phrase "living in adultery" under Section 125(4) CrPC (now Section 144(4) BNSS ). The Court drew a principled distinction between a continuous, habitual adulterous lifestyle on the one hand, and isolated conversations, fleeting lapses, or professional associations on the other. By doing so, the judgment reinforces the beneficent character of maintenance legislation and places a heavy evidentiary burden on any husband seeking to invoke the adultery exception as a shield against his legal obligation to provide sustenance to his estranged wife. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE The marriage between the revisionist-husband and Opposite Party No. 2 (the wife) was admitted and undisputed. However, on account of marital discord, the parties began residing separately. The wife subsequently initiated proceedings for maintenance before the Principal Judge, Family Court, Sambhal situated at Chandausi, pleading that she was unable to maintain herself and that her husband — who possessed sufficient means — had neglected and refused to maintain her. The Family Court, vide its order dated October 1, 2025, in Case No. 924 of 2024, allowed the wife's application for maintenance under the provisions corresponding to Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 . The husband challenged this order by filing Criminal Revision No. 7800 of 2025 before the Allahabad High Court under Sections 438 and 442 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) . The central plank of his challenge was that his wife was disqualified from receiving maintenance because she was allegedly "living in adultery" with an advocate. To substantiate this allegation, the husband placed heavy reliance on printouts of Instagram chats purportedly exchanged between his wife and the said advocate. These printouts constituted the sole evidence offered by the husband to establish the statutory disqualification. Notably, the husband did not produce any other corroborative material — no evidence of physical intimacy, no evidence of cohabitation, no testimony of witnesses, and no other documentary proof to buttress his claim of a continuous adulterous relationship. ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT The High Court framed the adjudicatory inquiry around two interlinked questions that went to the heart of the husband's challenge. The first question concerned the admissibility of the Instagram chat printouts: whether electronic records in the form of social media conversation printouts can be admitted in evidence without the mandatory statutory certification prescribed under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (corresponding to Section 63 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 ). The second question concerned the substantive legal standard: what scope and standard of proof is required to establish the ground of "living in adultery" under the maintenance provisions, and whether, even on a perusal of their contents, the Instagram chats could satisfy that standard. These two questions required the Court to navigate the intersection of evidence law — particularly the rapidly evolving jurisprudence on digital evidence — and the social welfare objectives of maintenance legislation. The resolution of the first question would determine whether the husband's evidence could even enter the evidentiary record; the resolution of the second would determine whether, assuming the evidence were considered, it could bear the weight the husband sought to place upon it. LEGAL FRAMEWORK: MAINTENANCE LAW AND THE "LIVING IN ADULTERY" EXCEPTION Justice Upadhyay commenced his analysis with an exposition of the fundamental purpose and character of maintenance law. The Court observed that the basic idea behind the grant of maintenance is to ensure that neglect and destitution are prevented for persons who are unable to provide for themselves. The law imposes an obligation upon those who possess sufficient means to provide for their dependents, thereby ensuring that individuals have the means to secure the essential aspects of a dignified life and implementing accountability for those who ignore their familial responsibilities. The Court noted that maintenance proceedings are inherently summary in character, designed to be speedy, and aimed at preventing vagrancy on the part of the person seeking relief. Drawing on the Supreme Court's pronouncements, the judgment underscored that maintenance provisions have consistently been recognised as social welfare measures. In Dukhtar Jahan v. Mohd. Farooq (1987) 1 SCC 624 , the Supreme Court held that the provisions relating to maintenance must be interpreted in a manner consistent with their social justice orientation. Similarly, in Rajnesh v. Neha (2021) 2 SCC 324 , the Supreme Court issued comprehensive directions aimed at ensuring uniformity and fairness in maintenance proceedings, reaffirming that these provisions must be interpreted liberally keeping their beneficent objective in view. The Allahabad High Court relied on both these landmark precedents to establish that any exception or disqualification under maintenance law must be construed narrowly, given the humanitarian purpose the statute serves. Against this backdrop, the Court examined the statutory exception contained in Section 125(4) CrPC (now Section 144(4) BNSS ), which provides that no wife shall be entitled to receive maintenance if she is "living in adultery," or if she refuses to live with her husband without sufficient reason, or if the parties are living separately by mutual consent. The Court's interpretation of the phrase "living in adultery" was meticulous and purposive. Justice Upadhyay held that the terminology "living in" — consciously employed by the legislature — fundamentally denotes a continuous, ongoing, and habitual course of adulterous conduct. It does not encompass a single, fleeting lapse. It cannot be inferred from mere conversational interactions, professional associations, or unsubstantiated suspicions. The Court was emphatic: for a husband to successfully defeat a wife's maintenance claim on this ground, he must present clear and cogent evidence that, on its face, establishes this continuous adulterous conduct. The burden of proving this statutory disqualification rests entirely on the party alleging it, and it is not for the wife to disprove a vague or unsubstantiated allegation. ADMISSIBILITY OF ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE: THE SECTION 65B MANDATE The second critical dimension of the judgment relates to the admissibility of the Instagram chat printouts under the law of electronic evidence. The Court observed that the admissibility of electronic evidence must be tested strictly at the anvil of Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 . This provision establishes a specific procedure for the admissibility of electronic records as secondary evidence and mandates that such evidence must be accompanied by a certificate from a person occupying a responsible official position in relation to the operation or management of the relevant device or system, certifying certain prescribed particulars about the electronic record. The Court relied extensively on the Supreme Court's three-judge bench decision in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal (2020) 7 SCC 1 , which authoritatively settled the law on this point. In Arjun Panditrao, the Supreme Court — following and affirming the ratio in Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer (2014) 10 SCC 473 — held that the certificate under Section 65B(4) is a mandatory condition precedent to the admissibility of electronic records as secondary evidence. The Supreme Court clarified that secondary evidence of electronic records is admissible only if led in the strict manner stated in the statute, and not otherwise. The Allahabad High Court applied this settled legal position and found that the Instagram chat printouts produced by the husband were not accompanied by the mandatory statutory certification. Justice Upadhyay observed that in the absence of such a certificate, "it would be entirely incorrect in law to treat this electronic evidence as admissible." The judgment also underscored the policy rationale behind this strict requirement. The Court noted that the necessity for such verification stems from the inherent vulnerabilities of digital data — the ease with which digital content can be fabricated, altered, manipulated, or taken out of context. Social media conversations are particularly susceptible to these vulnerabilities: messages can be edited, screenshots can be doctored, and context can be stripped away. The Section 65B certification requirement serves as a safeguard against precisely these dangers, ensuring that only authenticated and verified electronic records are placed before a court as evidence. In the absence of compliance with this procedural mandate, the entire evidentiary foundation of the husband's case collapsed. ANALYSIS AND REASONING OF THE COURT Having held the Instagram chats inadmissible on the threshold question of Section 65B compliance, Justice Upadhyay proceeded to examine the husband's case on its merits as well — even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the contents of the chats could be perused. This dual-track analysis strengthened the judgment considerably. The Court observed that "mere text messages on a social media platform, without corroborative evidence of physical intimacy or cohabitation, are thoroughly insufficient to legally establish that the wife is continuously living in adultery." The phrase "living in adultery" connotes a factual state of affairs — a relationship that is ongoing, physical, and habitual — not a digital conversation, however suggestive it might appear when read in isolation. The Court emphasised that the burden lay "heavily upon the revisionist to prove a continuous adulterous lifestyle," which he had failed to discharge. The husband had produced no witnesses, no evidence of cohabitation between the wife and the advocate, no evidence of physical meetings or intimacy, and no documentary or circumstantial evidence corroborating his allegation beyond the chat printouts. In effect, his entire case rested on a single category of evidence — one that was both legally inadmissible and substantively insufficient. The Family Court had correctly evaluated the material on record, and the High Court found that the impugned order did not suffer from any jurisdictional error, material irregularity, or perversity warranting interference in revision. The Criminal Revision was accordingly dismissed, and the Family Court's maintenance order dated October 1, 2025 was affirmed. CASE LAWS RELIED UPON The judgment draws upon a carefully assembled body of Supreme Court precedent that touches upon three distinct but interconnected areas of law — maintenance, electronic evidence, and social welfare interpretation. Each of these precedents deserves attention for the specific principle it contributed to the Court's reasoning. Dukhtar Jahan v. Mohd. Farooq (1987) 1 SCC 624 is one of the earliest Supreme Court decisions to recognise the social welfare character of Section 125 CrPC . The Supreme Court in that case emphasised that the provision is designed to achieve a social purpose — the prevention of vagrancy and destitution — and that its beneficial object must guide interpretation. The Allahabad High Court invoked this precedent to frame the interpretive lens through which the adultery exception must be viewed: any disqualification must be construed narrowly, and the beneficent purpose of the provision must be kept in the foreground. Rajnesh v. Neha (2021) 2 SCC 324 is a more recent and comprehensive treatment of maintenance law by the Supreme Court. In this landmark decision, the Court issued detailed directions aimed at ensuring uniformity across courts in maintenance proceedings, including directions on the disclosure of assets, the timely disposal of applications, and the enforcement of orders. The Allahabad High Court relied on Rajnesh v. Neha to reinforce the principle that maintenance provisions must be interpreted liberally in favour of the dependent spouse and that procedural or substantive barriers to maintenance must be applied with caution. Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer (2014) 10 SCC 473 is the foundational Supreme Court judgment on the admissibility of electronic evidence under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act. The Court in Anvar P.V. held that electronic evidence can only be proved in the manner prescribed by Section 65B , and that the certification requirement under Section 65B(4) is not optional but mandatory. This overruled the earlier position that appeared to permit electronic evidence without such certification. The Allahabad High Court's reliance on this precedent was pivotal in rejecting the husband's Instagram chat printouts. Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal (2020) 7 SCC 1 is the three-judge bench decision that conclusively affirmed and expanded the ratio of Anvar P.V. The Supreme Court in Arjun Panditrao held that the Section 65B(4) certificate is a condition precedent to the admissibility of secondary electronic evidence, clarified the limited circumstances in which such certification may be dispensed with (i.e., where the original electronic record is itself produced), and settled the conflict that had arisen from certain earlier decisions. The Allahabad High Court's application of this precedent to the Instagram chats in the present case demonstrates how the Arjun Panditrao framework operates in practice — especially in matrimonial disputes where digital evidence is increasingly common. CONCLUSION AND KEY TAKEAWAYS The Allahabad High Court's judgment in X v. State of U.P. and Another is a timely and consequential ruling that stands at the crossroads of digital evidence law and family law. It sends a clear message to litigants and courts alike: in an age of pervasive digital communication, the mere existence of social media conversations — even if they are suggestive — cannot substitute for the rigorous evidentiary standard that the law demands before a wife's right to maintenance can be extinguished. The judgment operates on two levels. At the procedural level, it reaffirms that Section 65B compliance is non-negotiable and that electronic records produced without mandatory certification are simply inadmissible, regardless of what they might appear to show. At the substantive level, it clarifies that "living in adultery" within the meaning of Section 125(4) CrPC (now Section 144(4) BNSS ) demands proof of a continuous, ongoing, habitual adulterous relationship — not an isolated conversation, not a professional association, and not a suspicion drawn from digital exchanges. For practitioners, the judgment carries several practical lessons. A husband seeking to invoke the adultery exception under maintenance law must go far beyond producing social media printouts. He must ensure full Section 65B compliance for any electronic evidence he seeks to rely upon, and he must supplement that evidence with corroborative material — whether in the form of witness testimony, evidence of cohabitation, evidence of physical intimacy, or other circumstantial evidence that collectively demonstrates a continuous adulterous lifestyle. Conversely, a wife defending against such an allegation can draw on this judgment to argue that uncertified digital evidence must be excluded at the threshold, and that even certified digital evidence, standing alone without corroboration, is insufficient to cross the statutory bar. The ruling ultimately upholds the principle that maintenance law exists to protect vulnerable persons from destitution, and that this protective purpose must not be defeated by unverified allegations built on the fragile foundation of social media screenshots. Relevant Statutory Provisions Referenced in the Judgment: Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Order for maintenance of wives, children, and parents. Section 125(4) CrPC — Bar on maintenance where the wife is living in adultery. Section 144 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) — Corresponding provision to Section 125 CrPC under the new criminal code. Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 — Admissibility of electronic records. Section 63 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) — Corresponding provision to Section 65B under the new evidence code. Sections 438 and 442 of the BNSS — Revisional jurisdiction of the High Court.