Husband's Girlfriend Is Not a "Relative" Under Section 85 BNS: Calcutta High Court Quashes Cruelty Case — Full Case Analysis
EduLaw EditorialLandmark JudgementsCan a wife's FIR drag her husband's alleged girlfriend and his students into a criminal cruelty prosecution? The Calcutta High Court says no — unless they qualify as "relatives" under the law. Justice Dr. Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee quashed all proceedings, reinforcing strict statutory interpretation of matrimonial cruelty provisions. Title: Husband's Girlfriend Is Not a "Relative" Under Section 85 BNS — Calcutta High Court Quashes Cruelty Prosecution Against Students and Associates Case Name: Purba Chatterjee & Ors. v. The State of West Bengal & Anr. Case Number: CRR 5550 of 2025 Court: High Court at Calcutta (Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction, Appellate Side) Judge: Hon'ble Dr. Justice Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee Judgment Date: 25 August 2026 Citation: Rabindra Sarobar P.S. Case No. 80 of 2025; CGR Case No. 2086 of 2025 ABSTRACT The misuse of matrimonial cruelty provisions has remained a persistent concern in Indian criminal jurisprudence. In Purba Chatterjee & Ors. v. The State of West Bengal & Anr. [CRR 5550 of 2025], the Calcutta High Court addressed a fundamental question: can a husband's alleged girlfriend, his students, and their family members be prosecuted for matrimonial cruelty under Section 85 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (corresponding to the erstwhile Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code ) when they bear no familial relationship to the husband by blood, marriage, or adoption? Justice Dr. Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee answered with an emphatic no. The Court quashed all criminal proceedings against the four petitioners, holding that the statutory requirement of being a "husband or relative of the husband" is a non-negotiable ingredient of the cruelty offence. Drawing upon the Supreme Court's landmark interpretation in U. Suvetha v. State by Inspector of Police, (2009) 6 SCC 757 , the Court reiterated that penal statutes must be construed strictly. This judgment also dissected the remaining charges under Section 305 BNS (theft), Section 351(3) BNS (criminal intimidation), and Section 3(5) BNS (common intention), finding each unsustainable against the petitioners on a plain reading of the FIR itself. The decision is a significant restatement of the principle that criminal law must not become a weapon of harassment in matrimonial disputes and that the constitutional right to a free, peaceful, and unblemished life cannot be sacrificed on the altar of vague, omnibus allegations. TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction — The Expanding Shadow of Section 498A and Section 85 BNS Factual Background — A Matrimonial Dispute Turned Criminal Dragnet Arguments of the Petitioners — Strangers to the Marriage, Strangers to the Offence Arguments of the Complainant — Investigation Must Not Be Stifled Prematurely The Court's Analysis — Strict Construction of "Relative" Under Section 85 BNS Examining Theft, Criminal Intimidation, and Common Intention — Sections 305, 351(3), and 3(5) BNS Relevant Case Laws and Their Application Conclusion — Criminal Law as Shield, Not Sword 1. Introduction — The Expanding Shadow of Section 498A and Section 85 BNS Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code , enacted in 1983 as a protective measure against dowry-related cruelty and domestic abuse, has over the decades earned the dubious distinction of being described by the Supreme Court itself as one of the most misused provisions in Indian criminal law. In Sushil Kumar Sharma v. Union of India, (2005) 6 SCC 281 , the Supreme Court observed that the provision, intended to be a shield for married women, was increasingly being used as a weapon of harassment against the husband's family. With the enactment of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), the cruelty provision has been re-enacted as Section 85 BNS , retaining the same essential ingredients — namely, that the offence can only be committed by "the husband or the relative of the husband." Despite the legislative transition from the IPC to the BNS, the interpretive challenges surrounding the word "relative" have persisted. The judgment in Purba Chatterjee & Ors. v. The State of West Bengal & Anr. squarely confronts this issue, arising from a situation where a wife's FIR sought to rope in her husband's alleged girlfriend, his students, and their family members into a prosecution designed around matrimonial cruelty. The Calcutta High Court's decision serves as a firm judicial reminder that penal provisions demand strict construction and that the net of criminal liability cannot be cast wider than the statute permits. 2. Factual Background — A Matrimonial Dispute Turned Criminal Dragnet The complainant, the wife of the principal accused (referred to as accused no. 1), lodged a written complaint alleging that she had endured prolonged physical and mental torture at the hands of her husband throughout their 27-year marriage. She further alleged that her husband had been maintaining an illicit extramarital relationship with the first petitioner, Purba Chatterjee, since February 2025. According to the complaint, the other petitioners — Ayan Mazumder (petitioner no. 2, a student of the husband), Surajit Biswas (petitioner no. 3, the husband of Purba Chatterjee), and Soham Dasgupta (petitioner no. 4, the son of petitioners no. 1 and 3) — had conspired with the principal accused to systematically intimidate the complainant, demand exorbitant sums of money, and force her out of the matrimonial home. The complainant specifically alleged that on 3 July 2025, the principal accused, along with petitioners no. 1 and no. 3, attempted to forcibly evict her from her residence, and upon her refusal, the husband absconded with both his own belongings and articles belonging to the complainant. Based on this complaint, Rabindra Sarobar Police Station Case No. 80 of 2025 was registered under Sections 85, 305, 351(3), and 3(5) of the BNS, 2023 , corresponding to CGR Case No. 2086 of 2025 . It is significant that petitioner no. 4 was named in the FIR as "Souvik Das Gupta," although his actual name was Soham Dasgupta — a discrepancy that the petitioners argued underscored the manufactured and hearsay-based nature of the allegations. The petitioners, none of whom bore any familial relationship to the principal accused, approached the Calcutta High Court under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) (corresponding to the erstwhile Section 482 CrPC ) seeking quashment of the entire proceeding. 3. Arguments of the Petitioners — Strangers to the Marriage, Strangers to the Offence Counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Antarikhya Basu, mounted a multi-layered challenge to the sustainability of the criminal proceedings. The primary contention was that even if every allegation in the FIR were accepted at face value, the ingredients of Section 85 BNS could not be made out against the petitioners because none of them was either the husband or a relative of the husband of the complainant. Petitioner no. 1, Purba Chatterjee, was a student of the principal accused engaged in research work. Petitioner no. 2, Ayan Mazumder, was also his student. Petitioner no. 3 was the husband of petitioner no. 1, and petitioner no. 4 was their son. The relationship between the petitioners and the principal accused was purely academic and professional, not one of blood, marriage, or adoption. The petitioners further argued that the allegations were omnibus, bereft of particulars, and directed almost entirely at the principal accused. Importantly, counsel pointed out that in an earlier complaint lodged by the same complainant against her husband, no mention whatsoever was made of the petitioners, suggesting that their inclusion was an afterthought motivated by malice. Regarding the date of the alleged incident — 3 July 2025 — petitioner no. 1 relied on a school attendance register showing that she was performing her professional duties as an Assistant Teacher from 10:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. on that very day, which would disprove her physical presence at the scene. 4. Arguments of the Complainant — Investigation Must Not Be Stifled Prematurely Counsel for the complainant, Mr. Anirban Guha Thakurata, vigorously opposed the quashing application. He argued that the petitioners had approached the High Court at a premature stage and that quashing at this juncture would deprive the victim of her right to a fair investigation. He relied on the well-established principle that an FIR is not an encyclopaedia and cannot be expected to contain every minute detail of the alleged offences. The complainant, being a layperson who lodged the complaint without legal assistance, could not be held to the standard of legal precision in her drafting. Counsel further argued that the petitioners had actively participated in the conspiracy with the principal accused to intimidate and extort money from the complainant, attracting the common intention provision under Section 3(5) BNS . With respect to the alibi based on the school attendance register, it was contended that such a document was disputed in nature and could not be treated as conclusive at this nascent stage of investigation. The complainant's counsel also highlighted that vital electronic evidence, including call detail records and tower location data, was yet to be collected, and that allowing the investigation to proceed was essential for a complete picture of the petitioners' involvement. To support his submissions, counsel placed reliance on Mushkan v. Ishan Khan, 2025 SCC OnLine 2355 , Rajesh Bajaj v. State of NCT of Delhi, (1999) 3 SCC 259 , State of U.P. v. O.P. Sharma, (1996) 7 SCC 750 , and Skoda Auto Volkswagen India Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P., (2020) SCC OnLine SC 958 — all of which caution against quashing FIRs at an embryonic stage of investigation. 5. The Court's Analysis — Strict Construction of "Relative" Under Section 85 BNS Justice Dr. Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee commenced his analysis by turning to the foundational statutory requirement of Section 85 BNS . The provision, like its predecessor Section 498A IPC , expressly limits the class of persons who can be prosecuted for matrimonial cruelty to "the husband or the relative of the husband." The Court noted that this is not a peripheral procedural requirement but an essential ingredient of the offence itself. If the accused does not fall within this defined category, the offence simply cannot be constituted, regardless of how the allegations are framed. The Court relied squarely on the Supreme Court's authoritative interpretation in U. Suvetha v. State by Inspector of Police and Another, (2009) 6 SCC 757 , where the Apex Court held: "In the absence of any statutory definition, the term 'relative' must be assigned a meaning as is commonly understood. Ordinarily it would include father, mother, husband or wife, son, daughter, brother, sister, nephew or niece, grandson or granddaughter of an individual or the spouse of any person. The meaning of the word 'relative' would depend upon the nature of the statute. It principally includes a person related by blood, marriage or adoption." Applying this test, the Court found that not a single petitioner satisfied this requirement. Purba Chatterjee was the principal accused's student and research associate — not his relative. Ayan Mazumder was also a student. Petitioners no. 3 and 4 were the husband and son of petitioner no. 1 respectively, bearing no familial connection to the principal accused at all. Even if petitioner no. 1 was alleged to have been involved in an extramarital relationship with the principal accused, that circumstance did not convert her into a "relative" for the purposes of Section 85 BNS . The Court observed that the allegation of an illicit relationship, however morally objectionable, did not create a legal bond of the kind contemplated by the statute. This finding alone was sufficient to demolish the cruelty charge against all four petitioners. With respect to the school attendance register produced by petitioner no. 1, the Court acknowledged that it could not be treated as an unimpeachable document at this stage, but clarified that this evidentiary question was ultimately immaterial because the fundamental legal deficiency — the absence of the "relative" requirement — rendered the cruelty charge unsustainable irrespective of the alibi evidence. 6. Examining Theft, Criminal Intimidation, and Common Intention — Sections 305, 351(3), and 3(5) BNS Having disposed of the cruelty charge, Justice Mukherjee turned to the remaining provisions invoked in the FIR. On the allegation of theft under Section 305 BNS , the Court conducted a careful reading of the FIR and found that the complainant herself had attributed the entire allegation of unlawful removal of property solely to the principal accused — her husband. Paragraph 5 of the complaint specifically stated that it was the principal accused who "unlawfully absconded with his personal belongings as well as articles belonging to the complainant, thereby committed theft." There was no allegation that any of the petitioners independently removed any movable property from the complainant's possession. Consequently, the Court held that Section 305 BNS had no application against the petitioners. On the allegation of criminal intimidation under Section 351(3) BNS , the Court examined the relevant portion of the FIR and found that it stated only that "the principal accused has been habitually perpetrating physical violence upon the complainant causing grievous hurt and endangering her physical and mental well-being." The Court noted that this allegation was directed exclusively at the principal accused and contained no specific averment of threatening conduct by any of the petitioners. Finally, the Court addressed the invocation of Section 3(5) BNS , which deals with constructive criminal liability arising from common intention. Justice Mukherjee held that for this provision to apply, two factors must be established: common intention and actual participation by the accused in the commission of the offence. In the present case, since the underlying substantive offences themselves were not made out against the petitioners, the question of common intention did not arise. The Court emphasized that the word "furtherance" in Section 3(5) indicates "some kind of aid or assistance producing an effect, i.e. advancement or promotion," and such allegations were completely absent against the petitioners. Merely naming persons in an FIR, without clearly and separately setting out their individual roles in the alleged criminal acts, cannot sustain a prosecution under the common intention provision. 7. Relevant Case Laws and Their Application This judgment draws upon a robust framework of precedents that collectively define the limits of criminal prosecution in matrimonial disputes. The most critical precedent is U. Suvetha v. State by Inspector of Police, (2009) 6 SCC 757 , where the Supreme Court held that the expression "relative of the husband" in Section 498A IPC must be given its ordinary and natural meaning, encompassing only persons connected by blood, marriage, or adoption. In that case, the Supreme Court specifically ruled that a girlfriend or concubine of the husband cannot be prosecuted as a "relative" for the purposes of the cruelty provision. The Calcutta High Court also invoked the principles laid down in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, (1992) Supp 1 SCC 335 , the seminal Supreme Court judgment that laid down the categories of cases in which the High Court's inherent power to quash FIRs may be exercised. The Bhajan Lal framework includes situations where the FIR, even taken at face value, does not prima facie constitute any offence or disclose a cognizable offence against the accused. The present case fell squarely within this category. Additionally, the judgment resonates with the concerns expressed in Sushil Kumar Sharma v. Union of India, (2005) 6 SCC 281 , where the Supreme Court acknowledged that Section 498A was being weaponized in matrimonial disputes and cautioned courts to remain vigilant against its misuse. The Court in the present case also had occasion to consider, though it ultimately distinguished, the precedents cited by the complainant's counsel, including Rajesh Bajaj v. State of NCT of Delhi, (1999) 3 SCC 259 and State of U.P. v. O.P. Sharma, (1996) 7 SCC 750 , which advocate restraint in quashing FIRs at early stages. While acknowledging the general validity of those principles, Justice Mukherjee held that they do not apply where the accused persons are, as a matter of law, incapable of committing the alleged offence due to the absence of a statutory ingredient. A related earlier decision by the same judge, Vargab Mallik & Ors. v. The State of West Bengal & Anr. [CRR 1382 of 2018], reinforces this judicial approach — in that case as well, Justice Mukherjee quashed proceedings under Section 498A IPC where the complaint contained vague allegations devoid of specific material indicating cruelty as defined under the provision, and where the complainant herself admitted in matrimonial proceedings that her husband had never tortured her. 8. Conclusion — Criminal Law as Shield, Not Sword The judgment in Purba Chatterjee & Ors. v. The State of West Bengal & Anr. is a principled reaffirmation of two foundational tenets of criminal jurisprudence. First, penal statutes must be interpreted strictly — courts cannot expand the scope of a criminal provision beyond the clear language of the statute, no matter how sympathetic the complainant's narrative may appear. Section 85 BNS , like Section 498A IPC before it, restricts criminal liability for matrimonial cruelty to the husband and his relatives. A girlfriend, a student, a professional associate, or any person who does not share a bond of blood, marriage, or adoption with the husband is simply outside the statute's reach. Second, the criminal justice system must not be permitted to become a tool for harassment, vendetta, or pressure in the context of matrimonial disputes. Justice Mukherjee's observation that the petitioners — being mostly students and researchers — possessed a "constitutionally guaranteed right to a free, peaceful and unblemished life" unless sufficient prima facie material existed to justify curtailing that freedom is a timely reminder of the stakes involved when criminal processes are set in motion against persons on the basis of vague, omnibus, and non-specific allegations. The Court accordingly quashed CGR Case No. 2086 of 2025 insofar as it concerned the four petitioners — Purba Chatterjee, Ayan Mazumder, Surajit Biswas @ Surojit Biswas, and Soham Dasgupta (wrongly named as Souvik Das Gupta in the FIR). Proceedings against the principal accused — the complainant's husband — were not examined as he was not a party before the Court. This decision will serve as an important reference for practitioners and courts dealing with the expanding but often improperly targeted application of matrimonial cruelty provisions under the new criminal law regime.