Husband Cannot Claim Maintenance From Wife Under Section 144 BNSS — Allahabad HC Imposes ₹15 Lakh Cost for Economic Abuse and False Affidavits
EduLaw EditorialLandmark JudgementsCan a husband claim maintenance from his wife under the criminal law framework? The Allahabad High Court answered with a decisive "No" — and went further, imposing ₹15 lakh in compensatory costs on an advocate-husband who systematically exploited his wife's finances, filed false affidavits, and misused the judicial process to sustain a fraudulent maintenance claim. Title: Husband Disentitled to Maintenance Under Section 144 BNSS — Allahabad High Court Imposes ₹15 Lakh Compensatory Cost for Economic Abuse and Judicial Fraud Case Name: Ranjeet Singh v. Neetu Singh Case Number: Matters Under Article 227 No. 12198 of 2025 (arising from Maintenance Case No. 523 of 2025) Court: High Court of Judicature at Allahabad Judge: Hon'ble Justice Vinod Diwakar Judgment Date: 23 April 2026 Neutral Citation: 2026:AHC:90307 ABSTRACT The Allahabad High Court, in Ranjeet Singh v. Neetu Singh (2026:AHC:90307), delivered a landmark ruling examining whether a husband can claim maintenance from his wife under Section 144 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 — the statutory successor to Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 . The petitioner-husband, a practicing advocate, sought to expedite his maintenance proceedings against his wife, an Additional Private Secretary at the Allahabad High Court, through a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India . Justice Vinod Diwakar found that the husband had concealed a prior maintenance order under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 , filed false affidavits, and systematically depleted his wife's financial resources by coercing her into personal loans exceeding ₹25 lakh. Holding that Section 144 BNSS was legislatively designed to provide maintenance only to wives, children, and parents — not husbands — the Court dismissed the petition and imposed ₹15 lakh as compensatory costs payable to the wife. The judgment draws upon the Madras High Court's reasoning in B. Clement v. Mcthel Thanga Annam and the Hyderabad High Court's ruling in Malleshwaramma v. G.S. Srinivasulu , while simultaneously developing the jurisprudence on economic abuse within marriage and the corrective purpose of compensatory costs in matrimonial litigation. TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction and Significance of the Judgment Factual Background and Marital History The Husband's Claims and Arguments Before the Court The Wife's Rebuttal and Exposure of Financial Fraud The Role of the Amicus Curiae and the False Affidavit Question Legal Analysis — Scope of Section 144 BNSS and the Husband's Disentitlement Economic Abuse Within Marriage — The Court's Jurisprudential Framework Directions, Compensatory Costs, and Precedential Value 1. Introduction and Significance of the Judgment The question of whether a husband can claim maintenance from his wife under the criminal law framework governing family welfare has long simmered in Indian matrimonial jurisprudence. While personal laws such as the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 do permit either spouse to seek interim maintenance under Section 24 during pendency of matrimonial proceedings, the criminal law provision — formerly Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), 1973 , now replaced by Section 144 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 — was specifically designed as a social welfare measure to protect certain categories of dependents from destitution. In Ranjeet Singh v. Neetu Singh , the Allahabad High Court confronted this question head-on, producing a judgment that is as much about statutory interpretation as it is about the judiciary's willingness to call out fraud, economic exploitation, and the weaponization of legal process in matrimonial disputes. Justice Vinod Diwakar's ruling is notable not only for clarifying that a husband falls outside the legislative scope of Section 144 BNSS but also for the unprecedented imposition of ₹15 lakh in compensatory costs — a figure that signals the court's growing intolerance for what it described as "luxury litigation born out of false pretenses, ego, and greed." The judgment weaves together principles of unjust enrichment, the doctrine of clean hands, the Supreme Court's disclosure mandates in Rajnesh v. Neha (2020) 14 SCC 596, and the emerging recognition of economic abuse as a distinct wrong within the institution of marriage. For practitioners, litigants, and scholars of family law, this decision offers a rich repository of doctrinal reasoning and practical deterrence. 2. Factual Background and Marital History The marriage between Ranjeet Singh and Neetu Singh was solemnized on 18 May 2019 in Etawah in accordance with Hindu rites. At the time of the marriage, both parties were unemployed and preparing for competitive examinations. Neetu Singh had qualified for the post of Additional Private Secretary on 14 May 2019 — merely four days before the wedding — and joined the Allahabad High Court on 7 June 2019. The timing of the marriage, coming within a week of the announcement of the wife's examination results, became a significant factual detail that the Court took note of in assessing the husband's conduct and motivations. Ranjeet Singh did not secure government employment but eventually obtained an LL.B. degree and enrolled as an advocate with the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh. He began legal practice under the guidance of Advocate Anurag Shukla and, according to the record, had previously been engaged in the construction business, filing an Income Tax Return showing total income of ₹4,70,540 for Assessment Year 2023–2024. The wife, accommodating her husband's needs, even obtained a transfer to the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court for approximately three years before returning to the Prayagraj seat after the marital relationship broke down. The relationship soon deteriorated into a web of cross-litigation involving FIRs under Sections 498A, 323, 504, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code read with Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act , criminal complaints of breach of trust under Section 406 IPC , a divorce petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act , a restitution of conjugal rights application under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act , and the maintenance proceedings that became the subject of this case. 3. The Husband's Claims and Arguments Before the Court The husband's case rested on the portrayal of himself as a helpless, unemployed young man, driven to destitution by his earning wife's alleged cruelty and multiple false criminal prosecutions. In his maintenance application filed under Section 144 BNSS, 2023 before the Family Court at Etawah, and in the Article 227 petition before the High Court seeking expeditious disposal of that application, Ranjeet Singh argued that he had no independent source of income and was surviving entirely on loans from friends and relatives. He contended that the respondent-wife, after securing her government position, had begun quarreling with him and his mother, humiliated him at her workplace for being unemployed, and launched fabricated criminal cases to destroy his career and reputation. He emphasized the physical and emotional toll of attending court proceedings across multiple forums — a distance of approximately 400 kilometres on each occasion — and claimed to have developed serious health conditions including hypertension, diabetes, and heart and kidney diseases. His counsel submitted that the wife had not been appearing in the maintenance proceedings before the Etawah Family Court, frustrating the adjudication process, and that the petition merely sought a direction for speedy disposal. Notably, at paragraph 16 of his maintenance application, the husband had sworn on affidavit that no case regarding maintenance was pending in any court — a statement that, as the proceedings unfolded, was revealed to be patently false. 4. The Wife's Rebuttal and Exposure of Financial Fraud The respondent-wife's case, presented through Advocate Vijeta Singh, systematically dismantled the husband's narrative. Neetu Singh demonstrated through banking records and documentary evidence that her husband had coerced her into taking two personal loans from her State Bank of India salary account — the first of ₹11,50,000 on 10 November 2020 (which was subsequently repaid), and the second of ₹13,56,000 on 6 October 2022 — purportedly for the purchase of a plot of land. In reality, the entire loan amounts were transferred to the husband's personal bank accounts via UPI. No land was ever purchased. The wife continued to bear the burden of a monthly EMI of ₹26,020 from her salary, with repayments extending until October 2028. An examination of the wife's bank account statements revealed a pattern of daily withdrawals ranging from ₹5,000 to ₹10,000, and on several occasions ₹49,000, all allegedly made by the husband who had possession of her banking credentials, ATM cards, and passwords. The wife further established that the husband came from a politically connected and financially comfortable family — his uncle was a former Member of the 15th Lok Sabha from the Etawah constituency, his mother was a former Gram Pradhan, and the family owned substantial immovable property including a two-storied furnished house, agricultural land, and a vacant plot at Bharthana Chauraha, Etawah. She also alleged that the husband had taken possession of her Maruti Vitara Brezza car and demanded ₹10 lakh for its return, which led to the filing of FIR No. 0043 of 2024. The husband's attempt to quash that FIR was rejected by the High Court, which observed that the FIR prima facie disclosed the commission of a cognizable offence. Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court decisions in Ashok Kumar Mittal v. Ram Kumar Gupta (2015) 2 SCC 182, Vinod Seth v. Devinder Bajaj (2010) 8 SCC 1, and Sanjeev Kumar Jain v. Raghuvir Saran Charitable Trust (2012) 1 SCC 455 to argue that compensatory costs of a realistic nature were warranted to curb such vexatious litigation. 5. The Role of the Amicus Curiae and the False Affidavit Question A particularly illuminating dimension of this case was the appointment and contribution of Advocate Amrita Rai Mishra as Amicus Curiae. The Court was compelled to take this step because the petitioner-husband had a pattern of frequently changing his legal representatives and failing to appear on hearing dates. During the proceedings, the husband's senior counsel, Shri O.P. Singh, even sought permission to withdraw the case and then requested a discharge, leaving the Court without effective representation for the petitioner. The Amicus Curiae's submissions proved decisive. She brought to the Court's attention the critical fact that the petitioner had already been granted maintenance of ₹5,000 per month and ₹10,000 towards litigation expenses under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 , by an order dated 15 September 2025 of the Family Court, Prayagraj — in the very divorce proceedings initiated by the wife. Despite receiving this benefit, the husband had filed a separate maintenance application under Section 144 BNSS before the Etawah Family Court and sworn on affidavit that no maintenance proceedings were pending in any court. This was a direct and demonstrable falsehood. The Amicus Curiae relied upon the Supreme Court's landmark directions in Rajnesh v. Neha (2020) 14 SCC 596, which mandated the filing of detailed affidavits of assets and liabilities by both parties in all maintenance proceedings. The husband had not only failed to comply with this mandate but had furnished affidavits with incomplete and misleading financial information, concealing multiple bank accounts and sources of income. The Amicus further submitted that a practicing advocate who appears regularly before the High Court cannot legitimately portray himself as wholly dependent on his wife without full and candid financial disclosure. She urged the Court to initiate perjury proceedings, observing that "contesting matrimonial litigation is one thing, and filing false and frivolous petitions along with false affidavits is another matter of grave concern." 6. Legal Analysis — Scope of Section 144 BNSS and the Husband's Disentitlement The core legal question — whether a husband can seek maintenance from his wife under Section 144 BNSS, 2023 — was answered by Justice Diwakar with reference to two authoritative High Court precedents that have interpreted the identically worded predecessor provision, Section 125 CrPC . The Madras High Court in B. Clement v. Mcthel Thanga Annam (Criminal Original Petition No. 10466 of 2012, decided 7 June 2012) had categorically held: "The legislature would not have intended to clothe the husband with the right to claim maintenance from his wife under this Chapter. Though under some personal laws, the husband may be entitled to claim maintenance from the wife, it is certainly not possible under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure." This reasoning was reinforced by the Hyderabad High Court in Malleshwaramma v. G.S. Srinivasulu , which observed: "It appears, the Parliament, in its wisdom, intentionally not included the words 'husband' or 'spouse' after the words 'his wife' and preceding the words 'unable to maintain' in clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 125 Cr.PC; therefore, a husband is not entitled to file application under Section 125 Cr.PC claiming maintenance from the wife." The textual architecture of Section 144 BNSS mirrors that of Section 125 CrPC in its designation of the categories of persons entitled to maintenance — "wives, children, and parents." The deliberate legislative omission of "husband" or "spouse" is not an accidental gap but a purposeful exclusion reflecting the social welfare objective of the provision: to prevent vagrancy and destitution among those members of a family who are typically economically vulnerable. Justice Diwakar noted that while personal law remedies such as Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act permit either spouse to seek interim maintenance during matrimonial proceedings — a remedy the husband had already availed — the criminal law provision under BNSS is categorically gendered in its application. The Court further held that even if the husband could somehow overcome this textual barrier, his claim was independently vitiated by his suppression of material facts, filing of false affidavits, and approach to the Court without clean hands — all of which disentitled him from any equitable relief under the supervisory jurisdiction of Article 227 of the Constitution . 7. Economic Abuse Within Marriage — The Court's Jurisprudential Framework Perhaps the most forward-looking portion of the judgment is the Court's extended discussion on economic abuse within marriage. Justice Diwakar recognized that the husband's conduct — coercing the wife into personal loans, siphoning the proceeds into his own accounts, failing to create any asset, and then claiming to be penniless and dependent — constituted a systematic pattern of economic exploitation that the law could not tolerate. The Court observed that "economic abuse within marriage operates in insidious ways — through control over income, coercive appropriation of assets, and the gradual erosion of financial independence," and that limiting compensatory costs to direct financial loss "fails to capture the full extent of the injustice." Drawing upon the doctrine of unjust enrichment and the principle of restitutio in integrum — the equitable principle that seeks to restore the injured party to the position they would have occupied but for the wrongdoing — Justice Diwakar articulated a broader conception of compensatory costs in matrimonial litigation. The Court held that "the imposition of financial liability — whether through maintenance, compensation, or restitution — serves a legitimate legal purpose. It is not merely punitive, but corrective: aimed at restoring, as far as possible, the economic position and dignity of the aggrieved spouse." This reasoning aligns with the English jurisprudence cited in the judgment — the famous observation of Justice Browen in Cropper v. Smith (1884) 26 Ch. D. 700, that "there is one panacea which heals every sore in litigation, and that is costs" — while extending it to address the specific dynamics of financial exploitation within the marital relationship. The Court was also candid in its assessment of the parties based on its direct interactions with them during the proceedings. Justice Diwakar noted that the wife's "body language and demeanor reflected that she has been physically abused and now seems to be mentally drained," while the husband was "a well built, shameless youth, who has no respect for the hard work, sincerity, and loyalty." While such observational commentary is unusual in appellate orders, it reflects the Court's effort to engage with the lived realities behind the legal submissions — a recognition that matrimonial litigation, more than any other form of civil dispute, involves the assessment of human conduct, credibility, and moral character. 8. Directions, Compensatory Costs, and Precedential Value The Court's operative directions were comprehensive and deliberately structured to address both the immediate dispute and the broader pattern of litigation abuse. First, the petition was dismissed as being devoid of bona fides and legally unsustainable, since the very proceedings the husband sought to expedite had already been stayed by a coordinate bench of the High Court — a fact the husband had concealed. Second, the husband was directed to pay ₹15 lakh as compensatory costs to the wife within six weeks through a demand draft deposited with the Registrar General, failing which the amount would be recoverable as arrears of land revenue, with the District Magistrate, Etawah directed to probe the husband's assets and prevent any dissipation. Third, the Family Court at Prayagraj was directed to expedite the pending divorce proceedings in accordance with Section 21-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 , which mandates that matrimonial petitions be concluded within six months of service of notice. The Family Court was also directed to review the Section 24 maintenance order within four weeks, conduct in-camera hearings to protect the privacy and dignity of the parties under Section 11 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 , ensure the physical security of the wife during proceedings, and submit quarterly progress reports. Fourth, the Court left it open for the trial court to examine the initiation of perjury proceedings in respect of the false affidavits filed by the husband. This judgment carries significant precedential value on several fronts. It confirms — through a persuasive synthesis of the Madras and Hyderabad High Court authorities — that Section 144 BNSS does not confer upon a husband the right to claim maintenance from his wife, settling a question that may arise with increasing frequency as gender dynamics in Indian marriages continue to evolve. It develops the jurisprudence on economic abuse by recognizing that financial exploitation within marriage justifies compensatory costs grounded in the principles of unjust enrichment and equitable restitution. It reinforces the Supreme Court's mandates in Rajnesh v. Neha regarding disclosure of assets and liabilities, demonstrating the consequences of non-compliance. And it sends a powerful deterrent signal — through the ₹15 lakh cost imposition — that courts will not permit the judicial process to be weaponized for exploitation, particularly in the matrimonial jurisdiction where the stakes are deeply personal and the potential for abuse correspondingly high. As Justice Diwakar pointedly observed, "The High Court is not a window shopping forum." Key Statutory Provisions Discussed: Section 144 BNSS, 2023 (Maintenance of Wives, Children, and Parents); Section 125 CrPC, 1973 (now replaced); Section 24, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (Interim Maintenance); Section 13, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (Divorce); Section 9, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (Restitution of Conjugal Rights); Section 21-B, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (Speedy Disposal); Section 11, Family Courts Act, 1984 (In-Camera Proceedings); Article 227, Constitution of India (Supervisory Jurisdiction); Sections 498A, 323, 406, 504, 506 IPC ; Sections 3 and 4, Dowry Prohibition Act .