Consensual Relationship Cannot Be Termed Rape: Allahabad HC Quashes Criminal Proceedings Case Analysis 2026

EduLaw EditorialLandmark Judgements2026-06-23

The Allahabad High Court flagged the "growing trend" of consensual relationships being criminalized after breakups and quashed rape proceedings, holding that where consent is voluntary and free from coercion, Section 376 IPC cannot be invoked merely because a relationship ends without marriage. Title: Consensual Relationship Between Adults Cannot Be Branded as Rape: Allahabad High Court Flags Growing Misuse of Criminal Law Case Name: Sanjay @ Sanjay Kashyap vs. State of U.P. and Another Case Number: Application U/S 528 BNSS No. 29363 of 2025 Court: Allahabad High Court Judge: Hon'ble Justice Vivek Kumar Singh Judgment Date: May 20, 2026 Citation: 2026:AHC:116590 ABSTRACT In a judgment that carries far-reaching implications for criminal jurisprudence in India, the Allahabad High Court quashed the chargesheet, cognizance order, and the entire criminal proceedings against a man accused of rape under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 on the alleged false promise of marriage. Justice Vivek Kumar Singh, delivering the judgment on May 20, 2026, held that where a man and a woman maintain a consensual relationship as adults, and the FIR is lodged only after the relationship turns sour, the continuation of criminal proceedings would amount to gross misuse of criminal jurisdiction and an abuse of the process of law. The Court extensively relied upon a catena of Supreme Court judgments, including Samadhan vs. State of Maharashtra (2025) , Pramod Suryabhan Pawar vs. State of Maharashtra (2019) , Rajnish Singh @ Soni vs. State of U.P. (2025) , and Pramod Kumar Navratna vs. State of Chhattisgarh (2026) , to emphasize that the offence of rape must be reserved exclusively for cases involving genuine sexual violence, coercion, or absence of free consent — and that criminalizing every broken relationship trivializes the gravest offences known to criminal law. TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction and Context II. Factual Background of the Case III. Contentions of the Parties IV. Legal Framework: Consent, False Promise, and Breach of Promise V. The Court's Reasoning and Analysis VI. Key Supreme Court Precedents Relied Upon VII. Ratio Decidendi and Final Order VIII. Critical Observations and Broader Implications I. INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT The criminalization of consensual adult relationships following their breakdown has emerged as one of the most debated issues in Indian criminal law. Courts across the country have repeatedly encountered situations where women lodge FIRs under Section 376 IPC (or its replacement under Section 64 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita ) alleging rape on the false promise of marriage — not after any act of violence, but after the relationship deteriorates or the man declines to marry. The Allahabad High Court's judgment in Sanjay @ Sanjay Kashyap vs. State of U.P. and Another arrives at a time when Indian judiciary is grappling with the difficult task of distinguishing genuine cases of sexual exploitation from instances where criminal law is weaponized to settle personal scores or coerce reluctant partners into marriage. The judgment was delivered by Justice Vivek Kumar Singh under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) — the successor provision to Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — which vests the High Court with inherent power to quash proceedings that constitute an abuse of the process of any court or that are otherwise necessary to secure the ends of justice. The case arose from Case Crime No. 238 of 2024, registered under Sections 376, 323, 342, and 506 of the IPC at Police Station Pipraich in Gorakhpur district. II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE CASE The FIR in this case was registered on March 30, 2024, by the complainant (opposite party no. 2/victim), who alleged that she had met the applicant (Sanjay @ Sanjay Kashyap) approximately one year earlier at a marriage ceremony. According to her version, the applicant purchased a mobile phone and gifted it to her, after which they began communicating regularly. She claimed that the applicant made a promise of marriage before her family members, and on the basis of that promise, they developed physical intimacy. When the complainant pressurized the applicant to fulfill his promise of marriage, he allegedly made excuses and later threatened to kill her. She further claimed that on March 26, 2024, when she visited the applicant's house, he physically assaulted her and ultimately declined to marry her. Notably, the FIR did not specify the date, time, or place where the alleged offence of rape was first committed. In her statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. , the complainant described herself as approximately 20 years of age and educated up to Class 9. In her statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate, she stated that she had been in a relationship with the applicant for one year and that on May 30, 2023, the applicant took her to a friend's house and forcibly established physical relations. She concluded her statement by expressing her desire to marry the applicant. The medical examination of the complainant, conducted on April 2, 2024, revealed no external injuries on her body. The ossification test confirmed her age as above 20-21 years. The Investigating Officer submitted a chargesheet on June 9, 2024, and the learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offence on February 8, 2025. The applicant, whose arrest had earlier been stayed by a Division Bench of the High Court and who was subsequently granted anticipatory bail, then moved the present application under Section 528 BNSS seeking quashing of the chargesheet, cognizance order, and the entire criminal proceedings. III. CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES The applicant's counsel argued that the FIR was false and frivolous, lodged solely because the relationship had broken down. The admitted position — that the complainant was in a relationship with the applicant for approximately one year — itself demonstrated that the FIR was the product of a soured relationship rather than any genuine sexual offence. Counsel emphasized that the FIR contained no material particulars regarding the date, time, or place of the alleged first instance of rape, and that the complainant's version kept shifting between her FIR, her Section 161 statement, and her Section 164 statement. The absence of any injury on the complainant's body, combined with her own admission of being a major adult in a consensual relationship, pointed conclusively toward the misuse of criminal law. The complainant's counsel and the Additional Government Advocate for the State resisted the application, arguing that the applicant had exploited the victim for one year under a false promise of marriage. They contended that the promise was false from the very inception and that the applicant had physically abused and threatened the victim when she insisted on marriage. They submitted that sufficient material existed on record for the chargesheet, that a prima facie offence was made out from the FIR and statements, and that the application therefore lacked merit. IV. LEGAL FRAMEWORK: CONSENT, FALSE PROMISE, AND BREACH OF PROMISE The legal distinction between "false promise of marriage" and "breach of promise of marriage" lies at the heart of this case. Under Section 375 of the IPC , sexual intercourse becomes rape if a woman's consent is obtained by "misconception of fact." When an accused makes a promise to marry with no intention of fulfilling it from the very inception — solely to obtain sexual consent — the woman's consent is vitiated by misconception of fact, and the act constitutes rape. However, where the promise is made in good faith and is subsequently broken due to changed circumstances, unforeseen obstacles, or a genuine change of mind, it constitutes a mere breach of promise — a matter that sounds in civil law and cannot be transformed into criminal liability under Section 376 IPC . This distinction was crystallized by the Supreme Court in Deepak Gulati vs. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675 , where the Court held that the court must examine whether the false promise was made at an early stage, whether it was the sole reason for the woman's consent, and whether the accused never intended to honor the promise from the beginning. The Court in Deepak Gulati recognized that a woman may agree to sexual intercourse "on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her." Similarly, Section 90 of the IPC addresses consent given under misconception of fact, providing that consent is not valid if it is given under fear of injury or under a misconception of fact — but only if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that consent was given in consequence of such fear or misconception. This provision cannot be invoked to fasten criminal liability unless it is established that the accused never genuinely intended to marry the complainant from the very beginning of the relationship. V. THE COURT'S REASONING AND ANALYSIS Justice Vivek Kumar Singh began by examining the FIR, the complainant's statements under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. , and the material collected during investigation. The Court found that the prosecution's case rested on nothing more than "bald allegations" bereft of material particulars. The FIR was entirely silent on the specific date, time, and place where the alleged offence of rape was first committed. The complainant's statements were internally inconsistent — while the FIR made generalized allegations of rape over one year, the Section 164 statement introduced a specific date (May 30, 2023) and location (friend's house) for the first time, demonstrating an evolving narrative. The Court noted that the medical examination revealed no injuries whatsoever, and the complainant was a major adult aged approximately 20 years who was admittedly in a relationship with the applicant. Crucially, the complainant herself expressed a desire to marry the applicant — both in her Section 164 statement and through the overall tenor of her complaint — suggesting that the FIR was lodged not because of any sexual violence but because the applicant declined to proceed with marriage. The High Court found that this was squarely a case where "consensual relationships going on for a prolonged period, upon turning sour, had been sought to be criminalised by invoking criminal jurisprudence." The continuation of such prosecution, the Court held, would amount to "gross misuse of criminal jurisdiction." Applying the well-established guidelines laid down in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 605 , the Court concluded that the case fell within categories (1), (5), and (7) of the Bhajan Lal framework — namely, that the allegations even if taken at face value did not constitute any offence; that they were so absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person could find sufficient ground for proceeding; and that the proceedings were manifestly attended with mala fide and ulterior motive. VI. KEY SUPREME COURT PRECEDENTS RELIED UPON The judgment extensively relied upon a chain of authoritative Supreme Court pronouncements that have, over the years, developed a coherent jurisprudence on the distinction between consensual relationships and rape: Pramod Suryabhan Pawar vs. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608 : The Supreme Court held that to establish a "false promise," the maker must have had no intention of upholding his word at the time of giving the promise. A mere breach of promise cannot be equated with a false promise. The consent of a woman under Section 375 is vitiated on the ground of misconception of fact only where such misconception was the very basis for her choosing to engage in the sexual act. Shiv Shanker vs. State of Karnataka, (2019) 18 SCC 204 : The Supreme Court quashed criminal proceedings, observing that it is "difficult to hold sexual intercourse in the course of a relationship which has continued for eight years, as rape, especially in the face of the complainant's own allegation that they lived together as man and wife." Naim Ahamed vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 15 SCC 385 : The Court drew a critical distinction between "false promise" and "breach of promise," holding that in the case of a false promise, the accused would not have any intention to marry the prosecutrix from the very beginning, whereas in breach of promise, the accused might have given the promise with all seriousness but later encountered circumstances that prevented fulfillment. Mahesh Damu Khare vs. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 11 SCC 398 : The Supreme Court observed that where a physical relationship is maintained for a prolonged period knowingly by the woman, "it cannot be said with certainty that the said physical relationship was purely because of the alleged promise of marriage." A woman may have reasons for a physical relationship other than the promise of marriage, such as personal liking for the male partner. Rajnish Singh @ Soni vs. State of U.P., 2025 (4) SCC 197 : The Supreme Court held that where a woman willingly engages in a long-term relationship, fully aware of its nature, and there is no cogent evidence that the relationship was induced by a misconception of fact or a false promise made in bad faith from the inception, the man cannot be held guilty of rape under Section 376 IPC. Prashant vs. State of NCT of Delhi, (2025) 5 SCC 764 : The Court observed that "it is inconceivable that the complainant would continue to meet the accused or maintain a prolonged association or physical relationship with him in the absence of voluntary consent on her part" and that "a mere breakup of a relationship between a consenting couple cannot result in initiation of criminal proceedings." Samadhan vs. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2528 : In this landmark ruling, the Supreme Court directly addressed the "disquieting tendency" of failed or broken relationships being given "the colour of criminality," and held that "to convert every sour relationship into an offence of rape not only trivialises the seriousness of the offence but also inflicts upon the accused indelible stigma and grave injustice." Ravish Singh Rana vs. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1055 : The Supreme Court laid down that when two able-minded adults maintain a long-term physical relationship, "a presumption would arise that they voluntarily chose that kind of a relationship fully aware of its consequences," and subsequent non-fulfillment of a promise of marriage would not attract criminal liability. Pramod Kumar Navratna vs. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 154 : The most recent Supreme Court pronouncement on this issue, where the Court directed that genuine cases under Section 376(2)(n) IPC "must be clearly demarcated from the litigation that arises from cases of consensual relationships between consenting adults going acrimonious on account of dispute and disagreement or a future change of mind." VII. RATIO DECIDENDI AND FINAL ORDER The ratio of the judgment rests on multiple converging grounds. First, the Court held that the material on record — including the FIR, statements under Sections 161 and 164, and the medical examination report — did not make out a prima facie case of rape under Section 376 IPC against the applicant. The allegations were bald, bereft of material particulars, internally inconsistent, and unsupported by any corroborative evidence. Second, the Court held that the complainant's own conduct — maintaining a relationship with the applicant for one year as a major adult, expressing a continuing desire to marry him, and lodging the FIR only when the relationship deteriorated — was wholly inconsistent with the allegation of rape and strongly suggested that the FIR was an instrument of coercion rather than a genuine criminal complaint. Third, the Court applied the Bhajan Lal guidelines and determined that the proceedings fell within the categories where quashing is warranted — the allegations did not constitute any offence, they were inherently improbable, and the proceedings were attended with mala fide and ulterior motive. The High Court accordingly allowed the application under Section 528 BNSS and quashed the chargesheet dated June 9, 2024, the cognizance order dated February 8, 2025, and the entire criminal proceedings of Case No. 159 of 2025 pending before the Judicial Magistrate/Civil Judge Junior Division-14, Gorakhpur. VIII. CRITICAL OBSERVATIONS AND BROADER IMPLICATIONS This judgment carries significance that extends well beyond the individual facts of the case. The Allahabad High Court's observation that courts are witnessing a "growing trend" of consensual relationships being converted into criminal prosecutions after breakups echoes a concern that has been raised at every level of the Indian judiciary, including by the Supreme Court in multiple recent decisions. The misuse of Section 376 IPC (and corresponding provisions under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita) in failed relationship cases creates a dual harm. On one hand, it subjects innocent individuals to the devastating stigma and consequences of a rape accusation — arrest, incarceration, social ostracization, and prolonged litigation. On the other hand, it trivializes the offence of rape itself, diverting judicial resources and prosecutorial attention from genuine cases of sexual violence where women have been truly exploited, coerced, or assaulted. The judgment also underscores the evolving judicial recognition that modern adult relationships often involve physical intimacy that may be driven by mutual attraction, love, or companionship rather than exclusively by a promise of marriage. As the Supreme Court observed in Ravish Singh Rana , women today are "financially independent and have the capacity to take conscious decisions of charting their life on their own terms" — and courts must not adopt a "pedantic approach" that treats every relationship as contingent upon a marriage promise. However, this judicial trend must be carefully balanced against the continued need to protect women who are genuinely deceived. The law on rape by false promise of marriage remains sound and necessary — what the courts are cautioning against is its misapplication to situations that do not meet its essential ingredients. As the Supreme Court held in Pramod Kumar Navratna (2026) , the essential ingredients are clearly defined: there must be a promise made solely to obtain sexual consent, without any intention of fulfillment from the very beginning, and the promise must have a direct bearing on the woman's consent. Where these ingredients are absent, criminal law has no role to play. For legal practitioners, this judgment reinforces the importance of scrutinizing FIRs in such cases for material particulars — date, time, and place of the alleged first offence; consistency across multiple statements; medical evidence; the length and nature of the relationship; and critically, the timing of the FIR relative to the breakdown of the relationship. These factors, when examined collectively, reveal whether a case involves genuine sexual violence or the weaponization of criminal law following a personal disappointment.