Advocate Playbook 048: How Senior Advocates Distinguish Between BNSS and CrPC | EduLaw
EduLaw EditorialAdvocate PlaybookA working guide for advocates on distinguishing BNSS from CrPC using Section 531 BNSS, the Parvinder Singh v. Directorate of Enforcement ruling (2026 INSC 519), and stage-wise section mapping. Updated to 19 July 2026.
EduLaw — Advocate Playbook Series Toggle High-Contrast Text ADVOCATE PLAYBOOK 048 How Senior Advocates Distinguish Between BNSS and CrPC The procedural stage—not merely the date of the offence—determines the applicable Code. Updated to 19 July 2026 Estimated reading time: 24–28 minutes Category: Criminal Procedure & Transitional Law Educational purpose only. This article is for legal education and professional research. Advocates must independently verify the enacted statutory text, binding precedent, applicable local High Court rules of practice, and the complete procedural record of their own case before filing or arguing any point discussed here. Every advocate who has argued a bail application in 2025 or 2026 involving an FIR from 2023 has faced the same silent trap: assuming that an "old" case must be governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. That assumption is frequently wrong, and the Supreme Court's decision in Parvinder Singh v. Directorate of Enforcement now makes the correct method unmistakably clear. On this page The 30-Second Answer Why Lawyers Get the Transition Wrong The Five-Date Test Section 531 BNSS: The Transitional Bridge Investigation, Inquiry or Trial? Parvinder Singh Case Study Investigation-Stage Section Map Court and Bail-Stage Section Map BNSS Is Not CrPC With New Numbers Special Statutes Come First Decision Tree Courtroom Examples Argument Formulations Common Courtroom Errors One-Page Checklist FAQ Conclusion Sources Table of Contents ▾ The 30-Second Answer Why Lawyers Get the Transition Wrong The Five-Date Test Section 531 BNSS Investigation, Inquiry or Trial? Parvinder Singh Case Study Investigation-Stage Map Court and Bail-Stage Map BNSS Is Not CrPC With New Numbers Special Statutes Come First Decision Tree Courtroom Examples Argument Formulations Common Errors Checklist FAQ Conclusion Sources The 30-Second Answer: Which Code Applies, BNSS or CrPC? The offence date is not the sole test. Identify the exact proceeding before the Court — a specific investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, or application. Determine whether that particular proceeding was pending immediately before 1 July 2024. Apply Section 531 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) to that proceeding specifically. Then check whether a special enactment such as the PMLA, NDPS Act, or POCSO Act prescribes an overriding or specialised procedure that displaces the general Code altogether. Do not say: "The case is old, so CrPC applies." Say instead: "This particular investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal or application was pending immediately before 1 July 2024 and must be tested under Section 531 BNSS." This distinction is not academic hair-splitting. Since 1 July 2024, when BNSS repealed and replaced the CrPC, 1 thousands of matters straddle the two Codes. A single FIR registered in 2023 might now generate an investigation continuing under CrPC, a chargesheet filed under old-Code principles, and — in the very same case file — a fresh anticipatory bail application in 2026 that must be captioned, argued and drafted entirely under BNSS. Getting this wrong produces defective cause titles, wrong statutory citations, and orders vulnerable to challenge on jurisdictional grounds. Why Lawyers Get the CrPC-to-BNSS Transition Wrong Two years after BNSS commencement, the same errors recur in trial courts, High Courts, and even in drafted pleadings from otherwise careful chambers. Recognising these errors is the first step toward avoiding them. The most common mistake is looking only at the date of the alleged offence and treating it as decisive. The offence date fixes the substantive law that defines the crime — whether the Indian Penal Code or the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 governs the definition of the offence — but it says nothing about which procedural Code governs the specific proceeding now before the Court. A closely related error is looking only at the FIR date and assuming that everything downstream of that FIR, including bail applications filed years later, remains frozen under CrPC. As the Bombay High Court explained in Chowgule and Company Pvt. Ltd. v. The Public Prosecutor , an investigation pending before 1 July 2024 continues under CrPC, but a bail application filed after that date is a distinct "application" for the purposes of Section 531 and is independently governed by BNSS. 2 A third and more structural error is assuming that an entire criminal case is either wholly CrPC or wholly BNSS, as if the case were one indivisible procedural unit. Section 531 BNSS does not speak in terms of "cases"; it speaks in terms of an "appeal, application, trial, inquiry or investigation" that was pending immediately before commencement. 3 Each of these is a discrete proceeding capable of being tested separately, and a single underlying FIR can spawn several such proceedings across different dates. Lawyers also mechanically replace old section numbers with new ones without comparing the actual statutory wording, assuming that because Section 41 CrPC "became" Section 35 BNSS, the two provisions say the same thing. Some corresponding provisions are substantially similar; others, such as the first proviso to Section 223 BNSS discussed later in this article, contain materially new mandatory language that did not exist in the corresponding CrPC provision. Citing a corresponding section number without reading the actual text of both provisions side by side is a drafting hazard that can cost a client a hearing. Finally, advocates sometimes mix CrPC and BNSS provisions mechanically within what is, in law, a single saved proceeding — for instance invoking a BNSS timeline provision in an investigation that is otherwise continuing under CrPC pursuant to Section 531(2)(a). The Supreme Court's reasoning in Parvinder Singh makes clear that Section 531 exists precisely to prevent this piecemeal application: once a proceeding is validly initiated under one Code, it must, as a rule, reach its logical conclusion under that same Code. 4 The Five-Date Test: What Each Date Proves (and What It Does Not) Before advising a client or drafting a pleading, a disciplined advocate reconstructs five distinct dates for the specific proceeding in question. No single date is dispositive; each narrows the inquiry but must be read together with the others. 1 Date of the alleged offence 2 Date of FIR or complaint 3 Date investigation or inquiry commenced 4 Date judicial mind was applied / cognizance taken 5 Date the present application, revision or appeal was instituted What it proves: Which substantive criminal law defines the offence (IPC/BNS) and, in special-statute matters, whether the alleged conduct falls within the statute as it stood at that time. What it does not prove: Which procedural Code governs any investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, or application connected to that offence. The offence date is irrelevant to Section 531 BNSS. What it proves: The date on which the investigation into a cognizable offence, or a complaint procedure before a Magistrate, was set in motion, which is the natural starting point for asking whether that investigation was "pending" before 1 July 2024. What it does not prove: Whether a later, distinct proceeding — such as a bail application, revision, or appeal filed years afterward — is governed by the same Code. Each such proceeding requires its own inquiry. What it proves: Whether an investigation (a police-led fact-finding exercise) or an inquiry (a judicial act by a Magistrate or Court, as defined in Section 2(1)(k) BNSS) was actually underway before commencement. What it does not prove: That a ministerial act — such as numbering a complaint or listing it for a future date — amounts to the "commencement" of an inquiry. The Supreme Court in Parvinder Singh drew a sharp line between administrative registry action and judicial inquiry. 5 What it proves: The moment judicial application of mind actually occurred — the taking of cognizance, dismissal of a complaint, or issuance of process — which is the earliest point at which an "inquiry" in the judicial sense can be said to have commenced. What it does not prove: Anything about the FIR date or the offence date; cognizance can occur well after both, and in a straddling case it can occur on the BNSS side of the commencement line even though the complaint was filed earlier. What it proves: Whether the specific proceeding actually before the Court today — the bail application, the revision petition, the appeal, the quashing petition — was itself instituted before or after 1 July 2024. This is frequently the operative date for drafting purposes, because Section 531(2)(a) protects proceedings "pending" before commencement, and a proceeding instituted afterward is, by definition, not pending before that date. What it does not prove: That the underlying investigation or trial is governed by the same Code as the fresh application; the two must be tested independently. Practical Hypothetical Chronology Consider a fact pattern that regularly appears in practice: the alleged offence occurred in March 2024, before BNSS; the FIR was registered in April 2024, also before BNSS; the investigation was still ongoing on 1 July 2024, the date BNSS commenced; the chargesheet was filed in September 2024, after BNSS commencement; and a bail application was filed in 2026, well after BNSS commencement. Analysing this chronology proceeding by proceeding: the investigation itself was pending immediately before 1 July 2024, and under Section 531(2)(a) BNSS it should ordinarily continue to be "disposed of, continued, held or made" in accordance with the CrPC as it stood immediately before commencement, as if BNSS had not come into force. 3 The fact that the chargesheet is physically filed in September 2024 does not, by itself, convert the investigation into a BNSS proceeding; what matters is whether the investigation was pending on the cut-off date, not when its product (the police report) is filed. However, this inference must still be verified against the order sheet: if, for instance, the investigating agency had actually closed the earlier investigation and a wholly new investigation was later initiated on different material after 1 July 2024, the analysis would change. The bail application filed in 2026 is a separate application instituted long after commencement, and there is no plausible basis on which it could be treated as "pending immediately before" 1 July 2024; it should ordinarily be filed and argued under the relevant BNSS provision (Section 482 or 483 BNSS, as applicable), citing the corresponding CrPC provision only for comparative or precedent purposes. The advocate must still verify locally whether the specific High Court or Sessions Court in question has taken a different view on any point of characterisation, and must confirm the exact date on which the investigation report was submitted and whether any intervening closure or fresh FIR occurred. Section 531 BNSS: The Transitional Bridge Between CrPC and BNSS Section 531 of the BNSS is titled "Repeal and savings" and performs two functions simultaneously. Sub-section (1) repeals the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in its entirety. Sub-section (2)(a) then immediately qualifies that repeal: notwithstanding the repeal, if immediately before the date on which BNSS came into force there was any appeal, application, trial, inquiry or investigation pending, such appeal, application, trial, inquiry or investigation shall be disposed of, continued, held or made, as the case may be, in accordance with the provisions of the CrPC as in force immediately before commencement, "as if this Sanhita had not come into force." 3 Every operative word in that clause carries independent weight for drafting purposes. The phrase "immediately before the date on which this Sanhita comes into force" fixes the relevant moment at the close of 30 June 2024 / opening of 1 July 2024 — the commencement date fixed by the Ministry of Home Affairs notification bringing BNSS into force with effect from 1 July 2024. 1 The list "appeal, application, trial, inquiry or investigation" is exhaustive of the categories of saved proceedings; it is not a residual catch-all for "the case" as a whole. The word "pending" requires that the proceeding actually be alive and unconcluded at that moment — not merely that its subject-matter (the alleged offence) predates that moment. The Supreme Court in Parvinder Singh explained the underlying purpose of this saving clause in terms that practitioners should internalise: the provision has "a laudable objective" of saving proceedings initiated under CrPC prior to BNSS commencement so that the proceeding "must meet its logical conclusion under the CrPC itself," and its object is "to avoid piecemeal application of the CrPC vis-à-vis the BNSS." 4 The Court further clarified that this is not a retrospective or retroactive application of BNSS, but a prospective one — a better procedural right conferred by BNSS enures to the benefit of an accused against whom none of the Section 531(2)(a) proceedings had yet been initiated. 4 This anti-piecemeal principle cuts both ways. It means that once a proceeding is validly a "saved" CrPC proceeding, an advocate should not selectively import a more favourable BNSS provision into the middle of that same proceeding. It equally means that once a proceeding is a fresh, post-commencement proceeding, an advocate cannot resurrect an old CrPC provision merely because the underlying facts are old. The correct method is to identify the exact saved proceeding — and only that proceeding — and test it against Section 531; a fresh proceeding, even one arising from decade-old facts, must ordinarily be examined under BNSS, subject always to any overriding special-law procedure. PENDING BEFORE 01.07.2024 → Test whether the identified proceeding is saved under CrPC by Section 531(2)(a) BNSS. Confirm actual pendency, not merely an earlier offence or FIR date. FRESHLY INITIATED AFTER 01.07.2024 → Test BNSS, subject to special law and the precise nature of the proceeding. Confirm no earlier saved proceeding is being improperly continued under a new label. Note the deliberate use of "test" rather than "conclude." Neither line above is an exceptionless universal rule; each merely identifies which statutory question the advocate must now answer with reference to the order sheet, the registry record, and any binding precedent governing that precise stage. What Counts as an Investigation, Inquiry or Trial? Definitions That Decide Cases The entire Section 531 analysis depends on correctly classifying the procedural act in question, and BNSS itself supplies the operative definition of "inquiry": Section 2(1)(k) BNSS defines inquiry as "every inquiry, other than a trial, conducted under this Sanhita by a Magistrate or Court." 6 The Supreme Court in Parvinder Singh added the crucial gloss that this definition presupposes a judicial act, as against an administrative one, "requiring application of judicial mind which must be reflected through the recording made by a Court," and is therefore "a positive and conscious act done by a Magistrate or a Court." 5 This distinction between a ministerial registry act and a genuine inquiry is the single most litigated point in transitional practice, and it has direct textual roots in the Supreme Court's earlier Constitution Bench-adjacent reasoning in Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab , which the Court in Parvinder Singh expressly relied upon. In Hardeep Singh, the Court held that the stage of inquiry, insofar as the court is concerned, commences with the filing of the chargesheet and the court's consideration of the material collected by the prosecution for the purpose of trying the accused, and that even the stage of ensuring compliance with what were then Sections 207 to 209 CrPC (supply of documents and committal) cannot be termed an inquiry, "because there is no judicial application of mind" and the Magistrate is merely making the case ready for the Court of Session. 7 Applying that reasoning, Parvinder Singh held squarely that a direction by a Special Court to number a complaint as a miscellaneous case and post it for a future hearing on the question of cognizance is a ministerial act, not an inquiry, and does not attract Section 531(2)(a) BNSS. 5 Cognizance itself — "nothing but an application of judicial mind" — is the operative threshold: "so long as the application of the judicial mind is not exercised, an inquiry cannot commence." 5 It follows that a careful advocate must distinguish at least seven discrete steps that are often blurred together in casual argument: a complaint being physically filed with the registry; the complaint being numbered or given a case number; the Court merely listing the complaint for a future date; the Court examining the contents of the complaint; the Court applying judicial mind to the material; the Court formally taking cognizance; and the Court issuing process to the accused. Only from the point of judicial application of mind onward can an "inquiry" in the Section 2(1)(k) BNSS sense, or its CrPC equivalent, be said to have commenced. A trial, by contrast, is generally understood to commence with the framing of charge and does not include the stages preceding it, per the reasoning in Raj Kishore Prasad v. State of Bihar cited with approval in Hardeep Singh. 7 An "application" for Section 531 purposes is any formal request for judicial relief distinct from the main inquiry or trial — bail applications, applications for recall, applications for committal — and each is separately tested by its own date of institution, as the Bombay High Court confirmed in Chowgule. 2 An "appeal" or "procedural application" filed against a judgment or order is likewise tested independently by its own filing date, not by the date of the original proceeding it challenges. Case Study: Parvinder Singh v. Directorate of Enforcement (2026 INSC 519) Parvinder Singh v. Directorate of Enforcement Neutral Citation 2026 INSC 519 Court Supreme Court of India, Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction Bench M.M. Sundresh, J. Date of Judgment 19 May 2026 Appeal No. Criminal Appeal (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 12055 of 2025) Statute in Issue Section 223 & Section 531(2)(a) BNSS; Sections 43, 44, 46, 65, 71 PMLA Material Chronology 24.07.2023 ECIR registered 27.04.2024 Arrest 24.06.2024 Complaint filed & numbered 01.07.2024 BNSS commences 02.07.2024 Cognizance taken (no hearing given) 24.12.2024–22.03.2025 Recall application dismissed; charges framed 19.05.2026 Supreme Court judgment Legal Issue Whether the first proviso to Section 223(1) BNSS — which prohibits a Magistrate from taking cognizance of an offence without giving the accused an opportunity of being heard — applied to a PMLA prosecution complaint that had been filed on 24 June 2024, before BNSS commencement, but on which cognizance was actually taken on 2 July 2024, after commencement; and, connected to that, whether the earlier act of numbering the complaint and posting it for a cognizance hearing amounted to an "inquiry" pending before commencement so as to attract the CrPC-saving effect of Section 531(2)(a) BNSS. Arguments The appellant's Senior Counsel argued that Sections 200 to 205 CrPC, reiterated in Sections 223 to 228 BNSS, applied without inconsistency to PMLA complaints, relying on the Supreme Court's earlier decisions in Tarsem Lal v. Enforcement Directorate , (2024) 7 SCC 61, Yash Tuteja v. Union of India , (2024) 8 SCC 465, and Kushal Kumar Agarwal v. Directorate of Enforcement , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1221, and further argued that mere numbering of the complaint did not amount to an inquiry under Section 2(1)(k) BNSS, so Section 531(2)(a) had no application. The Additional Solicitor General for the Enforcement Directorate argued that PMLA is a stand-alone enactment to which BNSS's complaint-procedure chapters (Chapters XIV to XVII) do not apply at all, that Section 531(2)(a) was correctly applied by the High Court because an inquiry had already been initiated by the Special Court before commencement, and, relying on Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab , (2014) 3 SCC 92, that the inquiry had commenced upon the filing of the complaint itself. Holding and Ratio The Supreme Court rejected the submission that PMLA displaces the general complaint procedure, holding that Sections 200 to 205 CrPC, now Sections 223 to 228 BNSS, apply to PMLA complaints because no provision of the PMLA is inconsistent with them, following Tarsem Lal, Yash Tuteja, and Kushal Kumar Agarwal. 8 On the transitional question, the Court held that the direction to number the complaint and post it for a future cognizance hearing was a ministerial act, not an inquiry, because there was no application of judicial mind at that stage; cognizance itself is "nothing but an application of judicial mind," and until that application occurs, an inquiry cannot commence. 5 The Court expressly found that the Additional Solicitor General's reliance on Hardeep Singh in fact undermined his own argument, since Hardeep Singh itself holds that even the stage of ensuring compliance with the document-supply and committal provisions does not amount to an inquiry. 5 Because cognizance was actually taken on 2 July 2024 — after BNSS commencement — the first proviso to Section 223(1) BNSS, requiring a pre-cognizance hearing to the accused, governed the proceeding, and the Court held that proviso to be "substantive in nature," conferring a fair-trial right under Article 21, such that non-compliance renders the cognizance order void ab initio, without requiring the accused to separately demonstrate prejudice. 9 Final Directions The Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court of Uttarakhand dated 19 May 2025 and the Special Court's order dated 2 July 2024 taking cognizance without hearing the appellant. The Special Court was directed to afford the appellant a hearing and to proceed afresh from the stage of taking cognizance, completing that exercise within eight weeks of receipt of the judgment. The appeal was allowed. 10 Show Practice Significance and Limits of the Ruling Practice Significance For practitioners, Parvinder Singh supplies two durable working principles. First, in any transitional dispute, the correct question is not "when was the offence committed" or even "when was the complaint filed," but "at what precise moment did a Magistrate or Court actually apply judicial mind to the matter." Second, registry-level acts — numbering, listing, docketing — are never, without more, sufficient to trigger Section 531(2)(a) BNSS; advocates opposing an inquiry-based saving argument should scrutinise the order sheet for the actual language used by the Court at each hearing before commencement. Limits of the Decision This is a PMLA complaint-cognizance case, and its transitional holding is narrowly confined to the specific procedural sequence before it: a complaint filed pre-commencement, on which cognizance was taken post-commencement, in a PMLA Special Court. It should not be read as a general proposition that every criminal proceeding filed before 1 July 2024 is automatically governed by BNSS merely because a later step in it occurred after that date; the Court's own reasoning depends on there being no antecedent judicial inquiry, and cases where a genuine judicial inquiry (as opposed to a ministerial act) did commence before 1 July 2024 would fall the other way under Section 531(2)(a). Nor does the judgment purport to resolve every dispute about the boundary between PMLA's special procedure and BNSS's general procedure outside the specific complaint-cognizance context; the Court expressly confined its holding on the applicability of Sections 223 to 228 BNSS to complaints under Section 44(1)(b) PMLA, following the settled line of authority in Tarsem Lal, Yash Tuteja, and Kushal Kumar Agarwal. CrPC to BNSS Section Map: Investigation Stage The following table sets out verified investigation-stage correspondences between CrPC and BNSS, checked against the enacted text as available up to 19 July 2026. Advocates must still read the full text of each provision before citing it, since numbering correspondence does not guarantee identical wording. Subject CrPC Provision BNSS Provision Wording Change Practical Drafting Consequence Arrest without warrant Section 41 Section 35 Materially changed — Section 35 BNSS consolidates the former Sections 41 and 41A CrPC, adding structured conditions for arrest in offences punishable up to seven years and a mandatory notice-of-appearance mechanism at sub-section (3). Do not cite Section 41 CrPC in a post-commencement remand or arrest challenge without separately pleading Section 35 BNSS; the notice-of-appearance safeguard is now internal to the arrest provision itself. Verify before citing. Notice of appearance Section 41A Section 35(3) Restructured — folded into the arrest provision rather than standing alone. Pleadings citing "41A notice" should now cross-reference Section 35(3) BNSS for proceedings instituted after commencement. FIR / information in cognizable cases Section 154 Section 173 Materially changed — Section 173 BNSS expressly provides for information "given orally or by electronic communication," requires electronic information to be signed within three days, mandates videographed recording of certain statements from disabled complainants, and introduces a structured preliminary-enquiry mechanism at sub-section (3) for offences punishable between three and seven years, exercisable only with prior permission of an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police, to be completed within fourteen days. 11 Do not assume Section 154 CrPC and Section 173 BNSS are interchangeable; the preliminary-enquiry mechanism under Section 173(3) has no direct CrPC equivalent and materially affects when the clock for investigation timelines begins. Verify before citing. Magistrate-directed investigation Section 156(3) Section 175(3) Changed — Section 175(3) BNSS requires the Magistrate to consider submissions made by the concerned police officer before directing an investigation, a procedural safeguard absent from the bare text of Section 156(3) CrPC as judicially developed. Applications under the "new Section 156(3)" should expressly invoke Section 175(3) BNSS and address the requirement to hear the police officer's submissions before a direction is sought. Verify before citing. Search by police officer Section 165 Section 185 Changed — Section 185(2) BNSS introduces a requirement for audio-video recording of the search process, read together with the separate general audio-video mandate in Section 105 BNSS for search and seizure documentation. A search conducted after 1 July 2024 without audio-video recording where required may attract an evidentiary or procedural challenge that had no direct counterpart under Section 165 CrPC. Remand Section 167 Section 187 Changed in structure — Section 187 BNSS retains the fifteen-day outer limit for police custody but restructures how that period may be availed across the permissible 40/60-day or 60/90-day investigation window, and courts have read it alongside Section 105 and 176(3) BNSS obligations. Remand applications after 1 July 2024 must be captioned and argued under Section 187 BNSS; do not import Section 167 CrPC computation assumptions without checking the specific sub-section relied upon. Verify before citing. Police report / chargesheet Section 173 Section 193 Changed — Section 193 BNSS introduces express provisions on victim-informant progress updates and, in certain readings, chain-of-custody documentation for seized property, which had no identical express counterpart in Section 173 CrPC. Do not conflate the numbering coincidence (both "Section 173" in different Codes referring to different subject-matter — FIR in BNSS, chargesheet in CrPC) — this is a frequent source of citation error. Verify before citing. CrPC to BNSS Section Map: Court and Bail Stage Subject CrPC Provision BNSS Provision Wording Change Practical Drafting Consequence Cognizance by Magistrate Section 190 Section 210 Broadly similar in structure, with Section 210(1)(b) BNSS expressly recognising a police report "submitted in any mode including electronic mode." Confirm whether cognizance was taken before or after commencement; this single fact, per Parvinder Singh, is often decisive of which Code's complaint-procedure chapter applies. Examination of complainant Section 200 Section 223 Materially changed — the first proviso to Section 223(1) BNSS mandatorily requires the Magistrate to give the accused an opportunity of being heard before taking cognizance on a complaint, a safeguard the Supreme Court in Parvinder Singh held to be substantive, not merely procedural, with non-compliance rendering cognizance void ab initio. 9 Do not treat Section 200 CrPC and Section 223 BNSS as interchangeable; a cognizance order taken after 1 July 2024 without hearing the accused is vulnerable regardless of when the complaint was filed. Verify before citing. Supply of documents to accused Section 207 Section 230 Changed — Section 230 BNSS expressly recognises electronic supply of documents as valid compliance. Objections to non-supply of documents in post-commencement matters should expressly address whether electronic supply satisfied Section 230 BNSS. Commitment to Sessions Court Section 209 Section 232 Broadly similar in substance and structure. Commitment orders passed after 1 July 2024 should recite Section 232 BNSS; verify local practice directions on format. Examination of accused Section 313 Section 351 Broadly similar in substance; both provisions confirm that statements made are not sworn evidence and cannot alone found conviction. No major drafting risk, but confirm the applicable Code in the memo of examination given the stage-dependent nature of trials straddling commencement. Anticipatory bail Section 438 Section 482 Broadly similar core power; verify local High Court rules on notice to the Public Prosecutor and any conditions attached to the direction. Applications filed after 1 July 2024 must be captioned under Section 482 BNSS even where the FIR is from before commencement; several High Courts have re-captioned CrPC-titled anticipatory bail applications as BNSS applications rather than dismiss them outright. 12 High Court / Sessions Court bail powers Section 439 Section 483 Changed — Section 483 BNSS adds a second proviso requiring notice to the Public Prosecutor within fifteen days for offences under Sections 65 or 70(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, and mandates the presence of the informant or an authorised representative at the bail hearing for such offences. 13 Bail applications after 1 July 2024 for offences within Sections 65/70(2) BNS must ensure the informant-notice and presence requirements are complied with; failure may expose the eventual bail order to challenge. Verify before citing. High Court inherent powers Section 482 Section 528 Broadly similar in substance — both preserve inherent power to give effect to orders, secure the ends of justice, and prevent abuse of process. Quashing petitions filed after 1 July 2024 must be captioned under Section 528 BNSS even where the underlying FIR predates commencement. Drafting warning: Check the applicable Code in the cause title, jurisdiction paragraph, statutory provision, prayer clause and supporting affidavit. An internal mismatch between these five locations in a single pleading — for example, citing Section 438 CrPC in the prayer clause of a petition captioned under BNSS — is one of the most common defects raised at the admission stage. BNSS Is Not CrPC With New Numbers: Genuine Procedural Changes A recurring misconception among practitioners is treating BNSS as a mere renumbering exercise. Several provisions introduce genuinely new procedural content that has no CrPC counterpart at all, and advocates should not describe these using the broader language of government publicity material without checking the narrower statutory text. Zero FIR & e-FIR Preliminary Inquiry Forensic Mandate Undertrial Release Trial in Absentia Statutory Basis: Section 173 BNSS What changed: Section 173(1) BNSS expressly permits information relating to a cognizable offence to be given "orally or by electronic communication," and requires electronically communicated information to be signed within three days of being taken on record. Section 173(1) also provides that information may be given "irrespective of the area where the offence is committed" — the statutory basis commonly described as the Zero FIR framework, allowing registration at any police station regardless of territorial jurisdiction, for subsequent transfer to the appropriate station. 11 Conditions and exceptions: The three-day signature requirement for electronic information creates a documented gap between electronic submission and formal recording that advocates should track precisely in cases turning on the exact date of FIR registration. Practical impact: Complainants unable to travel to the relevant police station may lodge an e-FIR, and any police station may register a Zero FIR before transfer. Common misconception: That "Zero FIR" is a wholly new statutory term found nowhere in earlier practice — in fact, Zero FIR was a practice recognised under CrPC-era guidelines even without express statutory text; what Section 173 BNSS does is give it clearer legislative grounding alongside the electronic-communication mechanism. Statutory Basis: Section 173(3) BNSS What changed: For cognizable offences punishable with imprisonment of three years or more but less than seven years, Section 173(3) BNSS permits — but does not mandate — the officer in charge, with the prior permission of an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police, to conduct a preliminary enquiry to ascertain whether a prima facie case exists, to be completed within fourteen days, "without prejudice to" the Magistrate's separate power under Section 175 BNSS. 11 Conditions and exceptions: This mechanism applies only to the specified punishment band (three to seven years) and only with the specified senior-officer permission; it does not apply to offences below three years or of seven years and above. Practical impact: Registration of the FIR itself can, in this specific band of offences, be preceded by a fourteen-day preliminary enquiry, which did not exist as an express statutory option under Section 154 CrPC. Common misconception: That preliminary enquiry is now mandatory before every FIR — it is a conditional, discretionary mechanism confined to a specific punishment band and requiring a senior officer's prior permission, not a general prerequisite to registration. Statutory Basis: Section 176(3) and Section 105 BNSS What changed: Section 176(3) BNSS mandates that for offences punishable with imprisonment of seven years or more, the officer in charge of a police station shall ensure that a forensic expert visits the crime scene to collect forensic evidence and cause the process to be recorded on a mobile or electronic device, in areas where forensic facilities are notified as available. Section 105 BNSS separately mandates audio-video recording of the search and seizure process, including preparation of the list of seized property. 14 Conditions and exceptions: The forensic-expert mandate is tied to notified availability of forensic facilities in the relevant State, and courts have treated non-compliance as a factor going to the weight of evidence rather than an automatic ground for acquittal, given the phased rollout of forensic infrastructure. Practical impact: Defence counsel in serious offences should specifically call for the forensic visit record and the audio-video recording where the offence carries seven years or more. Common misconception: That absence of forensic-expert visit automatically vitiates the trial — the position remains fact-sensitive and depends on the state of forensic infrastructure and the specific findings of the trial court on prejudice. Statutory Basis: Section 479 BNSS What changed: Section 479(1) BNSS provides that an undertrial who has undergone detention, during investigation, inquiry or trial, for a period extending up to one-half of the maximum period of imprisonment specified for the offence (not being an offence punishable with death or life imprisonment) shall be released by the Court on bail; the first proviso reduces this threshold to one-third for a first-time offender who has never previously been convicted of any offence. Section 479(2) BNSS additionally provides that a person facing investigation, inquiry or trial in more than one offence or multiple cases shall not be released on bail under this provision. 15 Conditions and exceptions: The Court may, after hearing the Public Prosecutor and recording reasons in writing, order continued detention beyond the one-half threshold; no person may in any case be detained beyond the maximum sentence prescribed; and delay attributable to the accused is excluded from the computation. Practical impact: This provision has no identically worded CrPC counterpart (the nearest analogue, Section 436A CrPC, used a flat one-half threshold without the first-time-offender one-third carve-out); advocates for first-time offenders should specifically plead the one-third threshold. Common misconception: That Section 479 BNSS entitles automatic release without a Court order — release still requires a judicial order, and Section 479(2) creates an absolute bar where the person faces multiple pending matters. Statutory Basis: Section 356 BNSS What changed: Section 356 BNSS permits inquiry, trial, or pronouncement of judgment in the absence of a person declared a proclaimed offender who has absconded to evade trial, subject to conditions including representation by an advocate engaged by the accused or, failing that, an advocate provided by the Court. 16 Conditions and exceptions: The accused must first be formally declared a proclaimed offender through the established process; mere absence without such a declaration does not trigger Section 356. Practical impact: Prosecutions against absconding accused, particularly in economic offences, can now proceed to judgment without indefinite adjournment, subject to the safeguard of court-appointed representation. Common misconception: That trial in absentia applies to any absent accused — it is confined to persons formally declared proclaimed offenders and comes with mandatory representation safeguards. Special Statutes Come First: PMLA, NDPS, UAPA and Others Before applying either CrPC or BNSS to a given proceeding, an advocate must check whether a special enactment occupies the field. The correct hierarchy runs from the special statute's own express procedure, to any special procedure it separately prescribes, to the general procedural Code (CrPC or BNSS, depending on the Section 531 analysis) where the special statute is silent, and finally to general procedural principles developed by courts. The Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 illustrates this hierarchy precisely. Section 71 PMLA gives the Act overriding effect over any inconsistent law. 17 Section 65 PMLA applies the general procedural Code "insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act" to arrest, search, seizure, investigation, and other proceedings. 18 Section 46 PMLA deems the Special Court a Court of Session for the purpose of applying the general Code, again "save as otherwise provided in the Act." 19 As Parvinder Singh confirms, this "save as otherwise provided" and "not inconsistent" language means the general complaint-procedure chapter (Sections 200 to 205 CrPC, now Sections 223 to 228 BNSS) fully applies to